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Abstract
Sharing information between users constitutes the cornerstone of the Web 2.0. Online
Social Networks (OSN), with their billions of users, are a core component of this new
generation of the web. In fact, OSNs offer innovative services allowing users to share
their self-generated content (e.g., status, photos etc.) for free. However, this free access is
usually synonymous with a subtle counterpart: the collection and usage of users’ personal
information in targeted advertisement. To achieve this goal, OSN providers are collecting a
tremendous amount of personal, and usually sensitive, information about their users. This
raises concerns as this data can be exploited by several entities to breach user privacy. The
primary research goals of this thesis are directed toward understanding the privacy impact
of OSNs.
Our first contribution consists in demonstrating the privacy threats behind releasing
personal information publicly. Two attacks are constructed to show that a malicious
attacker (i.e., any external attacker with access to the public profile) can breach user privacy
and even threaten his online security.
Our first attack shows how seemingly harmless interests (e.g., music interests) can leak
privacy-sensitive information about users. In particular, we infer their undisclosed (private)
attributes using the public attributes of other users sharing similar interests. Leveraging
semantic knowledge from Wikipedia and a statistical learning method, we demonstrated
through experiments —based on more than 104K Facebook profiles— that our inference
technique efficiently predicts attributes that are very often hidden by users.
Our second attack is at the intersection of computer security and privacy. In fact, we
show the disastrous consequence of privacy breach on security by exploiting user personal
information —gathered from his public profile— to improve the password cracking pro-
cess. First, we propose a Markov chain password cracker and show through extensive
experiments that it outperforms all probabilistic password crackers we compared against.
In a second step, we systematically analyze the idea that additional personal information
about a user helps in speeding up password guessing. We propose a methodology that
exploits this information in the cracking process and demonstrate that the gain can go up
to 30%.
These studies clearly indicate that publicly disclosing personal information harms
privacy, which calls for a method to estimate this loss. Our second contribution tries to
answer this question by providing a quantitative measure of privacy. We propose a practical,
yet formally proved, method to estimate the uniqueness of each profile by studying the
amount of information carried by public profile attributes. To achieve our goal, we leverage
Ads Audience Estimation platform and an unbiased sample of more than 400K Facebook
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public profiles. Our measurement results show that the combination of gender, current city
and age can identify close to 55% of users to within a group of 20 and uniquely identify
around 18% of them.
In the second part of this thesis, we investigate the privacy threats resulting from the
interactions between the OSN platform and external entities. First, we explore the tracking
capabilities of the three major OSNs (i.e., Facebook, Google+ and Twitter) and show that
“share-buttons” enable them to persistently and accurately track users’ web activity. Our
findings indicate that OSN tracking is diffused among almost all website categories which
allows OSNs to reconstruct a significant portion of users’ web profile and browsing history.
Finally, we develop a measurement platform to study the interaction between OSN
applications — of Facebook and RenRen — and fourth parties. We show that several third
party applications are leaking user information to “fourth” party entities such as trackers
and advertisers. This behavior affects both Facebook and RenRen with varying severity.
Résumé
Les réseaux sociaux en ligne (OSNs) collectent une masse de données à caractère
privé. Le recueil de ces données ainsi que leur utilisation relèvent de nouveaux enjeux
économiques et suscite, à juste titre, de nombreuses interrogations notamment celles
relatives à la protection de la vie privée. Nous nous sommes proposés dans cette thèse de
répondre à certaines de ces interrogations.
Dans le premier chapitre nous analysons l’impact du partage des données personnelles
de l’utilisateur sur sa vie privée. Tout d’abord, nous montrons comment les intérêts d’un
utilisateur – à titre d’exemple ses préférences musicales – peuvent être à l’origine de
fuite d’informations sensibles. Pour ce faire, nous inférons les attributs non divulgués du
profil de l’utilisateur en exploitant d’autres profils partageant les mêmes ”goûts musicaux”.
Nos expérimentations réalisées sur plus de 104,000 profils publics collectés sur Facebook
montrent que notre technique d’inférence prédit efficacement les attributs qui sont très
souvent cachés par les utilisateurs.
Dans un deuxième temps, nous exposons les conséquences désastreuses du partage
des données privées sur la sécurité. Nous nous focalisons sur les informations recueillies
à partir de profils publics et montrons comment celles-ci peuvent être exploitées pour
accélérer le craquage des mots de passe. Premièrement, nous proposons un nouveau «
craqueur » de mots de passe basé sur les chaînes de Markov permettant le cassage de
plus de 80% des mots de passe, dépassant ainsi toutes les autres méthodes de l’état de
l’art. Deuxièmement, et afin de mesurer l’impact sur la vie privée, nous proposons une
méthodologie qui intègre les informations personnelles d’un utilisateur afin d’accélérer le
cassage de ses mots de passe.
Nos résultats mettent en évidence la nécessité de créer de nouvelles méthodes d’estimation
des fuites d’informations personnelles. Nous proposons pour cela une méthode formelle
pour estimer l’unicité de chaque profil en quantifiant l’information portée par chaque
attribut public.
Notre travail se base sur la plate-forme publicitaire d’estimation des utilisateurs de
Facebook pour calculer l’entropie de chaque attribut public. Ce calcul permet d’évaluer
l’impact du partage d’informations. Nos résultats, basés sur un échantillon de plus de
400,000 profils publics Facebook, montrent que la combinaison des attributs: sexe, ville de
résidence et âge permet d’identifier d’une manière unique environ 18% des utilisateurs.
Dans la deuxième section de notre thèse nous analysons les interactions entre la plate-
forme du réseau social et des tiers et son impact sur la vie privée des utilisateurs.
Dans une première étude, nous explorons les capacités de « tracking » des réseaux
sociaux Facebook, Google+ et Twitter. Nous étudions les mécanismes qui permettent à ces
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services de suivre d’une façon persistante l’activité web des utilisateurs ainsi que d’évaluer
sa couverture. Nos résultats indiquent que le « tracking » utilisé par les OSNs couvre la
quasi-totalité des catégories Web, indépendamment du contenu et de l’auditoire.
Finalement, nous développons une plate-forme de mesure pour étudier l’interaction
entre les plates-formes OSNs, les applications sociales et les « tierces parties » (e.g.,
fournisseurs de publicité). Nous démontrons que plusieurs applications tierces laissent
filtrer des informations relatives aux utilisateurs à des tiers non autorisés. Ce comportement
affecte à la fois Facebook et RenRen avec une sévérité variable: 22% des applications
Facebook testées transmettent au moins un attribut à une entité externe. Quant à, RenRen,
nous démontrons qu’il souffre d’une faille majeure causée par la fuite du jeton d’accès
dans 69% des cas.
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1.1 What is Privacy?
The traditional definition of “privacy” is the limit which the law sets for others to
penetrate your private sphere. As such, privacy is conceived as a way to constrain the
power of any entity —particularly the government — by explicitly framing the context
in which these entities have the right to snoop into one’s private affairs (e.g., enter one’s
home and/or search one’s papers). Accordingly, a possible definition of privacy is the one
provided by Warren and Brandeis back in 1890 which states that privacy is “the right to be
left alone”. Hence, from a legal perspective, privacy represents the set of legal restrictions
on the power of others to invade your private sphere [1].
This definition might seem awkward as privacy is defined as a function of the private
sphere, which is in turn, hard to define. However, back in the 19th century1, it was easy to
define the private sphere as almost all possession were tangible and therefore, explicitly
subject to law (e.g., the fourth amendment). The process of invading someone’s privacy
1For instance the Fourth Amendment was introduced in Congress in 1789 by James Madison.
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through data gathering is also classified in two classes according to the nature of the
collected data: monitoring for intangible elements and searching for the tangible ones.
Specifically, the monitored part of one public sphere is the part of one’s life that others
can see (or respond to when asked). It is (i) transitory as people will only notice unusual
events; (ii) inaccurate as multiple people are likely to have a different — and sometimes
contradictory — picture of the information; (iii) costly as it is hard to collect and process
such data.
The searchable part, however, is the portion of our life that is “recorded” and hence
easy to query (e.g., diary, hard drive, smartphone). This data is usually not ephemeral,
provides an accurate (though potentially incomplete) restitution of the information and can
be reviewed at any time.
Throughout our history, the cost and inaccuracy of monitoring was sufficient to prevent
people from snooping into one’s private life. Only the searchable part of the data gathering
process —usually tangible — was regulated. However, digital technologies change this
balance radically. They do not only make large scale behavioral monitoring possible, but
also make individuals’ behavior searchable. Nowadays, the same technology is able to
monitor, index, make most parts, if not all, of our daily activities searchable on large scale.
However, as both monitoring and searching activities are today carried out by machines,
their impact on user privacy has to be assessed.
1.1.1 Machines and Privacy
“Machine collection and processing of data, cannot, as such, invade privacy” This is
how Judge Richard Poster defended the Bush administration’s extensive surveillance of
(domestic) communications2 in a Washington Post article. This argument is recurrent and
easily explainable: machines are rational not sentient beings and as such react based on a
set of predefined rules. There is no moral judgment as it is the case with humans but only
a logic behavior. Hence, the “monitoring” machine does not care about your problems at
work or whether you cheated in the last exam, it only cares about what we (they) asked it
for: terrorism in Judge Richard Poster’s scenario.
However, does using machines to process private information resolves privacy prob-
lems? What would happen if we knew that all, or a significant part, of our activities
are monitored? This would certainly challenge our feeling of “being left alone”. A nice
scenario depicting such a situation was provided by Lawrence Lessig [1]: “Imagine a
television that shifted its advertisement as it heard what you are talking about ”. Would we
accept such a system?
While it is hard to provide a universal answer, it is safe to say that most people will at
best feel uncomfortable with such a system. From a psychological point of view, some
events are private and are meant to remain so, feeling “monitored” will change our way of
thinking and behaving, affecting our interactions permanently.
2Regarding NSA warrantless surveillance controversy http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSA_
warrantless_surveillance_(2001%E2%80%9307)
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1.2 Why Should We Care?
The de facto answer to this question is the misuse of the data. An untrustworthy person
can misuse the system, breaching intentionally, the privacy of others. However, this is not
the only way privacy can be violated. In fact, the simple usage of someone’s information
without his informed consent is clearly a violation of his privacy. Defining this informed
consent in the context of new technologies/Internet is challenging as there are countless
numbers of scenarios where such data is collected and used. Hence, drawing a clear
“line” between what can be considered as private information and what is not is a complex
problem. A first step towards understanding digital privacy threats is to identify the goals
behind collecting data.
Surveillance The tip of the data collection iceberg is the one collected legally to either
prove or (hopefully) forestall crimes (e.g., video surveillance, phone calls). This lawful
data interception — carried out by governments and official institutions — is security-
driven. However, the amount of collected data and its usage are controversial. To illustrate
this, let us take surveillance cameras (or CCTV) as an example. For proponents, these
cameras reduce criminality as they easily allow resolve criminal affairs. The “nothing
to hide” slogan is usually used to claim that “honest” citizens have nothing to hide and
hence recording them does not represent a serious problem. Opponents of this approach
argue that the “surveillance state” is collecting a tremendous amount of data about citizens
which represents a threat to their privacy. Moreover, several abuses have been reported
showing that these cameras can be easily misused [2]. Hence, the benefits of deploying
video surveillance must be balanced against the costs and risks.
Malicious Attacks Various companies build their entire business model on selling user
data to others or using it to conduct malicious attacks (e.g., phishing). We believe that such
behavior represents a clear violation privacy: first, the gathered data is usually unknown or
very hard to assess. Second, the selling market is opaque as information about buyer(s) and
prices are not available. Finally, the data outcome (i.e., for which purpose the data is being
used for) is completely unknown. This business model is clearly in complete opposition
with the principle of informed consent.
Marketing and advertisement This data collection is operated by most companies —
either online or offline — to better target their customers (e.g., Walmart shopping card or
user preferences in Amazon.com). Gathered data span a wide range of personal, usually
sensitive, information. One might argue that a user is trading (a bit) of its privacy for
better services: ads tailored to the user needs, discount based on past purchases etc. More
importantly, in the online scenario, ads – and indirectly our personal information — allow
us to use Facebook, Gmail and many other services free of charge. In short, one can claim
that it is a win-win situation.
While the necessity of collecting data to better serve customers is unquestionable, the
techniques that are actually used to achieve this goal represent a real threat to our privacy.
This danger stems from two characteristics of the current systems: (i) the perfection and
coverage of the gathered information and (ii) the (roughly) unlimited life time of data
availability. These two properties breach user privacy as they allow user profiling at large
scale.
1.2. WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
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1.2.1 User Profiling
Behavioral advertisement, profiling and adver-gaming illustrate how user personal
information and social relations have been integrated into the market model. In other
words, user information is commodified: the user identity becomes a commodity to be sold
and bought. Such radical change allows a major shift in commerce: the offer is tailored to
a specific (targeted) customer. However, understanding the how and why of user privacy
threats requires a retrospective analysis of the tracking ecosystem.
First Party Tracking The genesis of tracking arises from the stateless nature of HTTP
protocol: each request is treated as an independent transaction and the server does not
retain any information about the communication nor the status of each request. While
the stateless characteristic of HTTP fitted the first needs of the web — displaying static
content —, it quickly became a barrier to building more complex transactional systems. In
February 19973, cookies were proposed to resolve this shortcoming by allowing the first
party server to store, temporarily, key-value data in the user browser and create sessions.
Interestingly, the two first RFCs that standardized cookies (RFC 2109 and 2965) specified
that the browser should protect the user privacy by forbidding the share of cookies between
servers. However, the newer RFC (RFC 6265) explicitly allows user agents to implement
whichever third-party cookie policy they want.
Third-Party Tracking Third parties started to exploit cookies to track users across multi-
ple websites. The approach is quite simple; whenever a user visits a web page with a third
party content (e.g., ads), a cookie is set (or updated) — without the user consent — allow-
ing the tracker to trace a significant part of the user navigation [3]. This tracking is highly
pervasive and is usually referred to as behavior tracking or user profiling. This knowledge
of the pages visited by a user allows the advertising company to target advertisements to
users presumed preferences. The endless race between advertisers gave birth to a multitude
tracking techniques, while cookies are still the predominant one, multiple others are being
developed and used (e.g., ever-cookie) [4, 5]. Third party tracking and profiling represent
a threat to user privacy as not only a tremendous amount of data is collected but also the
collection is done by a steadily decreasing number of entities [3].
1.3 What about Online Social Networks?
The advent of Online Social Networks (OSNs) radically changes the ecosystem. These
new players, with far more personal data, started to compete in the advertising arena. OSNs
exploit the huge amount of data to conduct user profiling and targeted advertisement. The
fundamental differences are not only the amount of collected data, but also its coverage.
In fact, OSN operators are not only collecting a wide range of personal and sensitive
information such as photos, friends, contacts, locations, likes etc. but also deploying
tracking mechanisms that can silently and persistently trace users’ browsing activities
outside the OSN platform (as we will show in Chapter 6).
From a privacy perspective, the profiling has shifted from abstract (i.e., where the
targeted user is virtual) to physical (i.e., the OSN is able to link the data to a physical
3RFC2109 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2109
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person). Let us analyze the impact of these worrisome threats according to the goals model
previously defined.
(Mass) Surveillance From a government perspective OSNs offer an unprecedented
access to user private data. This access can be legally supported or through spying
activities. The first approach targets a small range of users that are suspected of criminal
activities4 and relies on subpoena. As OSN operators have to comply with the country
legislation, they are obligated to provide user data to government when asked. This data
contains most of the user information (demographic, friends, photos, IP, phone number
etc.).5
However, data collected through lawful interception and subpoena seems to be small
compared to the ones collected through spying. In fact, several countries are engaged in
large scale monitoring of social networks. In the US for example, numerous agencies are
deploying different interception techniques to gather data from OSNs among which: Justice
Department, FBI, NSA and others.6 For instance, PRISM7 — the NSA framework of
systematic and massive data collection of user information — allows the U.S. intelligence
community to gain access from nine Internet companies —among which the three major
OSN providers — to a wide range of data including: meta-data, emails, social profiles etc.
As OSN data are diverse, personal, sensitive and regularly updated, the threats to user
privacy from a non legally supported interception are extremely severe.
Malicious Attacks Malicious attackers can exploit the OSN platform in several ways.
They can infer missing or hidden information about the user through e.g., machine learning
techniques [6, 7] or exploiting friendship information [8]. Sybil nodes can be created then
linked in away to form a social botnet aiming at collecting massive amounts of data [9] or
sending spams [10]. The attacker can also exploit social applications [11, 12] or mobile
social application [12, 13] to collect data. All collected information can be used in other
attacks among which social engineering, spear phishing (i.e., spam mails that use the
user information to create the illusion that the mail is authentic) or targeted attacks (e.g.,
Advanced Persistent Threat APT8).
Marketing and Advertisement This data collection is done either by the OSN itself, or
by third parties. In the first scenario, the amount of provided information as well as its
diversity represent a privacy threat to user’s privacy. Moreover, this data can be extended
through different machine learning techniques. For instance, using user interests, OSN
operators can infer information such as user marital status, origin [6], race, IQ, sexuality,
substance use and political views [14]. OSN operators also deploy tracking mechanisms to
monitor user navigation patterns outside the social network which allows them to create
an accurate user profile [15] . Third party websites can also collect several pieces of
4Note that some OSNs might also provide data in case of civil litigants.
5See http://goo.gl/bFyvwe for subpoena of different OSNs.
6http://goo.gl/1S5uBx
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program)
8http://goo.gl/8dFUjn
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information about the user either through the OAuth protocol9 (i.e., the website allows the
user to connect with his Facebook login) or when such personal information is leaked from
the OSN [16].
1.4 What Can We Do?
In this section we argue that privacy is a multidimensional problem and that any solution
addressing a single dimension is at best a partial solution. We show that privacy decisions
are complex due to several factors and that soft paternalism is a promising approach for
protecting user privacy.
1.4.1 The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy
Lawrence Lessig argues in his book Code 2.0 [1] that there is no single solution to
privacy problems on the Internet. He identifies four dimensions to address privacy threats:
Law, architecture/code (technology), markets and norms. Law represents legal regulations
relative to user privacy. Technology can be used to either create a privacy by design
products or to develop privacy enhancing tools. Market can create an incentive for and
benefit from privacy. Finally, companies can create norms to enhance user privacy (e.g.,
norms for sharing data). Lessig shows that any privacy solution should be a mix of at least
two modalities and that addressing a single dimension would be at best a partial fix. In
the following, we show how the legal or the technological dimension may fail to protect
privacy if used separately.
1.4.1.1 Privacy By Law
The most visible privacy artifact on the Internet is privacy policy. One simple Google
search for the term “privacy policy” returns more than 8 billion hits. The goal of this
legal text is to explain which data is being stored and/or processed and to whom it can
be transferred. These regulations differ from one country to another and present a wide
spectrum of severity regarding what can be collected. If the data collector resides in Europe
then it is subject to the “Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans border Flows of Personal Data”.
The main goal of these guidelines is to provide a standard definition of privacy to ease
the transfer of data with collaborating countries. The EU Data Protection Directive (a.k.a,
95/46/EC) is the implementation of these guidelines in the European community. Each EU
member is then responsible for translating this directive into a national law.
These policies are the product of a traditional government approach to regulation that
hardly bear the specificity of Internet. The government was pushed to solve the problem of
Internet privacy. Its solution was to require the user to read and accept the service privacy
policy. Let us analyze the possible reasons of the failure of such a legal approach to protect
user data.
A first question is whether users read the privacy policy? According to the Internet
Society’s Global Internet User Survey [17], only 16% of internet users read privacy policies.
Of those who do, only 20% actually understand them. Multiple reasons explain why users
9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth
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skim through or entirely skip these texts: First, they are on average 2,500 words long
requiring more than 10 minutes for reading [18]. Second, the technical writing (legal
lexicon) makes them hard to understand. Finally, they are binary: the user has to (fully)
accept them in order to use the system.
A second question is whether privacy laws are enforced? In 2010, Burghardt et al. [19]
showed that many data collectors within the EU jurisdiction were in conflict with the EU
Data Protection Directive. One hundred service provider privacy policies were inspected to
check the obligation to inform the user about data acquisition and handling, data forwarding
and automated processing. Results showed that only a single operator specifies to whom
the data is transferred, the remaining 99 are in a clear conflict with the law that states that
“the privacy policy should explain which data is transferred to whom”. Finally, only 35%
of them proposed a mechanism of data deletion.
In summary, trying to enforce privacy according to a single dimension (i.e., law) is
ineffective. This is mainly the result of a traditional approach to regulation that did not take
into consideration the technological side. Such approach would have been more effective
if the privacy policy was machine-readable (e.g., P3P10).
1.4.1.2 Privacy By Technology
There are numerous examples of Privacy Preserving Technologies tools, however, very
few of them are widely adopted. We argue that the main limit to their adoption is that
they do not fit the market demands. To illustrate this, let us take the example of privacy
preserving social network (e.g., Safebook [20], PeerSon [21]). In order to protect users’
privacy from the service provider itself, these systems adopt a decentralized architecture
by relying on the cooperation among users. Moreover, friendship relations are built on top
of “real” interactions in order to cope with the problem of building trust among virtual
friends. While such systems have been proven to provide strong privacy guarantees, they
are far from being able to compete with the top (centralized) players.
This lack of adoption is mainly due to the nature of the market. Big players offer
unlimited storing space, very easy and user-friendly interface, billions of connected friends
and nearly 100% availability time. The cost of moving to a secure service, is in most cases,
unbearable as it entails a highly limited storing and uptime, a very limited set of friends
and usually little or no support.
In summary, trying to enforce privacy solely through a technical approach is hardly
achievable. The proposed solution should not only be privacy friendly but should also suit
users’ demand.
1.4.2 Hurdles in Privacy Decision
Regardless of how privacy-friendly is the software we are using or how restrictive data
privacy laws are, our privacy depends on our own behavior. Hence, our ability to make
the right, thoughtful privacy decision is vital, yet it remains a complex problem. The right
privacy decision balances between our willingness to share information with others and the
protection of our private sphere. In short, it should maximize our welfare while minimizing
our future regrets [22]. The hurdles in making such decisions stem from a combination of
10http://www.w3.org/P3P/
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factors [23]: competing or opposing interests — the costs and benefits of sharing or hiding
information —, inconsistent privacy preferences (e.g., privacy perception changes with
age) and most importantly the incomplete and asymmetric information about the risks and
consequences of sharing data.
In the last few years, several research projects have proposed solutions to overcome
such hurdles, allowing users to easily manage their privacy preferences. Such researches
tackled the problem of salient information [24–27], control [28, 29] and expressiveness
[30, 31].
However, while empowering users may be a desirable goal, neither salient information,
nor control, nor expressiveness, if used separately, can achieve the desired privacy goal.
Salient information is usually hard to present and can be ignored [32]. Control, when
available, can be hard to tune: A coarse grained settings usually offers little degree of
freedom and might cause lack of access control. On the other hand, a fine grained system
might require several layers of menus/tabs which leads to poor privacy decision[33, 34].
Finally, giving the user the ability to expressively determine their previous privacy setting
does not guarantee that their future decisions will not be regretted [23].
1.4.3 Soft Paternalism
Paternalistic policies (i.e., legal approach) adopting a one size fits all approach cannot
handle the complexity of privacy. Rather than mandating a rule and obliging others
to follow it, a more subtle and effective approach have been proposed by behavioral
economists to achieve the same goal: Soft Paternalism[35, 36].11 As suggested by its name,
this approach combines two notions: (i) the soft expresses that the goal is to convince or
nudge the user to make the right decision (as opposed to oblige) (ii) the paternalism resides
in the definition of what is the right decision. This idea might seem to be an oxymoron as it
calls to influence the user behavior while at the same time protecting its freedom of choice.
However, “the goal is (only) to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions”[36]
without dictating a specific approach.
To achieve this goal, behavior economists exploit the user biased perception of privacy
and turn it in a way that does not impede user freedom of choice but offer him the option
of more informed choices. This concept of soft paternalism or nudging the user towards
the right privacy behavior is very appealing for policy makers and technologists. We argue
that this approach allows to enhance the privacy as it addresses several dimensions:
• Technology: Making the right decision requires an adequate software that can be
parametrized accordingly. Nudging creates the need of privacy solutions and makes
them more visible to the end-user (e.g., AdBlock is the most used extension in
Firefox12)
• Markets: Soft Paternalism can create incentive for privacy-friendly solutions. In
fact, the shift in user behavior is likely to trigger competition between companies to
support and/or protect privacy (e.g., Google+ privacy circles was highly publicized
which pushed Facebook to implement a similar feature).
11Also referred to as Libertarian Paternalism, Asymmetric Paternalism or Nudging
12https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/adblock-plus/
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• Norms: Both users and media pressure would create a need of privacy normalization.
This concept goes beyond a simple parametrization of the system, it aims to shift the
user behavior by exposing privacy threats and suggesting solutions. Exposing privacy
violations allows the user to make informed consent by rebalancing the asymmetric data
model. Consider for example, OSN users who post their music interests. This information
is not sensitive per se, but could lead to privacy breach through the inference of other
sensitive information — as we show in Chapter 3. A paternalistic (legal) approach would
ban the publication of such interests, which is too restrictive as user might have legitimate
reasons to share music interests (e.g., to share play-list with friends). A usability/tech-
nological approach would design a system where hiding such information is easy. A
soft paternalism approach, would expose the risk behind sharing that seemingly harmless
information publicly and provide some solution to mitigate this threat.
The work in this thesis adopts this approach by exposing several worrisome issues
regarding privacy in OSNs. Our goal is to raise awareness and trigger this soft change
towards a more privacy respectful behavior. The rationale behind our approach is to show
that current systems are not privacy-friendly as different entities can leverage seemingly
harmless information to breach user privacy. By drawing users, media and decision makers
attention to these threats, we hope to change the status quo bias (i.e., the common human
resistance to change one’s behavior).
1.5 Contributions
Every day, Facebook collects and processes 2.5 billion pieces of content — representing
more than 500 terabytes of data — including 2 billion Like actions and more than 300
million photos.13 However, this data is only the tip of the iceberg as Facebook and similar
OSN providers are not only collecting and mining this information but also exploiting other
techniques to further increase user monitoring and tracking. In this thesis, we uncover
several mechanisms that can be exploited by OSN operators, malicious attackers (or third
parties) or governments to acquire more information about users in the context of OSNs.
We expose several scenarios of either deployed or possible attacks to invade user privacy
and describe plausible solutions.
This thesis consists of two parts. The first deals with data publication within an OSN
and how it can be exploited to breach user privacy. More specifically, we show that
attributes that are publicly revealed by users can be used to (i) infer other missing or hidden
information and (ii) to enhance password cracking.
• Inferring Hidden or Private Information about Users [6]. We show how seem-
ingly harmless interests (e.g., music interests) can leak privacy-sensitive information
about users. In particular, we infer their undisclosed (private) attributes using the
public attributes of other users sharing similar interests. In order to compare user-
defined interest names, we extract their semantics using an ontologized version of
Wikipedia and measure their similarity by applying a statistical learning method.
Besides self-declared interests in music, our technique does not rely on any further
13https://www.facebook.com/data
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information about users such as friend relationships or group belongings. Our exper-
iments, based on more than 104K public profiles collected from Facebook and more
than 2000 private profiles provided by volunteers, show that our inference technique
efficiently predicts attributes that are very often hidden by users. This study calls for
a stricter information sharing decision.
• Exploiting Public Information to enhance password cracking [37]. In a second
step, we show the disastrous consequence of privacy breach on security. Specifically,
we demonstrate how user information — gathered from an OSN public profile — can
be exploited to enhance the password cracking process. From a security perspective,
we propose a novel password cracker based on Markov models, which extends
ideas used by Narayanan and Shmatikov [38]. Through extensive experiments,
we show that it can guess more than 80% of passwords (at 10 billion guesses),
more than all probabilistic password crackers we compared against. From a privacy
perspective, we systematically analyze the idea that additional personal information
about a user helps in speeding up password guessing. We show that the gain can
go up to 30% for passwords that are actually based on personal attributes. This
work highlights the important risk that might arise from weak, ill informed privacy
decision regarding published data. A seemingly benign information can be correlated
with user password which ultimately can be exploited to hack into the user account.
Our results highlight the need of new methods in password strength estimation which
take into consideration user information.
Throughout these studies, it becomes clear that publicly disclosed attributes harm
privacy. However, measuring the “loss” resulting from the revelation of some attributes
remains an open challenge. Our third contribution tries to answer this fundamental
question.
• A Quantitative Privacy Measure [39]. We provide a practical, yet formally proved,
method to estimate the uniqueness of each profile by studying the amount of infor-
mation carried by public profile attributes. Our first contribution is to leverage the
“Ads Audience Estimation” platform of a major OSN (Facebook) to compute the
uniqueness of public profiles, independently from the used profile dataset. Then, we
measure the quantity of information carried by the revealed attributes and evaluate
the potential privacy risk of releasing them publicly. Our measurement results, based
on an unbiased sample of more than 400K Facebook public profiles, show that the
combination of gender, current city and age can identify close to 55% of users to
within a group of 20 and uniquely identify around 18% of them. Our approach can
enhance privacy in at least two scenarios: First, it provides a quantitative privacy
measure: by hiding or revealing attributes a user can measure the amount of informa-
tion he is disclosing. Second, data providers can quantify the risk of re-identification
(i.e., identifying a user in a dataset) when disclosing a set of attributes.
The second part of this thesis analyses privacy threats outside the OSN. Specifically,
we analyzed how the interaction between the OSN platform and third parties can harm
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privacy. The two possible scenarios are analyzed: (i) sensitive information that OSNs
gather from third parties (i.e., other websites) and (ii) information that third party can
gather from OSNs.
• Information leakage from first party to OSNs [15]. In this study, we shed light
on web user tracking capabilities of the three major global OSNs (i.e., Facebook,
Google+ and Twitter). We study mechanisms which enable these services to per-
sistently and accurately follow users’ web activity, and evaluate to what extent this
phenomenon is spread across the web. Through a study of the top 10K websites, our
findings indicate that OSN tracking is diffused among almost all website categories,
independently from the content and from the audience. We also evaluate the tracking
capabilities in practice and demonstrate by analyzing real traffic traces that OSNs
can reconstruct a significant portion of users’ web profile and browsing history. We
finally provide insights into the relation between the browsing history characteristics
and the OSN tracking potential, highlighting the high risk properties.
• Information leakage from OSN to third parties [11]. We examine third-party
OSN applications for two major OSNs: Facebook and RenRen. These third-party
applications typically gather, from the OSN, user personal information. We develop a
measurement platform to study the interaction between OSN applications and fourth
parties. We show that several third party applications are leaking user information to
“fourth” party entities such as trackers and advertisers. This behavior affects both
Facebook and RenRen with varying severity. 22% of tested Facebook applications
are transmitting at least one attribute to an external entity with the user ID being the
most prominent (18%). On the other hand, RenRen suffers from a major privacy
breach caused by the leakage of the access token in 69% of the tested apps. These
tokens can be used by trackers and advertisers to impersonate the app and query
RenRen on behalf of the user.
1.6 Thesis Organization
This dissertation is structured as follows. In the next chapter, we overview privacy
in the context of OSN. First, we identify and classify privacy threats, then we describe
proposed solutions and expose their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, we compare our
work to previous researches and highlight our main contributions.
In Chapter 3, we propose a novel inference technique that leverages publicly disclosed
music interests to infer hidden or missing information about the user. Our approach relies
on semantic analysis and machine learning techniques to extract discriminative features
for user classification.
Chapter 4 is at the intersection of privacy and security. The first part treats the security
challenge of password cracking. Specifically, we propose a new Markov chain password
cracker and show through extensive experiments that it outperforms all state of the art pass-
word crackers. The second part treats the privacy challenge of integrating user information
in the cracking process. We describe a novel approach that exploits user information (e.g.,
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name, birthday) in password guessing and show that for some passwords, this additional
data can boost the cracking success by up to 30%.
Chapter 5 answers the fundamental question — raised by both previous chapters — of
How private is a public profile?. We provide a methodology to quantify the uniqueness
of a public profile. In the first part, we describe a formal approach to measure the
Information Surprisal (IS) carried by each attribute in two scenarios: in the first case,
we assume independence between attributes (i.e., the decision to show/hide an attribute
i is independent from the same decision for the attribute j) whereas in the second, we
allow these attributes to be correlated. We describe our algorithm and show how OSN
Advertising Platform can be exploited to achieve this goal.
The reminder of this dissertation examines the privacy implications resulting from the
interaction between OSN and third parties. Chapter 6 analyses the tracking capabilities
of OSN providers through the so called “share buttons”. First, we propose a detailed
description of how this tracking is implemented and which users are vulnerable. Then, we
evaluate the distribution of these buttons on Alexa’s14 top 10K most visited websites and
show that these buttons target a wide range of website categories. Third, we investigate
the amount of information that OSNs collect and to which extent they can reconstruct
user profiles. Our results, based on real traffic dataset, show that this mechanism is highly
efficient and can reconstruct up to 70% of some profiles. Finally, we propose several
solutions to reduce the tracking.
Chapter 7 investigates the data leakage from third party OSN applications to external
entities. We start by describing the OSN’s complex application ecosystem, then describe
our measurement platform as well as the data we collected form both Facebook and
RenRen. Third, we provide general statistics about applications. The following section
presents the information leakage and uncover its mechanisms. Lastly, we provide several
solutions and describe their strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, we conclude this dissertation by summarizing our main observations and
findings and discuss remaining open questions.
14http://www.alexa.com/topsites
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As the amount of personal information shared on OSNs is rapidly increasing, so do the
privacy concerns. In fact, over the past few years, OSNs experienced an exponential growth
which made public a tremendous amount of personal (and sensitive) data. This easily
accessible information has brought a plethora of attacks affecting both user privacy and
anonymity. This chapter surveys the current state of privacy issues as well as the available
defenses. We provide a novel classification of privacy threats with two main categories:
structural inference and information leakage. We acknowledge that this is a brief survey
and as such does not fully cover the ever-growing area of privacy in OSNs. Our main goal
is to categorize each privacy threat and provide some “representative” countermeasures.
Interested reader might refer to [40–45] for more details.
2.1 Privacy threat classification
OSNs’ users suffer from a wide range of privacy threats ranging from identity disclosure
to information leakage. These attacks are diverse as they assume different attacker models,
have distinctive goals and lead to various privacy impacts. At a high level, such attacks can
either rely on the graph structure or solely target user information (see Fig. 2.1). Graph
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FIGURE 2.1: Categorization of OSN privacy threats
structure attacks aim to infer some graph information such as node attributes (e.g., user
age), the existence of a link (e.g., whether two users are friends) or the node identity. We
note that these attacks are probabilistic as the adversary output is noisy and hence error-
prone. Information leakage on the other hand, represents a family of attacks where user
information are disclosed either to the OSN (e.g., information about the user navigation
pattern is sent to the OSN from an external website) or from the OSN to third parties (e.g.,
user location is leaked by the OSN). In the following we provide a detailed description of
each attack, survey related works and sketch possible solutions.
2.2 Identity disclosure
Identity disclosure refers to the ability of an attacker to map an unknown (possibly
“virtual”) identity v to a real-world entity p.1 First, let us define formally the notion of
mapping in the context of OSNs:
Definition 2.1 (Mapping Query[41]). In a set of online profiles V in a social network G, a
mapping query Q finds the profile v that maps to a particular individual p. It returns v if it
exists and /0 otherwise.
A first definition of identity disclosure can be expressed as the ability of an attacker to
answer a mapping query with a full certainty. However, such definition assumes a strong
adversary with a background knowledge that uniquely matches p to the corresponding
profile in V . In realistic scenarios, such attack is usually hard to achieve. A relaxed
definition would introduce uncertainty in the mapping process by modeling the mapping
as a distribution over the set of all profiles. More formally, let vi be a random variable over
the set of profiles V and Prp(vi) the probability that the profile i maps to a real entity p. In
addition, we introduce a dummy profile vdummy which serves the purpose of absorbing the
probability of individual p not having a profile in the network. We assume that p has a
unique profile in V ∪{vdummy} denoted v∗. Hence, the attacker confidence of mapping vi to
p is therefore Prp(vi). How Prp is constructed depends usually on the attacker capabilities
(see Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). We can now define identity disclosure similarly to [41] as:
1Real identity represents any Personally Identifiable Information (PII) that can be mapped to a single
“physical” identity.
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Definition 2.2 (Identity disclosure with a confidence t). In a set of online profiles V in
a social network G, identity disclosure with a confidence t occurs when Prp(v∗)≥ t and
v∗ $= vdummy
Identity disclosure represents the “highest” breach to user privacy according to our
classification as it allows to identify users. Suppose that an OSN provider releases publicly
the friendship graph. To protect the privacy of its users, the provider removes all names
and demographic information associated with individual except the gender. This operation
is usually referred to as sanitization. At first glance, this release seems to be privacy
preserving as no personal information can be drown from the released data. However,
using the attack described in [46], an adversary can infer the real identity of some nodes in
the graph. Moreover, he can exploit the gender data to infer further sensitive information
such as the user sexual orientation [47]. Hence, suppressing personal information (i.e.,
personally identifiable information or PII) is no enough to protect user identity from being
disclosed. To this end, more elaborated algorithms aiming at protecting user identity
through “anonymization” have been proposed. These protections aim at increasing the
attacker uncertainty (i.e., decrease the value of the confidence t in Definition 2.2).
2.2.1 Identity disclosure with no external information
In this scenario, the attacker solely uses the social graph G without relying on any
external information. The rationale behind such attack is that the graph structure can
be “finger-printed” which allows the attacker to de-anonymize a targeted user even if the
profile attributes have been suppressed.
Such attack can be passive or active. The former assumes no prior changes (e.g.,
creating new accounts) to G before it get published while the latter allows the adversary
to manipulate G before the anonymization. Both attacks are proposed by Backstrom et
al. [48] and are based on random graph theory. In the active attack scenario, an adversary
creates k accounts and links them randomly. The set of targeted account m are then linked
in a particular pattern to the set of k accounts to create unique and identifiable subgraphs.
After data release, the attacker can efficiently recover the set of k fake nodes and identify
the set of m targeted nodes by solving a set of restricted isomorphism problems exploiting
the previously created subgraphs. The passive attack works similarly by assuming a k
colluding nodes which are linked to the m targeted nodes. This linking is also done in
particular way that generates “identifiable” subgraphs. At data release, the adversary can
identify these subgraphs which allows him to de-anonymize the targeted nodes.
2.2.1.1 Discussion
Active attack demonstrated by Backstrom et al. [48] assumes that the adversary is able
to modify the graph prior to its release by creating an order of O(n logn) Sybil nodes.
Carrying out such attack on a large scale is difficult to achieve in practice for multiple
reasons. First, most social networks deploy a node admission control mechanism (e.g.,
requiring the user to link his account with a phone number) which drastically reduces
the ability of the attacker to create a large number of accounts. Second, this attack is
restricted to online graphs where the adversary is able to create more than one identity:
other datasets such as cellphone graphs or location-based social discovery services are
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immune as creating Sybil nodes is prohibitively expensive if not impossible. Third, as most
legitimate users have no reasons to link back to a Sybil node, an entity with no incoming
edges but many outgoing edges will stand out and thus can be easily detected by Sybil
defense mechanism such as [49, 50]. Finally, Narayanan et al. [46] show that the cut-based
attack of [48] which creates a 7-nodes subgraphs containing a Hamiltonian path can easily
be detected as only Sybil nodes have this property. Large scale active attacks are unlikely
to be feasible as already deployed protection mechanisms significantly reduce the attack
effectiveness.
Passive attack is realistic, however, it only breaches the privacy of users that are already
connected to either the attacker or the attacker “colluding” friends. Hence, it cannot scale
as only users who are “already” friends with malicious nodes can be targeted.
2.2.1.2 Protection mechanism
Two main strategies have been proposed so far to achieve graph anonymization: 2
k-anonymity and generalization (or clustering). These techniques present the following
structure: First, they consider a particular adversary by modeling its background knowledge
which affects both the privacy guarantee and the effectiveness of the attack. Second, each
model is based on a predefined privacy notion (e.g., k-anonymity). Finally, each technique
is evaluated based on the utility/privacy trade off that it provides.
k-anonymity: The broader definition of k-anonymity[51] can be expressed as the inabil-
ity of the attacker to distinguish the record of a user from a k−1 other records. In other
words, the attacker confidence that a profile v maps to an entity p is no more than 1
k
.
Generalization: The main idea is to group similar users in a single entity called super-
node. The output of this anonimyzation algorithm is a simplified graph where each group
of user is substituted by its super-node. Note that oppositely to k-anonymity, this model
does not provide any guarantee on the group size (i.e., the value of k).
We provide here a quick overview of the main graph anonymization techniques. Inter-
ested reader may refer to [40, 41, 52] for more details.
Each node has structural properties (i.e., sub-graph signature) that are the same as the
ones of a small set of other nodes in the graph, called a candidate set for this node[53]. As
this signature is very likely to be unique, it can be used to de-anonymize the node. One
example of such structures is the immediate one-hop neighbors (i.e., the node degree).
Numerous research papers adopt a modified version of k-anonymity specially tailored to
the graph structure. Based on the first hop degree, the notion of k-degree anonymity [52]
have been proposed to protect against an attacker with the knowledge of the node degree
of the users. This algorithm states that each node should have the same degree as at least
k−1 other nodes in the anonymized network. Formally, let G(V,E) be a graph and dg the
degree sequence of G. That is, dg is a vector of size n = |V | such that dg(i) is the degree
of the i-th node in G. First, let us define k-anonymity for a vector:
2Assuming that the adversary background knowledge can be modeled. A third model with no assumption
about adversarial knowledge will be presented in Section 2.2.2.
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Definition 2.3. A vector of integers v is k-anonymous, if every distinct value in v appears
at least k times.
For example, vector v = [8,8,8,5,5,2,2,2,2] is 2-anonymous. We can now define first
hop degree k-anonymity for a graph such as:
Definition 2.4. A graph G(V,E) is k-degree anonymous if the degree sequence of G, dg ,
is k-anonymous.
To achieve this, authors propose two approaches [52]: a first dynamic-programming
algorithm (DP) that solves the problem optimally but has a complexity of O(n2), the
second algorithm is greedy with a linear complexity of O(nk).
Zhou and Pei [54] extend the attacker knowledge by assuming that he also knows the
link between the one hop neighbors of the targeted node u and refer to it as NeighborG(u).
To protect the data from such attacker, the anonymized graph should satisfy the stricter
notion of k-neighborhood anonymity which states that each node in the graph should have
its NeighborG graph isomorphic to the NeighborG graph of at least k−1 other nodes.
Generalizing the k-anonimity to 2-hops neighborhood leads to the most general privacy
preservation definitions: k-candidate anonymity [53] and k-automorphism [55]. The latter
assumes a very strong adversary with the knowledge of any subgraph signature of a
target individual. In 2011, Zhou and Pei [56] proposed an algorithm that goes beyond
k-anonymity and achieves the stricter privacy notion of l-diversity. By both adding and
removing edges, the anonymized graph achieves both k-anonymity and l-diversity.
Other utility metrics and graph structures have also been considered. Ying and Wu [57]
propose two approaches to achieve graph anonymization while minimizing the disruption
of the spectral graph properties. Cormode et al. [58] introduce a new technique called
k, l-grouping to anonymize bipartie graphs.
Bhagat et al. [59] present a generalization technique to anonymize OSN data by
grouping the entities into classes, substituting each class by a “super-node” and finally
masking the mapping between entities. The released graph is composed of the super-nodes
and the link between them.
2.2.2 Identity disclosure leveraging external information
Another family of attacks relies on external information to help the adversary de-
anonymize the targeted social network. Wondracek et al. [60] exploit group membership
to create a “membership fingerprint” and de-anonymize the user. It is a two steps attack:
First the attacker crawls all groups of the targeted OSN and creates a membership directory
(MD). Note that the identity of each user in this directory is known. The de-anonymizing
step consists in stealing the victim v history — when visiting the attacker website for
example — and extracting the social groups that she belongs to (referred to as grpv). Note
that only v history is known but not its identity. The attacker can now use the MD to map v
to its identity by checking which user in MD has (approximately) the same set of links grpv.
The attack success depends on the entropy of the “membership fingerprint” which have
been experimentally shown to have enough entropy to identify a significant proportion of
users. In particular, authors show that for 42.06% of Xing3 OSN users participating in at
3XING is a social network for professionals.
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least one group (more than 753K users) this fingerprint is unique which implies that the
user can be uniquely identified.
Narayanan and Shmatikov [46] were the first to propose a re-identification algorithm
targeting anonymized social network graphs. The algorithm relies solely on the network
structure (i.e., node degree), and demonstrates the feasibility of large-scale, passive de-
anonymization of real-world social graphs. The authors show that a third of the users who
had accounts in both Flickr and Twitter could be re-identified in the anonymous Twitter
graph with only 12% error. The same algorithm — with only minor modifications– have
been successfully applied to de-anonymize a partial crawl of Flickr during the Kaggle
Social Network Challenge [61].
2.2.2.1 Discussion
Narayanan’s[46] attack is the most severe since it can be carried out on a large scale and
with a high accuracy. It raises worrisome privacy threats as it does not assume any access
to the graph before its release nor any Sybil nodes. It shows that by solely relying on the
graph topology and assuming that the target graph is properly anonymized (i.e., removing
all user information), an attacker is still able to re-identify a large fraction of users by using
an external source of information. This technique answers a fundamental question about
graph isomorphism by showing that for real graphs an algorithm can easily and efficiently
finds an approximate mapping between two instances (i.e., answering whether two graphs
are isomorphic). In fact, graph isomorphism is believed to be a hard problem especially
that the best know algorithm for resolving it (in a general scenario) is from Babai and
Lucks [62] with a complexity of expO(
√
n logn). However, Narayanan’s[46] work shows
that mapping two real graphs (e.g., social graphs) is easier and can be done efficiently.
The take home messages from Narayanan’s algorithm are not only technical, as they
proof, once again, a fundamental aspect of privacy: privacy guarantees are dynamics. For
years, graph isomorphism was thought to be intractable — which is the case for general
graphs — however, Narayanan’s algorithm proved that for social graphs, this observation
does not hold allowing large-scale de-anonymization.
2.2.2.2 Protection mechanism
Narayanan’s[46] attack relies on external information. In such scenario, k-anonymity
falls short as it is impossible to model arbitrary external information that an attacker might
use to de-anonymize the graph. The quest for a formal model preventing such attack with
a quantified privacy bound gave birth to Differential Privacy. This model proposed by
Dwork [63] frames the privacy in terms of indistinguishability: the result of a differentially
private algorithm A for a dataset Si containing a user i is statistically very close to (and
hence “indistinguishable” from) the output of the same algorithm A for a dataset Sī where
the user i is not part of the dataset. Formally:
Definition 2.5 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm A is ε-differentially private
if for all datasets D1 and D2 that differ on a single element (i.e., data of single user), and
all S ⊆ Range(A ),
Pr[A (D1) ∈ S]≤ eε ×Pr[A (D2) ∈ S]
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where the probability is taken over the coins of the algorithm and Range(A ) denotes the
output range of the algorithm A
This approach shifts the privacy problem from modeling and/or comparing prior and
posterior beliefs about individuals before and after data publication to bounding the risk of
joining the database. Note that differential privacy is a condition on the release mechanism
(i.e., the sanitization algorithm A ) and not on the dataset. This privacy definition provides
not only guarantees that are independent of the background information but also does not
bound the adversary computational power.
However, achieving differential privacy is challenging in the context of OSNs. This
difficulty stems from the fact that graph structure, when converted to the traditional
tabular dataset representation (i.e., each edge has a “source” and “destination” attribute),
requires an excessive amount of noise to fulfill the privacy requirements [64]. Hence, naive
approaches adopting anonymizing algorithms from statistical databases are impractical
as the generated graph has no utility. Therefore, specific approaches have been recently
proposed to achieve differential privacy for some of the graph properties such as the degree
distribution [65], the joint degree distribution (and assortativity) [66], triangle counting [67]
and some generalization of triangles [68] or any combination of these [69]. Based on these
statistics, the algorithm outputs a synthetic graph respecting these properties.
2.3 Link disclosure
Link disclosure occurs when an attacker is able to guess whether two entities in the
OSN are connected. Links can be categorized in two classes: social and affiliate. The
former defines a link between two individuals (e.g., friendship) while the latter expresses
the affiliation of an individual to a group (e.g., the user is a member of a band). However, in
most cases, link prediction algorithms do not make any assumption about the link category.
Link prediction task is often considered as a binary classification problem: for any two
— potentially linked – entities oi and o j, predict whether li, j is 1 or 0. This task is not
trivial as most linked data set are highly sparse. As pointed out in many studies [70–72],
one of the main difficulties of building statistical models for such a classifier is that the
prior probability (i.e., the probability that two entities are linked) is usually quite small.
This causes several difficulties, in particular, quantifying the level of confidence in the
prediction.
One possible approach to link prediction is to solely rely on the graph structure e.g.,
graph proximity measures [42] or to exploit the attribute information e.g., the structured
logistic regression proposed by Popscul et al. [73]. Prediction can also be made collec-
tively by defining a probabilistic model over the set of links, attributes and edges (e.g.,
Markov Random Fields (MRF)). In its simplest scenario, the set of entities O with their
corresponding attributes X and links E can be modeled by a MRF describing the joint
distribution over the set of edges P(E), or a distribution conditioned on the node’ attributes
P(E|X). Direct graph models can also be applied such as the algorithm described by
Getoor et al. [74] for handling link uncertainty in probabilistic relational models. Finally,
Yin et al. [75] propose a random walk based algorithm that integrates network structure
and node attributes to perform both link prediction and attribute inference.
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2.3.0.3 Discussion
Link inference attacks are usually seen as a stepping stone towards identity de-
anonymization and, as such, are rarely the final goal of a privacy breach. For instance,
Wondracek et al. [60] show that by identifying the groups a victim belongs to, an attacker
can identify its victim (See Section 2.2.2 for the attack description). Moreover, we note
that for scenarios like the one presented by Zheleva and Getoor [8] where an attacker
exploits the social links to infer user private attributes or the navigation attack [76] where
an adversary navigates through the OSN to uncover a hidden profile are ineffective when
social links are partially hidden, link prediction can then be used to overcome such issues.
2.3.0.4 Protection mechanism
From a user perspective, the first protection is to minimize the amount of information
he shares. While this measure does not completely solve the problem, it is a necessary step
towards the solution. Friends should also behave similarly as most OSNs do not provide
any mechanism to prevent “friends” from sharing their social links with others, breaching
their friends privacy. Friendship relations can also be exposed by the social network itself
through a variety of other means (e.g., mail searching capabilities, friends suggestion etc.).
In the data release scenario, Zheleva et al. [77] propose both randomization and
aggregation algorithm to protect users social links. The former randomly removes some
existent links while the latter groups multiple links into a single class. Note that all
approaches presented in section 2.2.1.2 (i.e., k-anonymity and generalization) and 2.2.2.2
(i.e., differential privacy) can also be used to mitigate link disclosure attacks.
2.4 Attribute disclosure
While users tend to share a tremendous amount of information about themselves, a
significant amount of this information is supposed to be private or shared with a small
circle of friends. Attribute disclosure refers to privacy breach where an attacker infers
such private information. Attributes can be categorized based on their observability: an
observable attribute is one that the user sets in his profile (e.g., age). Oppositely, a latent
attribute refers to an attribute that is not part of the profile and as such cannot be explicitly
set by the user (e.g., user mood or sentiment). To infer missing or hidden attributes several
strategies are possible.
Homophily. A first natural approach borrowed from social science is based on ho-
mophily [78] which states that linked users tend to share similar attributes suggesting that
network structure should inform attribute inference. Furthermore, other evidence [79, 80]
show that user sharing the same attributes are likely to be linked. Zheleva and Getoor
[8] were the first to study the impact of friends’ attributes on the privacy of a user. They
try to infer private user attributes based on the groups users belong to. For that purpose,
they compare the inference accuracy of different link-based classification algorithms (e.g.,
Friend-aggregate model, Collective classification model, Groupmate-link model etc.). In
[81], authors build a Bayes network from links extracted from a social network. Although
they crawl a real OSN (LiveJournal), they use hypothetical attributes to analyze their
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learning algorithm. A further step was taken by [82] who proposes a modified Naive Bayes
classifier that infers political affiliation (i.e., a binary value: liberal or conservative) based
on user attributes, user links or both. Becker and Chen [83] infer many different attributes
of Facebook users, including affiliation, age, country, degree of education using the most
popular attribute values of the user’s friends.
User attributes. Some publicly available attributes are correlated with the missing ones.
An adversary can learn these correlations e.g., by using machine learning techniques.
In [84, 85] authors use supervised learning and text processing techniques to extract
information from both user name and user generated text to infer ethnicity and political
orientation. Burger et al. [86] construct a large multilingual dataset of tweets with the
corresponding user gender. Based on this dataset, they explore several different classifiers
to infer user gender and show that the classifier accuracy depends on tweet volumes
as well as whether or not various kinds of profile metadata are included in the models.
Pennacchiotti et al. [87] use a Gradient Boosted Decision Trees to learn class of labels (e.g.,
political affiliation) for each tweet which is then used to infer the user profile (political
affiliation detection, ethnicity identification and detecting affinity for a particular business).
Dey et al. [88] leverage the college/university information to infer the user age.
Virtual Graph. Rather than relying on self declared or existing graphs, an attacker can
build a virtual graph where similar users are linked together. Such similarity might be the
affiliation to a group (e.g., same university), similar taste (e.g., like the same music), graph
based metric (e.g., conductance). Note that this similarity metric is a parameter which
depends both on the targeted OSN and the target attributes. For instance, Mislove et al. [7]
build a “virtual” communities based on a metric called Normalized conductance. Using
two Facebook datasets of both Rice and New Orleans universities, they infer few attributes
such as college, matriculation year and department. While they achieve good performance
for both department and school, the result for the matriculation year is much worse. This
behavior have been reported by Amanda et al. [89] who explain that community-based
inference is data dependent. In fact, through an in depth study of community detection
algorithms for social networks and after comparing the results of 100 different social
graphs (provided by Facebook), Amanda et al. [89] conclude that a common attribute of a
community is a good predictor only in small set of social graphs and cannot be generalized.
Latent attribute inference. The main goal of latent attribute inference algorithms is
to derive some unknown information about the user. The main difference with previous
approaches is that there is (usually) no ground truth to confirm the inferred data. Latent
information can be the user taste (music, films, books), user “mood” (e.g., happy, sad) or
any other variable that describes the user (psychological) state.
One possible approach to infer user mood or opinion relies on sentiment analysis. In
this scenario, the system takes as input a sentence and outputs the user mood or opinion.
While a wide range of moods can be captured from a sentence, most research studies focus
on polarity: inferring whether the message is positive, negative or neutral. Such analysis
has numerous applications especially for real time monitoring of public opinions (e.g.,
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predicting the stock Market based on users mood [90]). Sentiment analysis approaches
can be classified in two groups: machine learning and lexical based.
Machine learning mostly relies on supervised techniques [91–94] where the problem is
expressed as binary classification task (i.e., positive or negative). The learning phase of
the algorithm requires a labelled dataset to train the classifier. Various learning algorithms
have been tested such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Naive Bayes, and Maximum
Entropy classifiers, using a variety of features, such as unigrams and bigrams, part-of-
speech tags and term frequency [91]. The main advantages of learning models is their
adaptability to a specific context. However, the scarceness of labelled data impacts both
accuracy and the applicability of the learned model to new data.
Lexical based approaches make use of predefined lists of words or dictionary where
each word is associated with its emotional weight. The created models depend on the used
dictionary. For instance, “Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count” (LIWC) [95] or “General
Inquirer” (GI) [96] are usually used in the context of formally written English, while
PANAS-t [97] and POMS-ex [98] are used in the context of psychometric. While lexical
based techniques do not rely on labelled data and do not require a training phase, it is hard
to have a specific dictionary for each specific situation (e.g., dictionary for slang).
Gonçalves et al. [99] compare 8 different sentiment analysis algorithms — both ma-
chine learning and lexical— in terms of coverage (i.e., the fraction of messages whose
sentiment is identified) and agreement (i.e., the number of message that are correctly classi-
fied). Their results show that these algorithms have a varying degrees of coverage (ranging
from 4% to 95%) as well as agreement (ranging from 33% to 80%). From a privacy
perspective, their newly proposed algorithm — a mixture of the 8 others — achieves a
coverage of 95% with and F-measure of 70%. Using such approach, an attacker can learn
the user opinion and mood with very high accuracy. He can also monitor his victim mood
fluctuation [100], opinion about a product or even the victim willingness to buy it.
2.4.0.5 Discussion
Homophily based inference techniques represent the “natural” approach to infer user
data as they exploit the main data in OSN: friendship information. While these algorithms
have been proven to perform well, they suffer from at least two shortcomings. First, they
are usually OSN dependent as the semantic of friendship depends on the OSN (e.g., friends
in Facebook are different from those in LinkedIn). We note that this behavior has been
reported by Zheleva and Getoor [8] as they admit that their approach is not suitable for
Facebook especially with multi-valued attributes such as political views. Second, these
algorithms rely on attributes that are (publicly) revealed by friends, and hence, heavily
depend on the amount of revealed information. For instance, Zheleva and Getoor [8] make
the assumption that at least 50% of a user’s friends reveal the private attribute. However,
as we will show in Chapter 3, this is not realistic, since users tend to massively hide their
information from public access. For instance, only 18% of users on Facebook disclose
their relationship status and less than 2% disclose their birth date. Hence, the performance
of such approaches in today’s scenario is questionable.
Attribute based inference techniques are powerful but affects only few attributes. In
fact, most previous works targeted either the user gender or the political affiliation. The
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performance of such algorithms depends on the amount of publicly revealed information
which has been proven to be quickly diminishing [6, 101]. However, the fast progress in
both text mining and entity recognition might revive such attacks.
Virtual graph based inference and latent attribute inference are severe attacks for several
reasons. First, they usually exploit information that is seemingly harmless such as the
music interests or user name. Second, they are highly modular and hence can be easily
extended (e.g., using other interests). Finally, their machine learning building-blocks are
continuously improved.
2.4.0.6 Protection mechanism
The aforementioned privacy leaks stem from the lack of content control. An extensive
body of research is dealing with such protection ranging from providing access control to
user resources independently from the specific OSN to more stronger fine grained access
control where even the OSN provider is prevented from accessing the data.
Tootoonchian et al. tackle image privacy problem by providing a Firefox extension
called ImageLock [102] that substitutes the original picture by a fake and stores the former
in a trusted server (under the user control). When authorized users request the picture,
ImageLock downloads it from the trusted server and replace the fake one. An improved
version was proposed few years later [103, 104] and encompasses any type of updated
content. Similarly to the first version, the updated content is stored in a trusted server along
with an access control list that specifies which user (i.e., social relation) can have access to
the content. A public-key-based cryptographic credentials called social attestations are
created and shared among users to specify the kind of relation between users. The main
drawback of both approaches is that users still have to trust a third party (i.e., the server
where the data is stored).
To overcome the unnecessary trusted third party , Luo et al. propose FaceCloak [105],
an application that substitutes the users personal information with fake data while storing
the genuine information, encrypted, on a third party server. The fake data is then used
as index to decrypt the genuine information as long as the user knows the corresponding
mapping (the key).
Lucas and Borisov present flyByNight [106], a platform for content protection using
encryption. All operations are executed through a Facebook application as follows: the
application is used to update user profile and define the set of users who can access this
update. The information is then encrypted using the (set) receiver public key. Proxy
re-encryption [107] is used to reduce the storing and communication overhead in case
of one to many communication. This approach, however, has at least one drawback: it
is insecure against active attacks carried out by the OSN provider as it has access to the
encryption keys.
Guha et al. design None Of Your Business (NOYB) [108], a tool to encrypt the user
information and prevent the OSN provider from reading and even detecting the encryption.
As traditional encryption schema are easily detectable (e.g., by checking the entropy), the
authors propose a novel substitution encryption. NOYB partitions the users’ uploaded text
into atoms. These atoms are then pseudo randomly substituted by other NOYB’s users
atoms. Each substitution is performed based on a dictionary, which is indexed by the
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encrypted genuine atoms. Therefore, by decrypting the index (if the user has the proper
key to decrypt it) the user obtains the genuine atom.
Attribute based encryption (ABE) [109] is the basis of many content protection ap-
proaches handling multiple users. In a nutshell, each generated key has a single or a set
of attributes, for which it can both cipher and decipher the content. In the OSN case,
an attribute can represent a category of users such as “relatives”, “co-workers” or “close
friends”. Each social link has then an associated key with the corresponding attribute, the
user (i.e., data owner) can then encrypt the information according to the group of users with
whom he wishes to share it. Persona, proposed by Baden et al. [110], is an instantiation of
such approach.
Beato et al. proposed a Firefox extension called Scramble! [111] which, through access
control list, helps the user to enforce access control over his data. Both data integrity
and confidentiality are enforced using hybrid-encryption (OpenPGP). Diaspora,4 an open
source social network, also uses OpenPGP to ensure data confidentiality. However, it relies
on its own distributed infrastructure and, as such, does not support the existing (and highly
popular) centralized OSNs.
2.5 Information leakage
Web 2.0 have brought a new concept: connecting people in a rich participatory network.
Leveraging OSNs and federated identity platform, Internet migrated from a ready only
(or fetch only) media to a write/contribute one. While this evolution brought countless
advantages, it also rises several privacy issues as social interactions imply sharing personal,
and usually sensitive, information. They also complexify the interactions which heavily
reduces, or even impedes, any control over the flow of transmitted data. Data leakage
happens when user personal information is transferred, without the user consent, from a
first party website (i.e., the website user is browsing) to third parties. This information is
usually referred to as “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII) and stands for any piece
of data that can distinguish or trace an individual’s identity either alone or when combined
with other information that is linkable to a specific individual [16]. Information leakage in
the context of social networks can be categorized in two classes: (i) PII leaked from OSN
platform to external websites, and (ii) website leaking PII to OSNs.
2.5.1 Information leakage from OSN to external websites
Krishnamurthy and Wills were the first to study the potential leakage of PII from OSNs
to third party entities. In their work [16], they show that PII are indeed leaked from OSN
platforms to third parties through a combination of HTTP header information (i.e., Referer
and URI) and cookies. They identify four types of PII leakage. First, the transmission
of the OSN identifier to third party servers from the OSN: they showed that out of the
12 studied OSNs, 9 transferred the user identifier to third parties through the Referer, 5
through the request URI, and 2 through cookies. In all, 11 out of the 12 OSNs are leaking
the user identifier to third parties. The second class considered the transmission of the
OSN identifier to third-party servers via popular external applications and was not deeply
4https://diasporafoundation.org
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investigated. In fact, a single example of the “ilike” Facebook application was given to
prove the existence of such leakage. The third class dealt with the transmission of specific
pieces of PII to third-party servers: results showed that only 2 OSNs directly leaked pieces
of PII to third parties via the Request URI, Referer header and cookies. Recently, Xia
et al. [112] present Tessellation a framework to correlate user identity –using OSN ID
extracted from the social network traffic – to its online behavior.
Protection Mechanism To restrict apps access to user data, multiple solutions have been
proposed. Egele et al. [113] proposed a client-side proxy that executes in the user’s web
browser, which makes requests for private data explicit to user and allows her to exert
fine-grained access control. Multiple solutions adopt a similar (proxy) based design [114].
While such solutions reduce the leakage, they cannot prevent the transmission of user
information to third party. Felt et al. [115] propose an alternative platform design that
prevents third parties from seeing real user data. The privacy-by-proxy approach imposes
a radical change as applications display information to users using special markup tags
that are (then) substituted by the real value (i.e., real user attribute) by the proxy.
2.5.2 Information leakage from first party to OSNs
While at first glance information leakage from first parties to OSNs seems impossible,
there exists a growing phenomena that can be considered as information leakage: tracking.
In fact, while OSNs are freely accessible, the viability of their business model relies on
collecting users’ personal data for targeted advertising and in some cases data moneti-
zation [116]. Hence, there is a huge incentive for OSNs to gather as much information
as possible as a mean to build accurate advertising profiles. In this quest of the perfect
profile, user browsing history represents a highly valuable data, and tracking, in general,
is more pervasive than ever [3]. Nevertheless, and to the best of our knowledge, a single
study [117] analyses this privacy threat of social tracking. To bridge this gap, our work [15]
(see Chapter 6) studies the tracking capabilities of OSNs and the potential data leakage it
can cause.
Protection Mechanism This technique is a cookie-based tracking mechanism, solutions
such as cookies deletion after each session or private mode browsing can be a first approach
to mitigate the threat. However these countermeasure suffer from at least two drawbacks.
First, navigation patterns belonging to one session are still tracked. Second, more aggres-
sive tracking techniques (e.g., through IP address and browser fingerprint [118]) can still
be applied. A more suitable solution consists in blocking the OSN “iframes” connections,
and as such all connections to the OSN servers. Tools like Ghostry [119] implement such
a mechanism as a browser Plugin.
2.6 Positioning
In this section, we sketch the main differences between our work and the aforemen-
tioned literature.
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Attribute Inference [6]. We infer users’ undisclosed (private) attributes using the public
attributes of other users sharing similar interests. Our approach creates a virtual graph
based on users’ music taste. It contrast with previous works as: First, it only relies on
users’ interests and does not exploit any link information (i.e., homophily) . Second, it uses
a (large) public dataset rather than relying on a private dataset as for [7, 8] and hence does
not make any (unrealistic) assumption about the availability of data. Finally, it assume a
different attacker model than [7, 8] as our attacker has only access to the public profile.
Exploiting Public Information to enhance password cracking [37]. Our work presents
two main contributions. First, we propose a novel password cracker based on Markov
models, which extends ideas used by Narayanan and Shmatikov [38]. Our algorithm
outputs passwords in decreasing probability order which allows it to outperform all pass-
word crackers we compared against. Our second contribution analyses how additional
personal information about a user can help in speeding up password guessing. Through a
formal analysis, we provide a method to integrate such data and assess experimentally its
effectiveness. We show that the gain is significant and can go up to 30% for passwords
that are actually based on personal attributes. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to systematically study the relationship between chosen passwords and users’ personal
information in the context of password cracking.
User Re-identification [39]. This work addresses the important goal of quantifying the
uniqueness of a public profile by measuring the information carried by each (public)
attributes. Sweeney [120] was the first to show that seemingly coarse-grained information
such as birth date or ZIP code, if combined, can uniquely identify their owners. Following
studies such as [121] emphasize the same finding that: “few characteristics are needed
to uniquely identify an individual." Our work complements these by proposing a way to
measure the uniqueness of every public profile in a large OSN (e.g., Facebook). Moreover,
these studies differ from ours in at least two aspects. First, studied datasets are released by
a third-party (e.g., government) who decides which attributes to disclose for all users. This
implies “a one rule fits all” approach, where all users are subject to the same privacy policy.
Our work considers a dataset where each user has significant control over the revealed
data. Second, the targeted populations are significantly different, i.e. US census data
versus our world-wide and online population. Hence, our work can be viewed as a new
technique to quantify user anonymity in a dynamic environment (such as OSNs), where
both self-selected and crowd-driven privacy policies impact user anonymity. Moreover,
while our approach does not explicitly address user re-identification and record linkage, it
can be leveraged to assess the feasibility of such attacks. Specifically, the magnitude of
the information surprisal value of a user’s profile (in the attacked dataset) can be directly
related to the level of user’s vulnerability to linkage. Our approach relies on entropy which
has been used at various levels: to measure the fingerprint size of a web browser [122], of
a host [118] or to track users across multiple services based on their usernames [123].
Information leakage from first party to OSNs [15]. Despite the fact that tracking
user activities represents a major threat to user privacy, still it is widely used. The most
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comparable work to ours is [3] where the authors study web activity tracking by third
parties. Our work focuses on web activity tracking by OSNs, which was not considered
in [3], and presents a comprehensive analysis of tracking by the major OSN service
providers. Authors in [117] describe the mechanism deployed by Facebook to track user
navigation. The paper focuses on the legal issues of tracking and provides a succinct
technical description of the mechanism. Our work extends their research results by
including an in-depth description of how the tracking mechanism is deployed by the three
major OSNs, analyzing the presence of OSN tracking in Alexa top 10K web sites and
providing tracking statistics based on real traffic measurements.
Information leakage from OSN to third parties [11]. We examine third-party (OSN)
applications for two major OSNs: Facebook and RenRen by developing a measurement
platform to study the interaction between OSN applications and fourth parties. While
OSN privacy have been extensively studied [16, 124], few works dealt with social apps.
The first analysis of Facebook apps permissions is reported by Chia et al. [13] where they
show that community rating is not reliable and that most applications are requesting more
permissions than needed. A fine grained analysis of 150 Facebook apps permissions by Felt
et al. [115] reveals that only 9% of the evaluated applications need to access personal data
to work correctly. Frank et al. [12] extend this work and show that Facebook permissions
follow a predefined pattern and that malicious application deviate from it. Finally, Xia et
al. propose Tessellation [112] a framework to correlate user identity – using various OSN
identifiers extracted from the social network traffic – to its online behavior. Our approach
is complementary as it shows that OSN identifiers can be also extracted from other sources
(i.e., traffic between third party applications and external entities). None of these works
examine the flow of personal information from the third-party apps to fourth-party entities.
Our work, to our knowledge, is the first to explore indirect privacy leakage to external
entities via third-party applications.
Conclusion
In this chapter we provided a systematic analysis of privacy threats in OSNs. Through
a novel classification, we presented a detailed description of each threat, described several
attacking scenarios and present some available solutions. We then highlight the main
differences between our work and related works.
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3.1 Introduction
Among the vast amount of personal information, user interests or likes (using the
terminology of Facebook) is one of the highly-available public information on OSNs.
Our measurements show that 57% of about half million Facebook user profiles that we
collected publicly reveal at least one interest among different categories. This wealth of
information shows that the majority of users consider this information harmless to their
privacy as they do not see any correlation between their interests and their private data.
Nonetheless, interests, if augmented with semantic knowledge, may leak information about
its owner and thus lead to privacy breach. For example, consider an unknown Facebook
user who has an interest “Eenie Meenie”. In addition, there are many female teenager
users who have interests such as “My World 2.0" and “Justin Bieber”. It is easy to predict
that the unknown user is probably also a female teenager: “Eenie Meenie” is a song of
“Justin Bieber” on his album “My World 2.0", and most Facebook users who have these
interests are female teenagers. This example illustrates the two main components of our
approach: (1) deriving semantic correlation between words (e.g., “My World 2.0”, “Eenie
Meenie”, and “Justin Bieber”) in order to link users sharing similar interests, and (2)
deriving statistics about these users (e.g., Justin Bieber fans) by analyzing their public
Facebook profiles. To the best of our knowledge, the possibility of this information leakage
and the automation of such inference have never been considered so far. We believe that
this lack of exploitation is due to several challenges to extract useful information from
interest names and descriptions.
First, many interests are ambiguous. In fact, they are short sentences (or even one
word) that deal with a concept. Without a semantic definition of this concept, the interest
is equivocal. For example, if a user includes “My World 2.0” in her Art/Entertainment
interests, one can imply that this user is likely to be interested in pop as a genre of music.
Without a knowledge of what “My World 2.0” is, the information about such an interest is
hidden, and hence unexploited.
Second, drawing semantic link between different interests is difficult. For example,
if a user includes in her public profile “My World 2.0” and another user chooses the
interest “I love Justin Bieber”, then clearly, these two users are among the Justin Bieber
funs. However, at a large scale, automating interest linkage may not be possible without
semantic knowledge.
Finally, interests are user-generated, and as such, very heterogeneous items as opposed
to marketers’ classified items (e.g., in Amazon, Imdb, etc.). This is due to the fact that
OSNs do not have any control on how the descriptions and titles of interests are constructed.
As a result, interest descriptions as provided by users are often incorrect, misleading or
altogether missing. It is therefore very difficult to extract useful information from interests
and classify them from the user-generated descriptions. Particularly, interests that are
harvested from user profiles are different in nature, ranging from official homepage links
or ad-hoc created groups to user instantaneous input. In addition, interest descriptions, as
shown on public profiles, either have coarse granularity (i.e., high level descriptions of
classes of interests such as “Music”, “Movies”, “Books”, etc.), or they are too fine-grained
to be exploited (e.g., referring to the name of a singer/music band, or to the title of a recent
movie, etc.). Finding a source of knowledge encompassing this huge variety of concepts is
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challenging.
Therefore, linking users sharing semantically related interests is the pivot of our
approach. The main goal of our work is to show how seemingly harmless information
such as interests, if augmented with semantic knowledge, can leak private information.
As a demonstration, we will show that solely based on what users reveal as their music
interests, we can successfully infer hidden information with more than 70% of correct
guesses for some attributes in Facebook. Furthermore, as opposed to previous works
[7, 8, 82], our technique does not need further information, such as friend relationships or
group belongings.
Technical Roadmap
Our objective is to find out interest similarities between users, even though these
similarities might not be clearly observed from their interests. We extract semantic links
between their seemingly unrelated interest names using a semantic-based generative model
called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [125]. The idea behind LDA is to learn the
underlying (semantic) relationship between different interests, and classify them into
groups (called Interest Topics). The output of LDA is the probabilities that an interest
name belongs to each of these topics.
To identify latent (semantic) relations between different interests, LDA needs a broader
semantic description of each interest than simply their short names. For instance, LDA
cannot reveal semantic relations between interests “Eenie Meenie” and “My World 2.0”
using only these names unless they are augmented with some text describing their semantics.
Informally, we create a document about “Eenie Meenie” and another about “My World
2.0” that contain their semantic description and then let LDA identify the common topics
of these documents. These documents are called Interest Descriptions. In order to draw
semantic knowledge from the vast corpus of users’ interests, we leverage on the ontologized
version of Wikipedia. An interest description, according to our Wikipedia usage, is the
parent categories of the most likely article that describes the interest. These represent
broader topics organizing this interest. For instance, there is a single Wikipedia article
about “Eenie Meenie” which belongs to category “Justin Bieber songs” (among others). In
addition, there is another article about “My World 2.0” that belongs to category “Justin
Bieber albums". Therefore, the descriptions of interests “Eenie Meenie" and “My World
2.0" will contain “Justin Bieber songs" and “Justin Bieber albums", respectively, and
LDA can create a topic representing Justin Bieber which connects the two interests. An
interesting feature of this method is the ability to enrich the user’s interests from, say a
single item, to a collection of related categories, and hence draw a broader picture of the
semantics behind the interest of the user. We used two sets of 104K public Facebook
profiles and 2000 private profiles to derive the topics of all the collected interests.
Knowing each user’s interests and the probabilities that these interests belong to the
identified topics, we compute the likelihood that users are interested in these topics. Our
intuition is that users who are interested roughly in the same topics with “similar" likelihood
(called interest neighbors) have also similar personal profile data. Hence, to infer a specific
user’s hidden attribute in his profile, we identify his interest neighbors who publicly reveal
this attribute in their profile. Then, we guess the hidden value from the neighbors’ (public)
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attribute values.
We postulate and verify that interest-based similarities between users, and in particular
their music preferences, is a good predictor of hidden information. As long as users are
revealing their music interests, we show that sensitive attributes such as Gender, Age,
Relationship status and Country-level locations can be inferred with high accuracy.
Organization We describe our attacker model in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents
related work in the area of personalizing retrievals. Our algorithm is detailed in Section
3.4 and both of our datasets are described in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 is devoted to present
our inference results. We motivate the usage of each building block of our algorithm and
discuss possible alternatives in Section 3.7 and finally we conclude.
3.2 Attacker Model
Before defining our attacker model, we describe user profiles as implemented by
Facebook.
Facebook implements a user profile as a collection of personal data called attributes,
which describe the user. These attributes can be binary such as Gender or multi-valued
such as Age. The availability of these attributes obeys to a set of privacy-settings rules.
Depending on these privacy settings, which are set by the user, information can be revealed
exclusively to the social links established on OSN (e.g., friends in Facebook1) or partially
(e.g., to friends of friends) or publicly (i.e., to everyone). In this work, we demonstrate
the information leakage through users’ interests by inferring the private attributes of a
user. We consider two binary attributes (Gender: male/female and Relationship status:
married/single) and two multi-valued attributes (Country-level location and Age).
As opposed to previous works [8, 82], we consider an attacker that only has access
to self-declared, publicly available music interests. Hence, the attacker can be anyone
who can collect the Facebook public profile of a targeted user. In fact, earlier attacks
considered a dataset crawled from a specific community such as a university. Hence, the
crawler being part of this community had access to attributes that are only visible to friends
which impacts data availability. Indeed, as we will show in Section 3.5, data availability is
different whether we deal with public data (data disclosed to anyone) or private data (data
disclosed to friends only). Thus our attacker is more general compared to [8, 82], since it
relies only on public information.
This characteristic allows us to draw a broader attacker. For example, our technique can
be used for the purpose of profiling to deliver targeted ads. Advertisers could automatically
build user profiles with high accuracy and minimum effort, with or without the consent of
the users. Spammers could gather information across the web to send extremely targeted
spam (e.g., by including specific information related to the location or age of the targeted
user).
1Facebook has recently added a feature to split friends into sub-lists in order to make some attributes
accessible to a chosen subset of friends.
3.2. ATTACKER MODEL
Chapter 3. Attribute Inference 48
3.3 Related Work
In the following we briefly summarize related work in the area of Personalizing
Retrieval as we use techniques from this field in order to link users sharing similar interests.
Inferring private attributes and de-anonymizing users are two privacy problems related
to this work, however, we do not detail them here as they have already been treated in
Chapter 2 in Section 2.4 and Section 2.2 respectively.
Our work shares techniques with the area of personalizing retrieval where the goal is
to build personalized services to users. This can be derived from the user “taste” or by
interpreting his social interactions. This is an active research domain and a broad range of
problems were resolved and used in e-commerce, recommendation, collaborative filtering
and similar. This knowledge extraction entails the analysis of a large text corpora from
which one can derive a statistical model that explains latent interactions between the docu-
ments. Latent semantic analysis techniques provide an efficient way to extract underlying
topics and cluster documents [126, 127]. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [125] has
been extended by Zhang et al. [128] to identify communities in the Orkut social network.
The model was successfully used to recommend new groups to users. In addition, Zheleva
et al. [129] used an adapted LDA model to derive music taste from listening activities of
users in order to identify songs related to a specific taste and the listeners who share the
same taste.
Similarly to these works, we also use LDA to capture the interest topics of users but
instead of recommending content, our goal is to link users sharing semantically-related
interests to demonstrate information leakage.
3.4 From Interest Names to Attribute Inference
3.4.1 Overview
While a human can easily capture the semantics behind different interest names (titles
or short descriptions), this task cannot be easily automated. In this section, we present how
we can extract meaningful knowledge from users’ interests and then classify them for the
purpose of attribute inference.
Our technique consists of four main steps as illustrated by Figure 3.1:
1. Creating Interest Descriptions: Interest descriptions are the user-specified inter-
est names augmented with semantically related words which are mined from the
Wikipedia ontology.
2. Extracting semantic correlation between interest descriptions using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA). The output represents a set of topics containing semantically
related concepts.
3. Computing Interest Feature Vectors (IFV). Based on the discovered topics, LDA
also computes the probability that an interest I belongs to Topici for all I and i (Step
3a). Then, we derive the IFV of each user (Step 3b) which quantifies the interest of
a user in each topic.
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I1:Michael Jackson
I2:Lady Gaga
I3:Lil Wayne
I4:Bob Marley
I5:Sai Sai Kham Leng
I6:Fadl Shaker
I7:Charlene Choi
Interests
I1:Michael Jackson, american pop singers; american choreog-
raphers; american dance musicians; the jackson 5 members;
mtv video music awards winners; . . .
I2 :Lady Gaga, american pop singers; american singer-
songwriters; bisexual musicians; musicians from new york;
english-language singers; . . .
I4 :Bob Marley, jamaican songwriters; jamaican male singers;
rastafarian music; english-language singers; . . .
I5 :Sai Sai Kham Leng, burmese musicians; burmese singers;
burmese singer-songwriters; . . .
I6 :Fadl Shaker, lebanese singers; arabic-language singers; arab
musicians; . . .
Augmented interests (Interest descriptions)
Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 . . .
american blues singers arabic-language singers freestyle rappers
american soul singers lebanese singers hip hop singers
american male singers rotana artists g-funk
african american singers arab musicians crips
english-language singers israeli jews hip hop djs
american pop singers egyptian singers hip hop musicians
musicians from indiana algerian musicians electro-hop musicians
musicians from philadelphia rai musicians african american songwriters
Extracted interest topics
Interest Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 3 . . .
I1 0.8 0 0.4 0.5
I2 0.8 0 0.3 0
I4 0 0 0.1 0.7
I6 0 0.9 0 0
. . .
Topic belongings of Interests
User Interests
User1 I1
User2 I1, I2
User3 I6
User4 I1, I2, I6
. . .
Users
User Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 3 . . .
User1 0.8 0 0.4 0.5
User2 0.96 0 0.58 0.5
User3 0 0.9 0 0
User3 0.96 0.9 0.58 0.5
. . .
Interest Feature Vectors (IFV)
IFV computation (Step 3b)
Wikipedia
(Step 1)
LDA
(Step 2)
(Step 3a)LDA
FIGURE 3.1: Computing interest feature vectors. First, we extract interest names and aug-
ment them using Wikipedia (Step 1). Then, we compute correlation between augmented
interests and generate topics (Step 2) using LDA. Finally, we compute the IFV of each
user (Step 3).
4. Computing the neighbors of each user in the feature space (i.e., whose IFVs are sim-
ilar in the feature space) to discover similar users, and exploiting this neighborhood
to infer hidden attributes.
3.4.2 Step 1: Augmenting Interests
Interest names (shortly interests) extracted from user profiles can be single words,
phrases, and also complex sentences. These text fragments are usually insufficient to
characterize the interest topics of the user. Indeed, most statistical learning methods, such
as LDA, need a deeper description of a given document (i.e., interest) in order to identify
the semantic correlation inside a text corpora (i.e., set of interests). Moreover, the diversity
and heterogeneity of these interests make their description a difficult task. For instance,
two different interests such as “AC/DC” and “I love Angus Young" refer to the same band.
However, these strings on their own provide insufficient information to reveal this semantic
correlation. To augment interest names with further content that helps LDA to identify
their common topics, we use an ontology, which provides structured knowledge about any
unstructured fragment of text (i.e., interest names).
3.4.2.1 Wikipedia as an Ontology
Although there are several available ontologies [130, 131], we use the ontologized
version of Wikipedia, the most up-to-date and largest reference of human knowledge
in the world. Wikipedia represents a huge, constantly evolving collection of manually
defined concepts and semantic relations, which are sufficient to cover most interest names.
Moreover, Wikipedia is multilingual which allows the augmentation of non-english interest
names. We used the Wikipedia Miner Toolkit [132] to create the ontologized version of
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Wikipedia from a dump made on January, 2011 with a size of 27 Gb.
Wikipedia includes articles and categories. Each article describes a single concept
or topic, and almost all Wikipedia’s articles are organized within one or more categories,
which can be mined for broader (more general) semantic meaning. AC/DC, for example,
belongs to the categories Australian hard rock musical groups, Hard rock musical groups,
Blues-rock groups etc. All of Wikipedia’s categories descend from a single root called
Fundamental. The distance between a particular category and this root measures the
category’s generality or specificity. For instance, AC/DC is in depth 5, while its parent
categories are in depth 4 which means they are more general and closer to the root.
All articles contain various hyper links pointing to further (semantically related) articles.
For example, the article about Angus Young contains links to articles AC/DC, musician,
duckwalk, etc. The anchor texts used within these links have particular importance as they
can help with disambiguation and eventually identifying the most related article to a given
search term: e.g., if majority of the “duckwalk" links (i.e., their anchor texts contain string
“duckwalk") is pointing to Chuck Berry and only a few of them to the bird Duck, then
with high probability the search term “duckwalk" refers to Chuck Berry (a dancing style
performed by Chuck Berry). Indeed, the toolkit uses this approach to search for the most
related article to a search string; first, the anchor texts of the links made to an article are
used to index all articles. Then, the article which has the most links containing the search
term as the anchor text is defined to be the most related article.
3.4.2.2 Interest Description
The description of an interest is the collection of the parent categories of its most related
Wikipedia article (more precisely, the collection of the name of these categories). To create
such descriptions, we first searched for the Wikipedia article that is most related to a given
interest name using the toolkit. The search vocabulary is extensive (5 million or more terms
and phrases), and encodes both synonymy and polysemy. The search returns an article
or set of articles that could refer to the given interest. If a list is returned, we select the
article that is most likely related to the interest name as described above. Afterwards, we
gather all the parent categories of the most related article which constitute the description
of the interest. For example, in Figure 3.1, User3 has interest “Fadl Shaker". Searching
for “Fadl Shaker" in Wikipedia, we obtain a single article which has parent categories
“Arab musicians", “Arabic-language singers" and “Lebanese male singers". These strings
altogether (with “Fadl Shaker") give the description of this interest.
3.4.3 Step 2: Extracting Semantic Correlation
To identify semantic correlations between interest descriptions, we use Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) [125]. LDA captures statistical properties of text documents in a discrete
dataset and represents each document in terms of the underlying topics. More specifically,
having a text corpora consisting of N documents (i.e., N interest descriptions), each
document is modeled as a mixture of latent topics (interest topics). A topic represents a
cluster of words that tend to co-occur with a high probability within the topic. For example,
in Figure 3.1, “American soul singers" and “American blues singers" often co-occur and
thus belong to the same topic (Topic1). However, we do not expect to find “Arab musicians"
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in the same context, and thus, it belongs to another topic (Topic2). Note that the topics are
created by LDA and they are not named. Through characterizing the statistical relations
among words and documents, LDA can estimate the probability that a given document is
about a given topic where the number of all topics is denoted by k and is a parameter of
the LDA model.
More precisely, LDA models our collection of interest descriptions as follows. The
topics of an interest description are described by a discrete (i.e., categorical) random
variable M (φ) with parameter φ which is in turn drawn from a Dirichlet distribution D(α)
for each description, where both φ and α are parameter vectors with a size of k. In addition,
each topic z out of the k has a discrete distribution M (βz) on the whole vocabulary. The
generative process for each interest description has the following steps:
1. Sample φ from D(α).
2. For each word wi of the description:
(a) Sample a topic zi from M (φ).
(b) Sample a word wi from M (βzi).
Note that α and B = ∪z{βz} are corpus-level parameters, while φ is a document-level
parameter (i.e., it is sampled once for each interest description). Given the parameters α
and B, the joint probability distribution of an interest topic mixture φ , a set of words W ,
and a set of k topics Z for a description is
p(φ ,Z,W |α,B) = p(φ |α)∏
∀i
p(zi|φ)p(wi|βzi) (3.1)
The observable variable is W (i.e., the set of words in the interest descriptions) while
α , B, and φ are latent variables. Equation (3.1) describes a parametric empirical Bayes
model, where we can estimate the parameters using Bayes inference. In this work, we
used collapsed Gibbs sampling [133] to recover the posterior marginal distribution of φ for
each interest description. Recall that φ is a vector, i.e., φi is the probability that the interest
description belongs to Topici.
3.4.4 Step 3: Interest Feature Vector (IFV) Extraction
The probability that a user is interested in Topici is the probability that his interest
descriptions belong to Topici. Let V denote a user’s interest feature vector, I is the set of
his interest descriptions, and φ Ii is the probability that interest description I belongs to
Topici. Then, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Vi = 1− ∏
∀I∈I
(1−φ Ii )
is the probability that the user is interested in Topici.
For instance, in Figure 3.1, User4 has interests “Lady Gaga", “Michael Jackson", and
“Fadl Shaker". The probability that User4 belongs to Topic1, which represents American
singers, is the probability that at least one of these interests belongs to Topic1. This equals
1− ((1−0.8)(1−0.8)) = 0.96.
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3.4.5 Step 4: Inference
3.4.5.1 Neighbors Computation
Observe that an IFV uniquely defines the interest of an individual in a k-dimensional
feature space. Defining an appropriate distance measure in this space, we can quantify the
similarity between the interests of any two users. This allows the identification of users
who share similar interests, and likely have correlated profile data that can be used to infer
their hidden profile data.
We use a chi-squared distance metric. In particular, the correlation distance dV,W
between two IFV vectors V and W is
dV,W =
k
∑
i=1
(Vi −Wi)2
(Vi +Wi)
In [134], authors showed that the chi-squared distance gives better results when dealing
with vectors of probabilities than others. Indeed, we conducted several tests with different
other distance metrics: Euclidean, Manhattan and Kullback-Leibler, and results show that
the chi-squared distance outperforms all of them.
Using the above metric, we can compute the ℓ nearest neighbors of a user u (i.e., the
users who are the closest to u in the interest feature space). A naive approach is to compute
all M2/2 pairwise distances, where M is the number of all users, and then to find the ℓ
closest ones for each user. However, it becomes impractical for large values of M and k. A
more efficient approach using k-d tree is taken. The main motivation behind k-d trees is
that the tree can be constructed efficiently (with complexity O(M log2 M)), then saved and
used afterwards to compute the closest neighbor of any user with a worst case computation
of O(k ·M1−1/k).
3.4.5.2 Inference
We can infer a user’s hidden profile attribute x from that of its ℓ nearest neighbors: first,
we select the ℓ nearest neighbors out of all whose attribute x is defined and public. Then,
we do majority voting for the hidden value (i.e., we select the attribute value which the
most users out of the ℓ nearest neighbor have). If more than one attribute value has the
maximal number of votes, we randomly choose one.
For instance, suppose that we want to infer User4’s country-level location in Figure 3.1,
and User4 has 5 nearest neighbors (who publish their locations) because all of them are
interested in Topic2 with high probability (e.g., they like “Fadl Shaker"). If 3 out of these
5 are from Egypt and the others are from Lebanon then our guess for User4’s location is
Egypt.
Although there are multiple techniques besides majority voting to derive the hidden
attribute value, we will show in Section 3.6.2 that, surprisingly, even this simple technique
results in remarkable inference accuracy.
3.5 Dataset Description
For the purpose of our study, we collected two profile datasets from Facebook. The first
is composed of Facebook profiles that we crawled and which we accessed as “everyone”
3.5. DATASET DESCRIPTION
Chapter 3. Attribute Inference 53
(see Section 3.5.1). The second is a set of more than 4000 private profiles that we collected
from volunteers using a Facebook application (see Section 3.5.2). Next, we describe our
methodology used to collect these datasets. We also present the technical challenges that
we encountered while crawling Facebook. Finally, we describe the characteristics of our
datasets.
3.5.1 Crawling Public Facebook Profiles
Crawling a social network is challenging due to several reasons. One main concern is
to avoid sampling biases. A previous work [135] has shown that the best approach to avoid
sampling bias is a so called True Uniform Sampling (UNI) of user identifiers (ID). UNI
consists in generating a random 32-bits ID and then crawling the corresponding user profile
in Facebook. This technique has a major drawback in practice: most of the generated
IDs are likely to be unassigned, and thus not associated with any profile (only 16% of the
32-bits space is used). Hence, the crawler would quickly become very resource-consuming
because a large number of requests would be unsuccessful. In our case, inspired by the
conclusions in [135], and avoiding sampling bias that might be introduced by different
social graph crawls (e.g., Breadth-First Search), we follow a simple, yet efficient two-steps
crawling methodology as an alternative to UNI.
First, we randomly crawled a large fraction of the Facebook Public directory3. As a
result, a total of 100 Million (and 120 thousands) URLs of searchable Facebook profiles
were collected (without profile data). This technique allows to avoid the random genera-
tion of user identifiers while uniformly (independently from the social graph properties)
collecting existing user identifiers.
Second, from this list of candidate URLs of profiles, we crawled a set of randomly
selected 494 392 profiles out of the 100 millions. The crawled dataset is called RawProfiles.
Finally, the entire RawProfiles dataset was sanitized to fit our validation purposes.
Two restrictions were considered: (1) non Latin-written profiles were filtered out from
the dataset and (2) only profiles with at least one music interest with its corresponding
Wikipedia description were kept. Therefore, we obtained a set of 104 401 profiles. This
data set, called PubProfiles, is then used as an input of our inference algorithm (see details
in Section 3.4.4).
Technical challenges
As noted above, we crawled profiles to collect public information that are available
to everyone. However, Facebook, as most OSNs operators do, protects this data from
exhaustive crawling by implementing a plethora of anti-crawler techniques. For instance,
it implements a request rate limit that, if exceeded, generates a CAPTCHA to be solved.
To bypass this restriction and to be cautious not to DoS the system, we set a very slow
request frequency (1 per minute). In addition, we distributed our crawler on 6 different
machines that were geographically spread. In addition, it is worth noting that one of
the trickiest countermeasures that Facebook implements to prevent easy crawling is the
rendering of the web page. In particular, rather than sending a simple HTML page to the
client browser, Facebook embeds HTML inside JavaScript, thus, the received page is not a
3available at:http://www.facebook.com/directory/
3.5. DATASET DESCRIPTION
Chapter 3. Attribute Inference 54
valid HTML page but a JavaScript code that has to be interpreted. Unfortunately, most
publicly available crawling libraries do not interpret JavaScript. Thus, we developed our
own lightweight web browser, based on the Qt Port of WebKit [136], which is capable of
interpreting JavaScript. This allows our crawler to be served with easy-to-parse HTML
page.
3.5.2 A Facebook Application to Collect Private Attributes
We developed a Facebook application to gather private attributes from users. The
application was distributed to many of our colleagues and friends on Facebook, and was
surprisingly used by more users than expected. Users volunteered to install the application,
and hence, their private information was collected by our tool. We collected private
attributes from 4012 profiles out of which 2458 profiles have at least one music interest.
These anonymized private profiles, collected from April 6 to April 20 in 2011, represent
our private dataset (called VolunteerProfiles).
The usage of this dataset is motivated by our need to understand how data availability
varies between public and private datasets, and to verify whether it impacts the results of
our algorithm.
3.5.3 Ethical and Legal Considerations
In order to comply with legal and ethical aspects in crawling OSNs data, we were cau-
tious not to inadvertently DoS the Facebook infrastructure (as mentioned in Section 3.5.1).
Also cautionary measures were taken to prevent our crawler from requesting off-limit infor-
mation. In other words, our crawler is compliant with the Robots Exclusion Protocol [137].
Even though we accessed publicly available information, we anonymized the collected
data by removing user names and all information which were irrelevant to our study.
The Facebook application needed more sanitization to ensure users’ anonymity.
3.5.4 Dataset Description
In the following, we provide statistics that describe the datasets used in this study. First,
Table 3.1 summarizes the statistics about the availability of attributes in the three datasets
(i.e., in RawProfiles, PubProfiles and VolunteerProfiles).
Attributes Raw(%) Pub(%) Volunteer(%)
Gender 79 84 96
Interests 57 100 62
Current City 23 29 48
Looking For 22 34 -
Home Town 22 31 48
Relationship 17 24 43
Interested In 16 26 -
Birth date 6 11 72
Religion 1 2 0
TABLE 3.1: The availability of attributes in our datasets.
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FIGURE 3.2: Left: Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function of Music Interests.
Right: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Country-level Locations (retrieved
from the CurrentCity attribute)
We observe that Gender is the most common attribute that users publicly reveal.
However, three attributes that we want to infer are largely kept private. The age is the
information that users conceal the most (89% are undisclosed in PubProfiles). Comparing
the availability of the attributes in PubProfiles and VolunteerProfiles is enlightening. We
can clearly note that users tend to hide their attribute values from public access even though
these attributes are frequently provided (in their private profiles). For instance, the birth
date is provided in more than 72% in VolunteerProfiles, whereas it is rarely available in
PubProfiles (only 1.62% of users provide their full birth date). The current city is publicly
revealed in almost 30% of the cases, whereas half of all volunteers provided this data in
their private profile. Recall that the attributes we are interested in are either binary (Gender,
Relationship) or multi-valued (Age, Country-level location). Finally, note that, as it is
shown in Table 3.1, the public availability of attributes in PubProfiles and in RawProfiles
are roughly similar.
Also note that the availability of interests slightly changes from RawProfiles (57%) to
VolunteerProfiles (62%), yet still relatively abundant. This behavior might have at least
two explanations: (1) by default, Facebook sets Interest to be a public attribute, (2) users
are more willing to reveal their interests compared to other attributes. Figure 3.2 (left)
depicts the complementary CDF of music interests publicly revealed by users in the three
datasets. Note that more than 30% of RawProfiles profiles reveal at least one music interest.
Private profiles show a higher ratio which is more than 75%.
3.6 Experimentation Results and Validation
In the following, we validate our interest-based inference technique using both VolunteerProfiles
and PubProfiles. We evaluated the correctness of our algorithm in terms of inference accu-
racy, i.e. the fraction of successful inferences and the total number of trials. An inference
3Using random guessing instead of maximum likelihood decision
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Attribute
Overall marginal distribution (OMD) Inference accuracy on VolunteerProfiles
PubProfiles Facebook statistics PubProfiles OMD Facebook statistics OMD
Gender 62% (Female) 51% (Male) 39.3% 60.7%
Relationship 55% (Single) Unknown 36.7% 50%3
Age 50% (18-25) 26.1% (26-34) 33.9% 57.9%
Country 52% (U.S) 23% (U.S) 2.3% 2.3%
TABLE 3.2: Baseline inference using different marginal distributions. Inference of
VolunteerProfiles based on Facebook OMD is better than PubProfiles OMD.
is successful if the inferred attribute equals to the real value. In particular, for both
PubProfiles and VolunteerProfiles datasets and for each attribute to be inferred, we select
users that provide the attribute and then we compute the inference accuracy: we hide
each user’s attribute, compute the nearest neighbors of the user, do a majority voting as
described in Section 3.4.5.1, and then verify whether the inference yields the real attribute.
Before discussing our validation results, in the following, we introduce a maximum
likelihood-based inference technique that we consider as a baseline technique with which
we compare our method.
3.6.1 Baseline Inference Technique
Without having access to any friendship and/or community graph, an adversary can
rely on the marginal distributions of the attribute values. In particular, the probability of
value val of a hidden attribute x in any user’s profile u can be estimated as the fraction of
users who have this attribute value in dataset U :
P(u.x = val|U) =
|{v |v.x = val∧ v ∈U}|
|U |
Then, a simple approach to infer an attribute is to guess its most likely value for all users
(i.e., the value x for which P(u.x = val|U) is maximal).
To compute P(u.x = val|U), an adversary can crawl a set of users and then derive the
Overall Marginal Distribution (OMD) of an attribute x from the crawled dataset (more
preciselly, U is the subset of all crawled users who published that attribute). However, this
OMD is derived from public attributes (i.e., U contains only publicly revealed attributes),
and hence, may deviate from the real OMD which includes both publicly revealed and
undisclosed attributes.
To illustrate the difference, consider Table 3.2 that compares the real OMD of the four
attributes to be inferred, as provided by Facebook statistics (composed of both private
and public attributes [138]), with the OMD derived from our public dataset PubProfiles.
The two distributions suggest different predominant values which highly impacts the
inference accuracy when the guess is based on the most likely attribute value. For instance,
PubProfiles conveys that the majority of Facebook users are female which contradicts
Facebook statistics (with a significant difference of 11%). Similarly, the age of most users
according to PubProfiles is between 18 and 25-years old, while the predominant category
of ages, according to Facebook, is 26-34.
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In fact, all public datasets (e.g., PubProfiles) are biased towards the availability of
attributes (not to be confused with the bias in sampling discussed in Section 3.5.1). Recall
that, as shown in Table 3.1, some attributes (in particular Age, Relationship status and
Country) are publicly available for only a small fraction of users (see the PubProfiles
column). Put simply, the difference between the two OMDs is mainly due to the mixture of
private and public attributes in Facebook statistics and the absence of private attributes in
PubProfiles. Whether revealing attributes is driven by some sociological reasons or others
is beyond the scope of this work.
To illustrate how the bias towards attribute availability impacts inference accuracy,
we conduct two experiments. First, we infer the attributes in VolunteerProfiles using the
OMD derived from PubProfiles. In the second experiment, we infer the same attributes
using the OMD computed from Facebook statistics. As shown in Table 3.2, the second
approach always performs better. The results show that using the Facebook statistics we
obtain an inference accuracy gain of 21% for the gender and 25% for the age. Since
Facebook does not provide statistics about the relationship status of their users, we used
random guessing instead (i.e., we randomly chose between single and married for each
user). Surprisingly, even random guessing outperforms the maximum likelihood-based
approach using PubProfiles OMD. Therefore, we conclude that the maximum likelihood-
based inference performs better when we use the OMD derived from Facebook statistics.
Accordingly, in our performance evaluation, we also used this in our baseline inference
technique.
Finally, note that previous works [8, 82] computed the inference accuracy using private
data (i.e., their dataset is a crawl of a community, and thus, they could access all attributes
that can only be seen by community members). Hence, these results are obtained with
different attacker model, and the assumption that 50% of all attributes are accessible, as
suggested in [8], is unrealistic in our model.
3.6.2 Experiments
In order to validate our interest-based inference technique, we follow two approaches.
First, for each attribute, we randomly sample users from PubProfiles such that the sam-
pled dataset has the same OMD as the real Facebook dataset [138]. Then, we measure
the inference accuracy on this sampled dataset. Second, we test our technique on the
VolunteerProfiles dataset where both private and public attributes are known. Since we
know the attribute values in the collected profiles, we can check if the inference is success-
ful or not. In particular, we infer four attributes in both approaches: Gender, Relationship
status, Age, and the Country of current location. We run experiments to infer an attribute a
in PubProfiles as follows:
1. From all users that provide a in PubProfiles, we randomly sample a set of users
(denoted by S) following the OMD of Facebook. The size of S for each attribute is tai-
lored by (i) Facebook OMD and (ii) the number of available samples in PubProfiles.
Table 3.3 shows the size of S.
2. For this sampled set, we compute the inference accuracy as it has been described in
Section 3.6.2.
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3. We repeat Steps 2 and 3 fifteen times and compute the average of all inference
accuracy values (Monte Carlo experiment).
For VolunteerProfiles we proceed as for PubProfiles, but since the attributes are a mix
of public and private attributes, there is no need to do sampling, and we skip Step 1.
Attribute Size of S
Gender 1000
Relationship 400
Country 1000
Age 105
TABLE 3.3: Size of the Randomly Sampled Set of Users S
Parameter Estimation Recall from Section 3.4.5.1 that our algorithm is based on ma-
jority voting. Hence, estimating the number of neighbors that provides the best inference
accuracy for each attribute is essential. Figure 3.3 depicts the inference accuracy in func-
tion of the number of neighbors. This figure clearly shows that each attribute has a specific
number of neighbors that results in the best inference accuracy. Note that, as discussed at
the beginning of this section, we rely on repeated random sampling to compute the results,
and hence, the computed parameters are independent from the input data. Age inference
requires two neighbors. This can be explained by the limited number of users that disclose
their age which causes the IFV space to be very sparse: the more neighbors we consider
the more likely it is that these neighbors are far and have different attribute values. For
other attributes, the optimal number of neighbors is between 3 and 5. We tested different
IFV sizes (i.e., k the number of topics). Notably, best results were achieved with k = 100.
In the sequel, we will use these estimated numbers of neighbors as well as k = 100 which
yield the best inference accuracy.
Table 3.4 provides a summary of the results for PubProfiles. The information leakage
can be estimated to 20% in comparison with the baseline inference. Surprisingly, the
amount of the information is independent from the inferred attribute since the gain is about
20% for all of them. These results show that music interest is a good predictor of all
attributes.
Gender Inference Table 3.4 shows that the gender can be inferred with a high accuracy
even if only one music interest is known in the PubProfiles. Our algorithm performs 18%
Attribute Baseline Random guess IFV Inference
Gender 51% 50% 69%
Relationship 50% 50% 71%
Country 41% 10% 60%
Age 26% 16.6% 49%
TABLE 3.4: Inference Accuracy of PubProfiles
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FIGURE 3.3: Correlation between Number of Neighbors and Inference Accuracy
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Attribute
Inferred
Male Female
Male 53% 47%
Female 14% 86%
TABLE 3.5: Confusion Matrix of Gender
better than the baseline. Recall that the baseline guesses male for all users (Table 3.2). To
compare the inference accuracy for both males and females, we computed the confusion
matrix in Table 3.5. Surprisingly, Female inference is highly accurate (86%) with a low
false negative rate (14%). However, it is not the case for male inference. This behavior can
be explained by the number of female profiles in our dataset. In fact, females represent
61.41% of all collected profiles (with publicly revealed gender attribute) and they were
subscribed to 421685 music interests. However, males share only 273714 music interests
which represents 35% less than woman. Hence, our technique is more capable of predicting
females since the amount of their disclosed (music) interest information is larger compared
to males. This also confirms that the amount of disclosed interest information is correlated
with inference accuracy.
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳❳
Attribute
Inferred
Single Married
Single 78% 22%
Married 36% 64%
TABLE 3.6: Confusion Matrix of Relationship
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Relationship Inference Inferring the relationship status (married/single) is challenging
since less than 17% of crawled users disclose this attribute showing that it is highly
sensitive. Recall that, as there is no publicly available statistics about the distribution
of this attribute, we do random guessing as the baseline (having an accuracy of 50%).
Our algorithm performs well with 71% of good inference for all users in PubProfiles. As
previously, we investigate how music interests are a good predictor for both single and
married users by computing the confusion matrix (Table 3.6). We notice that single users
are more distinguishable, based on their IFV, than married ones. The explanation is that
single users share more interests than married ones. In particular, a single user has an
average of 9 music interests whereas a married user has only 5.79. Likewise in case of
gender, this confirms that the amount of disclosed interest information is correlated with
inference accuracy.
Country of Location Inference As described in Section 3.5, we are interested in infer-
ring the users’ location in the top 10 countries in Facebook. Our approach can easily be
extended to all countries, however, as shown by Figure 3.2, more than 80% of users in
PubProfiles belong to 10 countries and these countries represent more than 55% of all Face-
book users according to [138]. As the number of users belonging to the top 10 countries
is very limited in VolunteerProfiles, we do not evaluate our scheme on that dataset. Table
3.4 shows that our algorithm has an accuracy of 60% on PubProfiles with 19% increase
compared to the baseline (recall that, following Table 3.2, the baseline gives U.S. as a guess
for all users). Figure 3.4 draws the confusion matrix5 and gives more insight about the
inference accuracy. In fact, countries with a specific (regional) music have better accuracy
than others. Particularly, U.S. has more than 94% of correct inference, Philippine 80%,
India 62%, Indonesia 58% and Greece 42%. This highlights the essence of our algorithm
where semantically correlated music interests are grouped together and hence allow us to
extract users interested in the same topics (e.g., Philippine music). Without a semantic
knowledge that specifies the origin of a singer or band this is not possible. As for Gender
and relationship, the number of collected profiles can also explain the incapacity of the
system to correctly infer certain countries such as Italy, Mexico or France. In particular,
as shown in Table 3.7, the number of users belonging to these countries is very small.
Hence, their interests may be insufficient to compute a representative IFV which yields
poor accuracy.
Age Inference Finally, we are interested in inferring the age of users. To do that,
we created four age categories6 that are depicted in Table 3.8. Recall that the baseline
technique always predicts the category of 26 and 34 years for all users. Table 3.4 shows
that our algorithm performs 23% better than the baseline attack. Note that our technique
gives good results despite that only 3% of all users provide their age (3133 users in total)
in PubProfiles. We investigate how music interests are correlated with the age bin by
computing the confusion matrix in Table 3.8. We find that, as expected, most errors come
5We removed Brazil since all its entries (2) were wrongly inferred. This is caused by the small number of
Brazilians in our dataset.
6We created six categories but since in PubProfiles we have only few users in the last 3 bins, we merge
them together. For VolunteerProfiles we have six bins.
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FIGURE 3.4: Confusion Matrix of Country
Inference
Country % of users
US 71.9%
PH 7.80%
IN 6.21%
ID 5.08%
GB 3.62%
GR 2.32%
FR 2.12%
MX 0.41%
IT 0.40%
BR 0.01%
TABLE 3.7: Top 10
countries distribution in
PubProfiles
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Att
Inferred
13-17 18-24 25-34 35+
13-17 58.33% 30% 11.6% 0%
18-24 17% 67% 3.4% 1.3%
25-34 15.38% 46.15% 38.4% 0%
35+ 0% 100% 0% 0%
TABLE 3.8: Confusion Matrix of Age Inference
from falsely putting users into their neighboring bins. For instance, our method puts 30%
of 13-18 years old users into the bin of 18-24 years. However, note that fewer bins (such as
teenager, adult and senior) would yield better accuracy, and it should be sufficient to many
applications (e.g., for targeted ads). Observe that we have an error of 100% for the last
bin. This is due to the small number of users (3 in PubProfiles) who belong to this bin (we
cannot extract useful information and build a representative IFV for such a small number
of users).
3.6.2.1 VolunteerProfiles Inference
Attribute Baseline Random guess IFV Inference
Gender 51% 50% 72.5%
Relationship 50% 50% 70.5%
Age 26% 16.6% 42%
TABLE 3.9: Inference Accuracy for VolunteerProfiles
As a second step to validate our IFV technique, we perform inference on VolunteerProfiles.
Table 3.9 shows that our algorithm also performs well on this dataset. Notice that Age
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inference is slightly worse than in PubProfiles. Recall from Section 3.6.2 that we had only
a few users in the last three bins in PubProfiles, and hence, we merged these bins. However,
in VolunteerProfiles, we have enough users and we can have 6 different age categories.
This explains the small difference in inference accuracy between VolunteerProfiles and
PubProfiles. Regarding other attributes, the accuracy is slightly worse for Relationship
(-0.5%) and better for Gender (+3.5%). This small variation in inference accuracy between
PubProfiles and VolunteerProfiles demonstrates that our technique has also good results
with users having private attributes: in PubProfiles, we could compute the inference ac-
curacy only on users who published their attribute values, while in VolunteerProfiles, we
could also test our method on users hiding their attributes.
3.7 Discussion
Topic modeling We used LDA for semantic extraction. Another alternative is to use
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) [139]. As opposed to LDA, LSA is not a generative
model. It consists in extracting a spatial representation for words from a multi-document
corpus by applying singular value decomposition. However, as pointed out in [140],
spatial representations are inadequate for capturing the structure of semantic associa-
tion; LSA assumes symmetric similarity between words which is not the case for a
vast majority of associations. One classical example given in [140] involves China
and North Korea: Griffiths et al. noticed that, generally speaking, people have always
the intuition that North Korea is more similar to China than China to North Korea.
This problem is resolved in LDA where P(occurence of word1|occurence of word2) $=
P(occurence of word2|occurence of word1). In addition, [140] showed that LDA outper-
forms LSA in terms of drawing semantic correlations between words.
Collaborative Filtering Our algorithm is based on discovering latent correlations be-
tween user interests in order to cluster users. An alternative approach could be to employ
model-based collaborative filtering (MBCF) that avoids using semantic-knowledge. In
MBCF, each user is represented by his interest vector. The size of this vector equals
the number of all defined interest names, and its coordinates are defined as follows: a
coordinate is 1 if the user has the corresponding interest name, otherwise it is 0. Since
interest names are user-generated, the universe of all such names, and hence the vector
size can be huge. This negatively impacts the performance.
In particular, collaborative filtering suffers from a “cold-start" effect [141], which
means that the system cannot draw correct inferences for users who have insufficient
information (i.e., small number of interests). Recall from Section 3.5 that 70% of users
in PubProfiles have less than 5 interests and it is more than 85% in RawProfiles. Hence,
the sparseness of users’ interest vectors is very high (the average density7 is 0.000025).
Moreover, [142] has studied the effect of cold-start in recommendation systems (for both
item-based and collaborative-based) on real datasets gathered from two IP-TV providers.
Their results show that a well-known CF algorithms, called SVD [143], performs poorly
when the density is low (about 0.0005) with a recall between 5% and 10%. Additionally,
7The density of this vector is the number of coordinates equal one divided by the vector size.
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the number of new users and interests is ever growing (on average, 20 millions new users
joined Facebook each month in the first half of 2011 [138]). This tremendous number of
new users and interests keeps the system in a constant cold-start state. In addition, users,
in MBCF typically evaluate items using a multi-valued metric (e.g., an item is ranked
between 1 and 5) but it must be at least binary (e.g., like/dislike), whereas in our case, only
“likes” (interests) are provided. In fact, the lack of an interest I in a user profile does not
mean that the user is not interested in I, but he may simply not have discovered I yet. In
these scenarios, when users only declare their interests but not their disinterest, MBCF
techniques (e.g., SVD [143]) are less accurate than nearest neighbor-like approaches that
we employed [144].
OSN independence One interesting feature of our technique is that it is OSN indepen-
dent. In particular, it does not rely on any social graph, and the input data (i.e. interest
names) can be collected from any other source of information (e.g., deezer, lastfm, or any
other potential sources).
No need for frequent model updates (stability) One may argue that our LDA model
needs frequent updates since user interests are ever-growing. Nevertheless, recall from
Section 3.4.2 that our technique uses the parent topics of the user interests (according to
Wikipedia) to augment the semantics knowledge of each interest. There are substantially
fewer higher-level parent categories than leaf categories in the Wikipedia hierarchy, and
they change less frequently. Thus, there is no need to update the LDA model, unless the
considered interest introduces a new parent category in the running model. Hence, our
approach is more stable than MBCF; once the IFV vector is extracted and similarity is
computed, we can readily make inference without having to retrain the system.
Targeted advertising and spam Using our technique, advertisers could automatically
build online profiles with high accuracy and minimum effort without the consent of users.
Spammers could gather information across the web to send targeted spam. For example,
by matching a user’s Facebook profile and his email address, the spammer could send him
a message containing ads that are tailored to his inferred geo-localization, age, or marital
status.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents a semantics-driven inference technique to predict private user
attributes. Using only Music Interests that are often disclosed by users, we extracted
unobservable Interest topics by analyzing the corpus of Interests, which are semantically
augmented using Wikipedia, and derived a probabilistic model to compute the belonging
of users to each of these topics. We estimated similarities between users, and showed how
our model can be used to predict hidden information. These disclosed attributes can be
exploited to carry out numerous malicious attacks among which social aware phishing (i.e.,
spear phishing) is probably the most visible (i.e., 40% of social network accounts are used
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for spam8) and the most studied too [10, 145]. Such attack have been demonstrated to be
highly effective as stolen information from victims is hardly detectable [146].
Next chapter extends these works by demonstrating a novel attack that exploits user
leaked or inferred attributes to speed up password cracking process. In this context, the
consequences of the privacy breach are no more “hypothetical” but have an immediate
impact on the security of the user accounts.
8http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-24/
likejacking-spammers-hit-social-media
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4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented an inference algorithm to infer hidden or missing
attributes from a user profile. We showed that our algorithm is able to infer various
personal information with a high accuracy by solely relying on public data. In this
chapter, we present a novel attack that exploits these information to break the user security.
Specifically, we construct a password cracker that leverage user information to speed up the
process of password guessing. We target users’ password as password-based authentication
is the most widely used form of user authentication, both online and offline. Passwords
will likely remain the predominant form of authentication for the foreseeable future, due to
a number of advantages: passwords are highly portable, easy to understand for laypersons,
and easy to implement for the operators. Despite the weaknesses passwords have, they
still are and will be in use for some time. The reason can be found in [147], which lists a
large number of criteria that user authentication mechanism may fulfill, and evaluates the
quality of a large number of user authentication mechanisms. While alternative forms of
authentication can replace passwords in specific scenarios, they have not been able, so far,
to replace them on a large scale.
User chosen passwords have a number of potential problems, most importantly they
are vulnerable to guessing attacks. In this scenario, the attacker has access to an oracle
(either online or offline) that verifies whether a password guess is correct. The number of
guesses could be bounded by a number of factors: 1) in an online attack, it could be bound
by the server limiting the number of attempts per unit of time; 2) in an offline attack, the
limit lies in the amount of time and resources the attacker is willing to commit to the task
of correctly guessing the password.
In this work, we concentrate on offline guessing attacks, in which the attacker can make
a number of guesses bounded only by the time and resources she is willing to invest. While
such attacks can be improved by increasing the speed with which an attacker can verify
guesses (e.g., by using specialized hardware and large computing resources [148, 149]),
we concentrate here on techniques to reduce the number of guesses required to crack a
password. Hence, our approach reduces the attack time independently of the available
resources.
The optimal strategy for password cracking (both offline and online) is to enumerate
passwords in decreasing order of likelihood, i.e., trying more frequent passwords first and
less frequent passwords later. Moreover, human chosen passwords frequently have a rich
structure which can be exploited to generate candidate guesses (e.g., using a dictionary
and a set of concatenation rules).
Recent work [38, 150] has shown ways to improve cracking performance by enumer-
ating guessed passwords based on their likelihood. These password crackers have been
shown to outperform JtR in certain conditions. The first insight of our work will be to
build upon and improve on the performance of these probabilistic password crackers.
Furthermore, while previously proposed password crackers outperform John the Ripper
(JtR) – one of the most used password cracker –, they do not consider any user specific
information. This means that the guesses outputted by each of these tools are fixed and do
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not depend upon additional information about the user.1However, as a tremendous amount
of personal information about users is available — either publicly or through attacks such
as the one presented in the previous chapter — one might exploit this data to speed up the
cracking process.
Common sense would suggest that guessing a password can be done more efficiently
when personal information about the victim is known. For example, one could try to guess
passwords that contain the victim’s date of birth or the names of their siblings. However,
this raises the question, how do we include this personal information to in the guessing?
Shall we include all the information about the victims or only restrict the attack to a
subset of that information? To the best of our knowledge, these questions have not been
thoroughly explored so far and, as we will show, have a serious impact on the security of
passwords. This is especially true since the steadily increasing use of social networks gives
attackers access to a vast amount of public information about their victims for the purpose
of password cracking.
Chapter organization We review some basics on password guessing, commonly used
password guessers, as well as more related work in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we
describe the Ordered Markov ENumerator (OMEN) and provide several experiments
for selecting adequate parameters. Section 4.4 compares OMEN performance to other
password guessers. Next section, details the idea of exploiting personal information in
password guessing, provides some basic statistics about the data we use, and presents a
detailed description of our algorithm. Experimental results are depicted in Section 4.6. We
conclude with a brief discussion in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work In Password Cracking
One of the main problems with passwords is that many users choose weak passwords.
These passwords typically have a rich structure and thus can be guessed much faster
than with brute-force guessing attacks. Best practice mandates that only the hash of a
password is stored on the server, not the password, in order to prevent leaking plain-text
when the database is compromised. Furthermore, additional salting is used to avoid pre-
computation attacks. Let H be a hash function and pwd the password, choose a random bit
string s ∈R {0,1}16 as salt and store the pair (s,h = H(pwd || s)). In this work we mainly
consider offline guessing attacks, where an attacker is given access to the pair (s,h), and
tries to recover the password pwd. The hash function is frequently designed for the purpose
of slowing down guessing attempts [151]. This means that the cracking effort is strongly
dominated by the computation of the hash function making the cost of generating a new
guess relatively small. Therefore, we evaluate all password crackers based on the number
of attempts they make to correctly guess passwords.
4.2.1 John the Ripper
John the Ripper (JtR) [152] is one of the most popular password crackers. It proposes
different methods to generate passwords: In dictionary mode, a dictionary of words is
1JtR does some very limited guessing depending on the username
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provided as input, and the tool tests each one of them. Users can also specify various
mangling rules. When mangling rules are provided, JtR applies each rule to each word in
the input dictionary. In real attacks, the dictionary mode using simple mangling rules works
surprisingly well, especially when the input dictionary is derived from large collections
of leaked passwords. Similarly to [153], we discover that for relatively small number of
guesses (less than 108), JtR in dictionary mode produces best results. However, we focus
on attacks with larger number of attempts, for which simple, non probabilistic approaches
fall short.
In Incremental mode (JtR-inc) [152], JtR tries passwords based on a (modified) 3-gram
Markov model. Specifically, JtR-inc computes not only the probability of each 3-gram but
also the probability that this particular 3-grams appears at certain indices. In this way, this
attack takes into account the structure of the password (e.g., upper case appears usually
at the front while numbers at the end). However, two key differences are to be stressed:
first, as for Narayanan and al. algorithm [38], the guesses are not generated in the true
probability order (i.e., form the most probable password to the less probable) and second,
the Markov chain is modified so that it can cover the entire key-space.
4.2.2 Password Guessing with Markov Models
Markov models have been proven to be useful for computer security in general and for
password security in particular. They are an effective tool to crack passwords [38], and
can likewise be used to accurately estimate the strength of new passwords [154].
The underlying idea is that adjacent letters in human-generated passwords are not
independently chosen, but follow certain regularities (e.g., the 2-gram th is much more
likely than tq and the letter e is very likely to follow th). In an n-gram Markov model,
one models the probability of the next character in a string based on a prefix of length
n−1. Hence, for a given string c1, . . . ,cm, a Markov model estimates its probability as
P(c1, . . . ,cm) (4.1)
≈ P(c1, . . . ,cn−1) ·
m
∏
i=n
P(ci|ci−n+1, . . . ,ci−1).
For password cracking, one basically learns the initial probabilities P(c1, . . . ,cn−1) and
the transition probabilities P(cn|c1, . . . ,cn−1) from real-world data (which should be as
close as possible to the distribution we expect in the data that we attack), and then
enumerates passwords in order of descending probabilities as estimated by the Markov
model (according to Equation 4.1).
To make this attack efficient, we need to consider a number of details. First, one usually
has a limited dataset when learning the initial probabilities and transition probabilities.
The limited data entails that one cannot learn frequencies with arbitrarily high accuracy,
i.e., data sparseness is a problem. The critical parameters are the size of the alphabet Σ
and the parameter n, which determines the length of the n-grams.
Second, one needs an algorithm that enumerates the passwords in the right order. While
it is easy to compute the probability for a given password, it is not clear how to enumerate
the passwords in decreasing probability. To overcome this problem, [38] provides a
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method to enumerate all passwords that have probability larger than a given threshold
λ , but not necessarily in descending order. Hence, all passwords that have a probability
(approximately) higher than λ are produced in output, where λ is an input parameter. This
is sufficient for attacks based on pre-computation (rainbow tables), but not for “normal”
guessing attacks where guessing passwords in the correct order can drastically reduce
guessing time.
Notably, an add-on to JtR has been released with an independent implementation of the
algorithm presented in [38]. The implementation is available at [152]. In the evaluation
section, we use this implementation as a comparison (and refer to as JtR-Markov).
4.2.3 Probabilistic Grammars-based Schemes
Probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) schemes make the assumption that pass-
word structures have different probabilities [150]. In other words, some structures, such as
passwords composed of 6 letters followed by 2 digits, are more frequent than others. The
main idea of these schemes is therefore to extract the most frequent structures, and use
them to generate password candidates.
More precisely, in the training phase, different structures are extracted from lists of
real-world passwords, where each structure indicates the positions of lower and upper case
letters, numerical, and special characters, as well as the associated probabilities. In the
attack phase (or password generation phase), an algorithm outputs the possible structures
for the grammar with decreasing probabilities. From this output, which describes positions
of the four classes of characters, password guesses are generated as follows: Numerical
and special characters are substituted by those that have been observed in the training
phase and in decreasing order of probability, and letters are substituted with appropriate
words from a dictionary. This gives the final password candidate list.
4.2.4 Password Strength Estimation
A problem closely related to password guessing is that of estimating the strength
of a password, which is of central importance for the operator of a site to ensure a
certain level of security. In the beginning, password cracking was used to find weak
passwords [155]. Since then, much more refined methods have been developed. One used
so-called pro-active password checkers to exclude weak passwords [156–160]. However,
most pro-active password checkers use relatively simple rule-sets to determine password
strength, which have been shown to be a rather bad indicator of real-world password
strength [154, 161, 162]. The influence of password policies on password strength is
studied in [163], and [164] proposes new methods for measuring password strength and
applies them to a large corpus or passwords. More recently, Schechter et al. [165] classified
password strength by counting the number of times a certain password is present in the
password database. Finally, Markov models have been shown to be a very good predictor
of password strength while being provably secure [154].
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4.3 OMEN: An Improved Markov Model Based Password
Cracker
In this section we present our efficient implementation of password enumeration based
on Markov models, which is the first contribution of this chapter. Our implementation
improves previous work based on Markov models by Narayanan et al. [38] and JtR [152].
Note that the indexing algorithm presented by Narayanan et al. [38] combines two ideas:
first, it uses Markov models to index only passwords that have high probability, and second,
it utilizes a hand-crafted finite automata to accept only passwords of a specific form (e.g.,
eight letters followed by a digit). Our algorithm is solely based on Markov models to
create guesses. However, it could be combined with similar ideas as well.
4.3.1 An Improved Enumeration Algorithm
Narayanan et al. ’s indexing algorithm [38] has the disadvantage of not outputting
passwords in order of decreasing probability, however, guessing passwords in the right
order can substantially speed up password guessing (see the example in Section 4.4).
We developed an algorithm, the Ordered Markov ENumerator (OMEN), to enumerate
passwords with (approximately) decreasing probabilities.
On a high level, our algorithm discretizes all probabilities into a number of bins, and
iterates over all those bins in order of decreasing likelihood. For each bin, it finds all
passwords that match the probability associated with this bin and outputs them. More
precisely, we first take the logarithm of all n-gram probabilities, and discretize them
into levels (denoted η) similarly to Narayanan et al. [38], according to the formula
lvli = round(log(c1 ·probi + c2)) , where c1 and c2 are chosen such that the most frequent
n-grams get a level of 0 and that n-grams that did not appear in the training are still assigned
a small probability. Note that levels are negative, and we adjusted the parameters to get the
desired number of levels(nbLevel), i.e., the levels can take values 0,−1, . . . ,−(nbLevel−1)
where nbLevel is a parameter. The number of levels influences both the accuracy of the
algorithm as well as the runtime: more levels means better accuracy, but also a longer
running time.
For a specific length ℓ and level η , enumPwd(η ,ℓ) proceeds as follows:
1. It identifies all vectors"a = (a2, . . . ,al) of length ℓ−1 (when using 3-grams we need
ℓ−2 transition probabilities and 1 initial probability to determine the probability for
a string of length ℓ), such that each entry ai is an integer in the range [0,nbLevel−1]
, and the sum of all elements is η .
2. For each such vector"a, it selects all 2-grams x1x2 whose probabilities match level
a2. For each of these 2-grams, it iterates over all x3 such that the 3-gram x1x2x3 has
level a3. Next, for each of these 3-grams, it iterates over all x4 such that the 3-gram
x2x3x4 has level a4, and so on, until the desired length is reached. In the end, this
process outputs a set of candidate passwords of length ℓ and level (or “strength”) η .
A more formal description is presented in Algorithm 1. It describes the algorithm for
ℓ= 4. However, the extension to larger ℓ is straightforward.
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Algorithm 1 Enumerating passwords for level η and length ℓ (here for ℓ= 4).2
function enumPwd(η ,ℓ)
1. for each vector (ai)2≤i≤ℓ with ∑i ai = η
and for each x1x2 ∈ Σ2 with L(x1x2) = a2
and for each x3 ∈ Σ with L(x3 | x1x2) = a3
and for each x4 ∈ Σ with L(x4 | x2x3) = a4:
(a) output x1x2x3x4
Example We illustrate the algorithm with a brief example. For simplicity, we consider
passwords of length ℓ= 3 over a small alphabet Σ = {a,b}, where the initial probabilities
have levels
L(aa) = 0, L(ab) =−1,
L(ba) =−1, L(bb) = 0,
and transitions have levels
L(a|aa) =−1 L(b|aa) =−1
L(a|ab) = 0 L(b|ab) =−2
L(a|ba) =−1 L(b|ba) =−1
L(a|bb) = 0 L(b|bb) =−2.
• Starting with level η = 0 gives the vector (0,0), which matches to the password
bba only (the prefix “aa” matches the level 0, but there is no matching transition
with level 0).
• Level η = −1 gives the vector (−1,0), which yields aba (the prefix “ba” has no
matching transition for level 0), as well as the vector (0,−1), which yields aaa and
aab.
• Level η = −2 gives three vectors: (−2,0) yields no output (because no initial
probability matches the level −2), (−1,−1) yields baa and bab, and (0,−2) yields
bba.
• and so on for all remaining levels.
The selection of ℓ (i.e., the length of the password to be guessed) is challenging, as the
frequency with which a password length appears in the training data is not a good indicator
of how often a specific length should be guessed. For example, assume that are as many
passwords of length 7 and of length 8, then the success probability of passwords of length
7 is larger as the search-space is smaller. Hence, passwords of length 7 should be guessed
first. Therefore, we use an adaptive algorithm that keeps track of the success ratio of each
length and schedules more passwords to guess for those lengths that were more effective.
More precisely, our adaptive password scheduling algorithm works as follows:
2Here L(xy) and L(z|xy) stand for the level of initial and transition probabilities, respectively.
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1. For all n length values of ℓ (we consider lengths from 3 to 20, i.e. n = 17), execute
enumPwd(0,ℓ) and compute the success probability spℓ,0. This probability is com-
puted as the ratio of successfully guessed passwords over the number of generated
password guesses of length ℓ.
2. Build a list L of size n, ordered by the success probabilities, where each element is a
triple (sp, level, length). (The first element L[0] denotes the element with the largest
success probability.)
3. Select the length with the highest success probability, i.e., the first element L[0] =
(sp0, level0, length0) and remove it from the list.
4. Run enumPwd(level0 −1, length0), compute the new success probability sp∗, and
add the new element (sp∗, level0 −1, length0) to L.
5. Sort L and go to Step 3 until L is empty or enough guesses have been made.
4.3.2 Selecting parameters
In this section we discuss several parameters choices and examine the necessary trade-
off between accuracy and performance. In the following, we detail the rational behind the
choice of three central parameters: n-gram size, alphabet size and the number of levels for
enumerating passwords.
n-gram size The parameter with the greatest impact on accuracy is the size of the n-
grams. A larger n generally gives better results as larger n-grams fit better the password
distribution. However, it implies a larger runtime, as well as a larger memory and storage
requirements. Note also that the amount of training data is crucial as only a significant
amount of data can accurately estimate the parameters (i.e., the initial probabilities and the
transition probabilities). We evaluated our algorithm with n = 2,3,4, results are depicted
in Figure 4.1.
As expected, the larger n is, the better the results are. Experiments with 5-grams are
not depicted in this Figure, but show slightly better results than for 4-grams. As 5-grams
implies a much longer running time, memory and storage for a small performance increase,
we decided to choose n = 4.
Alphabet size The size of the alphabet is another factor that has the potential to sub-
stantially influence the characteristics of the attack. Larger alphabet size means that more
parameters need to be estimated and that the runtime and memory requirements increase.
In the opposite, a small alphabet size means that not all passwords can be generated.
We tested several alphabet sizes by setting k = 20,30,40,50,62,72,92 where k repre-
sents the most frequent characters from the training set. The results are given in Figure 4.2
and Table 4.1. We clearly see a sharp increase in the accuracy from an alphabet size of 20
to the one of 62. After this threshold (62) , the success cracking rate remains roughly the
same. This is mainly explained by the alphabet used in the RockYou dataset where most
users favour password with mostly alphanumeric characters rather than using special ones.
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FIGURE 4.1: Comparing different n-gram sizes for the RockYou dataset.
FIGURE 4.2: Comparing different alphabet sizes for the RockYou dataset.
To minimize the impact of the charset while keeping fast computation, we opted for the 72
charset alphabet.
Number of levels A third important parameter is the number of levels that are used to
enumerate password candidates. As for previous parameters, higher number of levels can
potentially increase accuracy, but it also increases the runtime.
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|Σ| 20 30 40 50 62 72 92
15.7 46.4 55.86 67.18 68.1 68.08 68
TABLE 4.1: Percentage of cracked password for 1B guesses and varying alphabet sizes.
FIGURE 4.3: Comparing different number of levels for the RockYou dataset.
The results are shown in Figure 4.3. We see that increasing the number of levels from
5 to 10 substantially increases accuracy, but further increasing to 20 and 30 does not make
a significant difference.
#Levels 5 10 20 30
63.70 % 68.68 % 68.70 % 68.70 %
TABLE 4.2: Accuracy for 1B guesses and varying number of levels.
Selected parameters Unless otherwise stated, in the following, we use omen with the
following parameters: 4-gram, alphabet size of 72 and 10 levels.
4.4 Evaluating OMENs performance
In this section, we present a comparison between our improved Markov model password
cracker and previous state-of-the-art solutions.
4.4. EVALUATING OMENS PERFORMANCE
Chapter 4. Faster Cracker Leveraging Personal Information 75
4.4.1 Datasets
We evaluate the performance of our password guesser on multiple datasets. The
largest password list publicly available is the RockYou list (RY), consisting of 32.6 million
passwords that were obtained by an SQL injection attack in 2009. The passwords were
leaked in clear, all further information was stripped from the list before it was leaked to the
public. This list has two advantages: first, its large size gives well-trained Markov models;
second, it was collected via an SQL injection attack therefore affecting all the users of the
compromised service. We randomly split the RockYou list into two subsets: a training set
(RY-t) of 30 million and a testing set (RY-e) of the remaining 2.6 million passwords.
The MySpace list (MS) contains about 50000 passwords (different versions with
different sizes exist, most likely caused by different sanitation or leaked from the servers at
different points in time). The passwords were obtained in 2006 by a phishing attack.
Attribute Availability Mean Std
Friends 67.77% 243.6 388
EduWork 46.28% 2 0.9
Contacts 20.94% 1.15 0.65
Siblings 20.44% 5.8 6.1
Birthday 0.97% - -
Current City 16.2% - -
Home Town 13.93% - -
TABLE 4.3: Facebook dataset statistics.
The Facebook list (FB) was posted on the pastebin website3 in 2011. This dataset
contains both Facebook passwords and associated email addresses. It is unknown how the
data was obtained by the hacker, but most probably was collected via a phishing attack.
We complemented this list by collecting the public information associated to the Facebook
profiles connected to the email address. For each profile, we collected the public attributes,
which include: first/last name; location; date of birth; friends names; siblings names;
education/work names. Note that the access to user profile is governed by a set of privacy
policies and as such, not all data is publicly accessible. Table 4.3 provides statistics about
attributes availability as well as the mean and standard deviation for multivalued attributes
(e.g., Friends list or Education history).
Finally, we used a list of 60000 email addresses and passwords leaked by the group
LulzSec (we call this list LZ). The list was publicly released in June 2011 via Twitter4.
Ethical Considerations Studying databases of leaked password has arguably helped
the understanding of users real world password practices and as such, have been used in
numerous studies [150, 154, 161]. While these datasets are already available to the public,
3http://pastebin.com/
4https://twitter.com/#!/LulzSec/status/81327464156119040
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we believe that the information they contain is private; therefore we treat these lists as
confidential [166].
4.4.2 Results
FIGURE 4.4: Comparing OMEN with the JtR Markov mode at 1B guesses (left) and at 10
billion guesses (right).
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our password guesser OMEN, and compare
it with other password guessers on different datasets. We discover that OMEN has
consistently better performance compared to previously proposed algorithms. For the
experiments, we trained all algorithms using the RockYou training set RY-t, and evaluated
it on the sets RY-e, MS and FB. Table 4.4 provides a summary of the results. The table can
also be used as a comparison of all the previously proposed password crackers.
Algorithm Training Set
Testing Set
RY-e MS FB
Omen
RY-t (1010) 80.40% 77.06% 66.75%
RY-t 68.7% 64.50% 59.67%
PCFG [150] RY-t 32.63% 51.25% 36.4%
JtR-Markov [38]
RY-t (1010) 64% 53.19% 61%
RY-t 54.77% 38.57% 49.47%
JtR-Inc RY-t(1010) 54% 25.17% 14.8%
TABLE 4.4: Summary table indicating the percentage of cracked passwords for 1 billion
guesses (or 10 billion when specified).
4.4.2.1 OMEN vs JtR’s Markov Mode
Figure 4.4 shows the comparison of OMEN and the Markov mode of JtR. JtR’s Markov
mode implements the password indexing function by Narayanan et al. [38]. Both models
are trained on a list of passwords (RY-t). Then, given a target number of guesses T (here 1
billion in the left graph and 10 billion in the right graph), we computed the corresponding
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FIGURE 4.5: Comparing OMEN using 2-grams with the JtR Markov mode.
level (η) to output T passwords. The curve shows the dramatic improvement in cracking
speed given by our improved ordering of the password guesses. In fact, JtR-Markov
outputs guesses in no particular order which implies that likely passwords can appear
“randomly” late in the guesses. This behaviour leads to the near-linear curves shown in
Figure 4.4. One may ask whether JtR-Markov would surpass OMEN after the point T ; the
answer is no as the results do not extend linearly beyond the point T ; and larger values of
T lead to a flatter curve. To demonstrate this claim, we performed the same experiment
with T equals to 10 billion guesses (instead of 1 billion). Figure 4.4 (right) shows how the
linear curve becomes flatter.
To show the generality of our approach, we compare the cracking performance on three
different datasets:RY-e, FB and MS. The ordering advantage allows OMEN to crack more
than 40% of passwords (independently of the dataset) in the first 90 million guesses while
JtR-Markov cracker needs at least eight times as many guesses to reach the same goal. For
the RockYou dataset the result are impressive: OMEN cracks 45.24% of RY-e passwords
in the first 10 million guesses (see Figure 4.4 (right)) while JtR-markov achieves this result
after more than 7 billion guesses.
In the above comparison, OMEN uses 4-grams (as determined in Section 4.3.2),
while JtR-Markov uses 2-grams. To see the effects that this difference has, we provide
an additional comparison of OMEN using 2-grams with JtR-Markov, this is given in
Figure 4.5. The results are as expected: JtR-Markov still has a straight line, which means
that OMEN has a better cracking speed. The speed advantage of OMEN can be seen at 1
billion guesses where OMEN cracks 50% of all passwords while JtR-markov cracks less
than 10% of them. At the point T , i.e., when JtR-Markov stops, both algorithms perform
roughly the same. Note that since all parameters (i.e., alphabet size, number of levels etc.)
of both models are not identical, we have a small difference in the cracking rate at the point
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T .
FIGURE 4.6: Comparing OMEN to the PCFG guesser (left) and to JtR incremental mode
(right).
4.4.2.2 OMEN vs PCFG
Figure 4.6 compares OMEN to the PCFG password guesser of Weir et al. [150],
based on the code available in [167]. We run it using the configuration as described in the
paper [150]: we use RY-t to extract the grammar and the dictionary dict-0294 [168] to
generate candidate passwords.
Figure 4.6 shows that OMEN outperforms the PCFG guesser. After 0.2 billion guesses,
OMEN cracks 20% more passwords than PCFG for both MS and FB datasets and 10%
more for RY-e. It is interesting to see the impact of the training set on PCFG performance:
PCFG performs much better on RY-e than on FB and MS. We believe the reason is that
the grammar for PCFG is trained on a subset of the RY list, which is better adapted for
guessing the RY list. OMEN achieves roughly the same results for all datasets which
proofs the robustness of the learning phase. Finally, note that PCFG mostly plateaus after
0.3 billion guesses and results hardly improve any more, whereas OMEN still produces
noticeable progress.
4.4.2.3 OMEN vs JtR’s Incremental Mode
We also compare OMEN to JtR in incremental mode (Figure 4.6). Similarly to the
previous experiments, both crackers were trained on the RockYou training set of 30 million
passwords and tested on RY-e, MS and FB datasets. Clearly, JtR incremental mode
produces worse guesses than OMEN. Notably, it also produces worse guesses than any
other cracker tested.
4.5 Personal Information and Password Guessing
The results of the previous section show that a significant fraction of passwords can
be guessed with a (relatively) moderate number of attempts, compared to the entire
possible search space. However, most techniques adopt a coarse grained approach that
relies on a generic probability distribution, which by definition, does not depend on the
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password being guessed. Intuitively, exploiting personal information in the password
cracking process may enhance the success ratio. Surprisingly, such possibility has not been
extensively studied.
While a multitude of personal information can be used, we focus on a realistic scenario
where these information can easily be extracted from a public source. For instance, an
attacker armed with his victim email address, can gather her social network profile and use
the collected information to guess her password. Such information includes:
• Information related to the user’s name, such as first name, last name, username;
• Social relations such as friends’ and family members’ names;
• Interests such as hobbies, favorite movies, etc;
• Location information like the place of residence;
In the next sections, we explore the relationship between such information, referred to
as hint in the rest of this chapter, and passwords, as well as its effect on password cracking.
4.5.1 Similarity between Passwords and Personal Information
To asses whether social information can be exploited to improve password cracking,
we quantify the correlation between passwords and personal information. We use two
different similarity metrics to capture different aspects of the potential overlap.
Longest common substring (LCSS): The LCSS of two strings is the longest string that is
a substring of both strings. For example, the LCSS of the two strings abcabc and abcba
is abc. We use the length of the LCSS as an indicator for similarity.
(Asymmetric) Jaccard similarity (JS): The Jaccard similarity index compares similarity
of two sets. For two sets X and Y , the Jaccard index is J(X ,Y ) := |X∩Y ||X∪Y | . It is a similarity
measure on sets, not on strings, but for our application it is very natural to extract the
n-grams of the strings and apply Jaccard similarity to the sets of n-grams. There is one
drawback of this measure that does not match our application, namely that appending
unrelated information to the hint (which degrades the “real” usefulness only for large
appended text) rapidly decreases the JS value. Therefore, we use an “asymmetric JS”
defined as follows: Given a password P and a hint H, and denoting the set of 3-grams that
appear in P and H with P3g and H3g, respectively, we define J∗3g(P,H) :=
|P3g∩H3g|
|P3g|
. Figure
4.7 displays the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the JS between passwords and
personal information for FB and LZ datasets. For each password of the Facebook dataset,
we compute the JS with each of its corresponding personal attribute.
The lowest (green) plot (FB Max) displays the CDF of the maximum of these values.
It basically shows that about 35% of Facebook passwords are somewhat correlated with
one of their user’s attributes. Note that any non-zero similarity means that at least one
3-gram is shared, which already is a substantial overlap. The correlation becomes stronger
for about 10% of users. The grey (FB Username) and black (LZ Username) curves display
the CDF of the similarity between passwords and UserNames for the FB and LZ datasets,
respectively. They both show similar shape, although surprisingly Facebook passwords
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FIGURE 4.7: CDF of Jaccard similarity
seem to be more correlated with UserNames than LZ passwords. In both datasets, about
10% of passwords seem to be highly correlated with the UserNames attribute.
Attribute Len JS JS(5%) LCSS LCSS(5%)
FirstName 5.84 0.02 0.31 0.93 4.34
LastName 6 0.01 0.24 0.71 3.55
Username 10.53 0.07 0.58 1.48 6.31
Friends 147.28 0.06 0.30 1.54 4.15
Edu/Work 40.93 0.02 0.23 1.20 3.5
Contacts 17.67 0.06 0.63 1.44 6.55
Location 25.70 0.01 0.13 1.07 2.94
Birthday 6.84 0.04 0.5 0.87 4
Siblings 94.71 0.04 0.36 1.27 4.96
TABLE 4.5: Mean similarity between passwords and personal information (FB dataset).
Table 4.5 goes into more details and summarizes similarity measures between different
attributes and the respective passwords of the FB datasets. As shown by Figure 4.7, more
than 60% of passwords have no similarity with personal information attributes. This
explains the small similarity values in column JS and LCSS, that correspond to averages
of the similarities over the whole dataset (since many similarities are equal to zero, the
resulting averages have pretty low values). For this reason, we order the passwords
according to their similarity values for the different attributes. We then present, in the
columns JS(5%) and LCSS(5%), the average similarity of the top 5% for each attributes.
First we notice how attributes such as UserNames, FirstName and Birthday seem to
substantially overlap with the passwords. For instance, for the top 5% users, UserNames
and Birthday share half of the n-grams with the password and have more than 4 and 6.4
common substring with it respectively. Furthermore, we notice that long attributes such as
Friends or Education and Work (on average 150 characters long and 50, respectively) have
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a high value of LCSS. Finally, the LCSS(5%) results show that the average LCSS value is
around 3 which sustains the usage of a 3-grams model (rather than 2-grams or 4-grams).
In Section 4.5.2.1 we will explore how to incorporate these findings to robustly increase
the performance of OMEN.
4.5.1.1 Password Creation Policies and Usernames
One surprising fact highlighted by the data in the previous section is that usernames
and passwords are very similar in a small, yet significant, fraction of the cases. This fact
prompted us to study this specific aspect of password policies in depth, the reader may
refer to appendix for more details. The results are worrisome: out of 48 tested sites, 27
allowed identical username and password, including major sites such as Google, Facebook,
and Amazon, and only 4 sites required more than one character difference between the
two. This could lead to highly effective guessing attack.
4.5.2 OMEN+: Improving OMEN Performance with Personal Infor-
mation
In Section 4.5.1 we showed that users’ personal information and passwords can be
correlated. However, it is not clear how to use such information when guessing passwords,
specifically because using some information that is not sufficiently relevant may have a
negative impact on the performance. Let us illustrate this possibility with an example:
assume that we possess extensive information about a victim. This information may include
name, date of birth, location information, family member names, etc. Intuitively, this
information should increase the performance of a password cracker. For example, we could
generate a password guess with the name of a sibling concatenated with their year of birth.
However, in order to increase the (overall) performance, one must still order password
guesses in decreasing probability. Otherwise, the integration of additional information
can decrease effectiveness. To show this, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the
attacker is only allowed one guess. The same argument can be extended to any number
of guesses. The attacker should use some personal information for the one guess only if
the probability of this password is higher than the most frequent “generic” password, say
123456. Assuming that no user specific password is, on average, more frequent than
123456, then, by including personal information, the attacker would decrease her chances
of success for the single guess.
Boosting Algorithm It is challenging to decide how to use the additional personal
information. In fact, only certain parts of this data overlap with the password. In a
dictionary-based attack, we need to decide which substring(s) should be added to the attack
dictionary, and choosing the wrong ones one could decrease performance. With Markov
models, however, the situation is easier, as n-grams are a canonical target. By increasing
(conditional) probabilities of important n-grams (i.e., n-grams that are contained in hints),
we can increase the probability of passwords that are related to them, and thus improve
OMEN’s performance. Our boosting algorithm takes as input a parameter α > 1 (see
Section 4.5.2.1 on how this parameter is chosen), a hint h, and a Markov model consisting
of the initial probabilities p(xy) and the conditional probabilities p(z|xy), and outputs
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modified conditional probabilities p∗(z|xy).
Let us assume we have a list of N passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdN , and for each password
pwdi we have some additional information hinti, which may or may not help us in guessing
the password. We want to automatically and efficiently determine if a specific set of hints
is useful or not, and how strongly each of the hints should be weighted. Note that since
hints are password-specific, trying all possible combinations would be too computationally
expensive. Our algorithm works as follows5:
1. For each pair pwdi,hinti, two sets are defined: Si is the set of 3-grams that appear
in both the password and the hint and Ti is the set of 3-grams from pwdi such that
hinti has a 3-gram that shares the first two letters, but not the third. For instance, if
pwdi = password and hinti = passabcd then Si = {pas,ass} and Ti = {ssw}.
2. For each 3-gram xyz in Si, we set the conditional probability
p∗(z|xy) := α · p(z|xy)
for a given parameter α . Considering the previous example, we boost the 3-grams
pas and ass, as follows: p∗(s|pa) := α · p(s|pa); p∗(s|as) := α · p(s|as)
By modifying a conditional probability from p̂ to α · p̂ we distribute a probability
mass of (α −1)p̂ that we need to subtract at another place. The probability p̂ is (in
practice) much smaller than 1 (we use an alphabet size of |Σ|= 72), so 1− p̂ ≈ 1.
Consequently, if we multiply all remaining (conditional) probabilities except p̂ with
(1−α p̂), they sum up to approximately 1 again (using the approximation simplifies
the calculations):
(1−α p̂) · (∑
i $=z
p(i|xy))+α p̂ ≈ (1− p̂α) ·1+α p̂ = 1.
Writing si := |Si| and ti := |Ti| for the sizes of the two sets, the overall effect on
password probabilities is
p∗pwdi = ∏
i∈(pwdi)3g
pi ≈ αsi(1− p̂α)ti · poldpwdi
where p∗pwdi is the “new” probability after boosting the n-grams, and p
old
pwdi
is the
“old” probability before boosting.
4.5.2.1 Estimating Boosting Parameters
The section describes how the optimal boosting parameter α of each hinti is computed.
Recall that OMEN outputs password guesses in descending order of their (estimated)
probabilities. Let f denote the function that gives the estimated probabilities x = f (y) for
the y-th guess that OMEN outputs. This function can simply be computed by running
OMEN and printing the probability estimation of the current password. The inverse
function y = f−1(x) gives the number of guesses OMEN needs to output before reaching
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α ln(α) boosted
email 1.6 0.5 0(*)
userName 2 0.7 1
firstName 2.3 0.8 1
lastName 1.5 0.4 0
birthday 5 1.6 2
location 1.7 0.5 1
contact 1.5 0.4 0
eduWork 1.1 0.1 0
friends 1.4 0.3 0
siblings 1.7 0.5 1
TABLE 4.6: The estimated values of α and the boosting parameters for the attributes we
considered.
passwords with a certain (estimated) probability. In order to simplify the subsequent
calculations, we approximate this function as f−1(x)≈ x−1.5.
The estimated number of guesses which is required to crack all passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdN
is consequently defined by S = 1
N ∑i=1,...,N f
−1(ppwdi).Therefore, for a given hinti, the
value αi to use to boost this hint is the value of α that minimizes the following function:
S∗ = 1
N ∑i=1,...,N(p
∗
pwdi
)−1.5.
The following section presents the optimal values of α for different hints.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Boosting Parameter Estimation
We use the techniques described in the previous section to estimate the boosting
parameter α for the different types of hint. For each hint, we compute the sum S∗ for
different values of α , and select the value that minimizes it. We illustrate the results with
three examples:
First Name When plotting S∗ as a function of α for the attribute first name it shows a
minimum at approximately α = 2.3, which yields a boosting parameter of 1.
EduWork When plotting S∗ as a function of α for the attribute eduWork, which is an
identifier that contains the persons’ education and occupancy, we notice a very small
decrease in the beginning, with a minimum around α = 1.2, but the overall differences are
small and the remainder of the graph is monotonically increasing. The boosting parameter
is 0.1, which is rounded to 0.
Birthday When plotting S∗ as a function of α for the birthday attribute, we have to note
that our dataset only contains a small number of profiles with that attribute, so the result
5To ease presentation, we only describe the estimation algorithm for 3-grams. The generalization to
n-grams is straightforward.
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might not be necessarily meaningful. Overall, there were only 7 profiles where the birthday
attribute have an effect, and for two of them the effect is positive. These two have enough
effect to lead to a great advantage in using the attribute. Overall, we limited the maximal
parameter considered to 5.
Email We dropped the attribute email. Although it gives an alpha of 1.6 since the
username is contained in email and achieves better results. The remaining boosting
parameters are summarized in Table 4.6.
FIGURE 4.8: Comparing OMEN with and without personal information on the FB list
4.6.2 OMEN+ Performance
Once we have estimated the values of the parameters αi for each hinti, we run OMEN+
on the Facebook (FB) list, consisting of 3140 passwords together with publicly available
information about the users (see Table 4.3 for data availability). The results are presented
in Figure 4.8. As expected, by including personal information in the Markov model,
OMEN+ is able to guess more passwords in absolute terms. We have also conducted
different experiments with other values of αi to test the effectiveness of our estimation
code. We confirmed that, when using different values of αi, the cracking performance
either remains the same or slightly decreases. The two lower curves in the Figure 4.8
show the performance of OMEN+ over all passwords with and without using personal
attributes. Using personal information can increase the guessed passwords up to 5%
(for lower number of guesses of up to 100 million), and around 3% at 1 billion guesses.
The limited performance gain is partially explained by the two facts: first, as shown in
Table 4.3, few personal information are available in FB dataset (e.g., only 0.98% of all
users relieved their birthday), and second, only a small proportion of passwords are based
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on personal information (see Section 4.5.1). However, these results are specific to our
dataset which assume a realistic – but rather a weak – adversary with a limited background
knowledge (i.e., only publicly available information from a single source). However, as
shown by Brown et al. [169] in a survey evaluating the generation and use of passwords,
two thirds of passwords are designed around one’s personal information and more than
50% of all passwords are constructed around proper names and birthdays. As such, our
results represent a lower bound for password cracking leveraging personal information.
FIGURE 4.9: Comparing OMEN with usernames as hint and without on the LZ/FB list
The two curves in the upper part of the Figure 4.8 display the performance of OMEN+
over the top 5% passwords that are the most correlated with their personal attributes. The
achieved performance is much better: About 82% of the passwords are cracked by using
usernames only, and more than 88% by using all considered personal attributes. This
result is very promising. Figure 4.9 shows a similar experiment performed on the LZ list
(60000 passwords). We only had access to the local-part (i.e., the username) of the email
associated to each password. Even though the information in this case was more limited,
we realized similar gains compared to the previous test on the more extensive FB data.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work we have first presented an efficient password guesser (OMEN) based
on Markov models, which outperforms all publicly available password guessers. For
common password lists we found that we can guess more than 80% of passwords with
10 billion guesses. Subsequently, in our second contribution, we tested if additional
personal information about a user can help us better guessing passwords. We found that
some attributes indeed help, and we showed how OMEN+ can efficiently exploit this
information. We summarize some of the key insights:
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• Markov models were long known [38] to be an effective tool in password guessing,
but our work shows that they have an even better potential than previously thought,
as we could make them guessing “in order”, which leads to the improvements shown
in Figures 4.4 and 4.6. Moreover, we assessed the impact of different parameters on
the accuracy of the algorithm.
• We find that we can guess up to 5% more passwords when exploiting personal
information. However this percentage is a lower bound since we had only access
to limited amount of data (e.g., only 0.98% of users in our dataset disclosed their
birthday see Table 4.3 ). However, as shown by Brown et al. [169], real passwords
tend to be correlated with user information in most cases. In such context, the gain
of OMEN+ can go up to 30%. This result clearly shows that passwords based on
personal information are weaker and should be avoided.
Our work demonstrates how privacy leakages can be exploited in the process of cracking
passwords and might lead to the compromise of the user account. This attack highlights a
severe security threat resulting from uninformed consent of data release which calls for
several countermeasures. First, users should be informed that using personal information in
their passwords is a risky behaviour. Second, password strength measurement tools should
provide a mechanism to integrate personal information, especially from social network,
and treat passwords based on that information as weak. Finally, a privacy measurement
tool for social profiles — while tackling an orthogonal problem — can persuade the user to
share less information, decreasing the security risks. In the next chapter, we tackle the last
point by proposing a quantitative privacy measure to quantify the privacy loss caused by
publicly revealing attributes. Our approach can enhance privacy in at least two scenarios:
(i) First, data providers can quantify the risk of re-identification (i.e., identifying a user in a
dataset) when disclosing a set of attribute and (ii) Second, it provides a quantitative privacy
measure: by hiding or revealing attributes a user can measure the amount of information
he is disclosing.
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5.1 Introduction
The potential to uniquely identify individuals by linking records from publicly available
databases has been demonstrated in a number of research works e.g. [120, 121, 170].
In [120] Sweeney reported on the uniqueness of US demographic data based on the
1990 census and showed that, 87% of the US population can be uniquely identified by
gender, ZIP code and date of birth. The resulting loss of privacy, i.e. the potential for
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re-identification of a person’s private data which may exist in any other publicly released
dataset, was also demonstrated by the author. A more recent study [121] also produced
similar conclusions. Therefore, anonymization of databases (e.g. medical records or
voting registers) with the aim of protecting the privacy of individual’s records when such
are publicly released, in reality cannot be successful if the released database contains
potentially unique combinations of attributes relating to specific individuals.
Today, with the proliferation of public online data, OSNs are a rich source of informa-
tion about individuals. For either social or professional purposes, users upload various,
in most cases highly personal and up to date information, to their OSN accounts. User’s
personal data exposure is managed by public profiles, which contain a selected (in some
case mandatory) subset of the total information available in their private OSN profiles. In
fact, public profiles represent an easily accessible public dataset containing user’s personal
details which, depending on the OSN, can include their age, gender, contact details for
home and workplace, interests, etc (for a full list, see [124]).
The existence of public profiles creates a valuable new source of information that has
to be considered when releasing anonymized personal records. Also, the anonymized OSN
private (profile) data is being released by OSN’s to profiling and advertising companies,
including in some cases additional information (e.g., political orientation such as in [171]),
thus increasing the number of already available anonymized datasets used e.g. for medical
or other research.
These can be henceforth linked to public profiles, allowing the re-identification (and
the de-anonymization) of the personal records i.e. the exposure of individual’s identities1.
Previous research has addressed the release of online data in public OSN profiles
[16, 124] and re-identification mechanisms aimed at e.g. anonymized OSN graphs [46].
In this chapter, we aim to revisit the study of the uniqueness of demographics, however
we consider online public data available for individuals. As a first step towards such
analysis, we consider the evaluation of the uniqueness of public OSN profiles, consisting of
the publicly available attributes e.g. gender, age, location, etc. associated with individual
OSN accounts. We use Information Surprisal (IS) and entropy, established information
theory metrics for measuring the level of information contained in random variables, to
quantify the level of uniqueness. Having a higher IS of the attribute values released in the
public OSN profile can be directly related to being more unique in a set of OSN users,
and therefore more easily re-identifiable when combining with other publicly available
datasets containing the same attribute values. Then, this work also answers the question of
the appropriate selection of attributes to be included when releasing anonymized personal
records.
The derived measure can also be used as a quantitative measure of privacy. In fact, the
IS value allows the user the assess the amount of information he is revealing publicly. By
hiding or revealing a set of attributes, a user can measure the amount of information he is
disclosing, and hence, can take corrective privacy measures to reduce his exposure.
We note that quantifying the user’s revealed information is a challenging task, as data
that needs to be acquired in order to obtain a reliable estimation of profile uniqueness,
is either only partially accessible (private attributes are by definition hidden), protected
1The policy of major OSNs is to use real names [172].
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by OSNs providers, or of too large a volume for the data collection to be practical. Our
study provides a novel probabilistic framework that leverages the global private attribute
statistics retrieved from a major OSN Ads platform (Facebook), to obtain an unbiased
quantification of uniqueness. We present an approach that takes user specific privacy policy
into account and allows us to calculate the uniqueness of public profiles, computed over
the entire Facebook dataset.
The first contribution of this work is our proposed methodology for computing the
uniqueness of public OSN profiles, independently from the dataset on which the analysis is
performed. This methodology can, more generally, be applied to any set of attributes that
comprise a user’s profile. To compute the probability of publicly revealing a combination
of attributes and evaluate the measure of uniqueness, we combine statistics derived from a
crawled dataset of public profiles and the Ads audience estimation platform. We consider
both independence and dependence of the probabilities to reveal different attributes.
Our second contribution is that we evaluate the quantity of information carried in
individual attributes and attribute combinations present in user’s profiles of a major OSN
(Facebook). We show that there is a wide range of values for the amount of identifying
information carried by different attributes, with gender being the lowest with 1.3 bits of
entropy and current city the highest with the entropy of 13.6 bits.
In our third contribution, we identify the key attribute combinations that contribute to
profile uniqueness. Consistent with reported results for linking anonymous US datasets
[120, 121] but also applicable globally, we show that the combination of gender, place of
residence and age (directly related to date of birth used in [120, 121]) has the highest impact
on the potential for re-identification of user’s anonymized data. The higher information
granularity available in [120, 121] and the difference in the type of community studied
(online and global versus US population) results in a lower, although still significant,
potential for identification. We show that 55% of Facebook users that reveal this attribute
combination (around 7.7 Million) can be identified as a group of 20 and around 18% of
such users can be considered unique with an information surprisal of 29 bits.
Finally, we show the impact of user’s privacy policy on the amount of information
carried in public profiles and highlight how policy uniqueness contributes to potential for
re-identification of users in anonymized datasets. We show that some attributes may allow
users to hide in the crowd if revealed, as opposed to hiding them from public access.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we provide a
summary of the datasets used for this study. In Section 5.3 we describe the methodology
for computing the uniqueness of public profiles. We present results and identify the
key attributes that contribute to uniqueness in Section 5.4, followed by the discussion in
Section 5.5. We finally conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Our data source
For the purpose of our study, we have collected two datasets from Facebook: a set
of public user profiles and a set of statistics collected from the Facebook Ads audience
estimation platform. In the following, we start by providing a brief description of user’s
profile as implemented by Facebook, then we describe the methodology used to collect the
data. Finally, we describe the characteristics of our datasets.
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5.2.1 Facebook Profiles
Recall from Chapter 3 (section 3.2), that a Facebook profile is a collection of attributes
that describe the user’s personal data. An attribute might be binary (e.g., gender), multi-
value from a predefined list (e.g., country) or in free form text (e.g., Interests). According
to the privacy settings, an attribute can be visible to anyone, shared with (a set of) user’s
social links (e.g., friends) or only visible to the owner of this profile. Hereafter, we consider
an attribute (resp. a set of attributes) to be public if it is visible to anyone and private
otherwise.
5.2.2 Public Facebook profiles dataset
We use PubProfiles dataset presented in Chapter 3 Section 3.5.1 which was further
sanitized to fit our experimentation purposes, e.g. we have used the Google Geocoding
API [173] to unify the values of country of origin and current country.
5.2.3 Facebook Ads Platform dataset
Facebook offers a platform to estimate the audience of targeted Ads campaigns2.
Advertisers can select different criteria such as user’s locations (country or city), gender,
age (or range of ages), etc.3 These criteria can also be combined in a conjunctive manner.
According to the selected combination, the Facebook Ads audience estimation platform
outputs the approximate audience which represents the number of Facebook users that
match the criteria. Figure 5.1 shows an example of the audience estimation on the Facebook
Ads platform. Potential advertiser’s selection criteria is for gender male, age of 25
and locations Sydney, Australia, with the corresponding audience size estimation, as
highlighted by area A, being 42500. Applying an additional criteria produces a lower
estimate highlighted by B in Figure 5.1.
Although there is no full report on how Facebook generates the audience values,
Facebook document [174] states that it uses all provided information to calculate the
audience size for targeted Ads which implies that both public and private attributes are
utilized. The only exception is the use of IP address to determine the current location
of users (i.e., current city and current country)4. To build the Facebook Ads platform
dataset we proceed as follows. We use a subset of six attributes: gender, age, relationship
status, Interested in, current city and current country. First, for every Facebook profile in
PubProfiles, we extract the set of revealed attribute’s values (e.g., male, New York). Then,
for each extracted attribute set, we retrieve the corresponding approximate audience size
using the Facebook Ads platform. In addition, we collect statistics for each attribute and
for all possible attribute values (e.g., all possible locations).
2www.facebook.com/advertising/
3Besides aforementioned attributes, the advertiser can also target user’s interests (e.g., beer and wine),
interested-in (men or/and women), relationship, language, education (e.g., High School or college/Grad) and
workplace.
4We note that users connecting to the OSN service through e.g. proxies may introduce errors into the
location distributions extracted from Facebook statistics compared to actual users locations. However, we
believe these users only represent a small proportion of the overall population, and as such only have a low
impact on the location accuracy.
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FIGURE 5.1: An example of Ads audience estimation on the Facebook Ads platform,
URL: https://www.facebook.com/ads/create.
To collect the statistics from the Ads audience platform, we have developed a cus-
tomized automated browser based on the Selenium WebDriver 5 which sends requests to
the Facebook Ads platform with an acceptable rate. We share our collected dataset with the
community on http://planete.inrialpes.fr/projects/AdsStatistics.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Facebook deliberately reduces the granularity of
estimated audience size by only returning “fewer than 20” for audience numbers lower
than 20 users (see area B in Figure 5.1). In our methodology presented in the following
section, we conservatively consider “fewer than 20” as being exactly 20 users.
5.3 Methodology for public profile uniqueness computa-
tion
This section presents our proposed method to leverage the Ads platform audience
estimation provided by OSNs operators (focusing on Facebook) to estimate the uniqueness
of users profiles. Uniqueness of a variable is related to the amount of information a
variable carries and is commonly measured by information surprisal and entropy. These
are probability based metrics, therefore to compute the IS or entropy associated with a
user’s profile, we need a way to estimate the probability to observe the set of attribute’s
values comprising the profile, independently from the population of profiles we consider.
We first introduce the required theoretical background and notations used in this chapter,
followed by the description of our mechanism to estimate the profile uniqueness.
5.3.1 IS and entropy computation for OSN profiles
Table 5.1 introduces the notations. We denote Tot as the set of all user profiles of a given
OSN. Every user profile uA in Tot comprises a set of k attributes A = (a1, ..,ai, ..,ak).
The profile uA and all the associated variables may refer to a private, priv or a public,
pub profile.
5http://seleniumhq.org/
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A A set of attributes (a1,a2, ...).
V (ai) The values of attribute ai.
uA A profile defined over the attributes in A .
pub, priv Denote the public and private OSN profiles.
∅
ai The set of profiles in which an attribute ai is not available.
P∅(ai) Probability that the attribute ai is not present in a profile.
Prev(A )
Probability to publicly reveal every attribute in A knowing that they are present
in the private profile.
TABLE 5.1: Notations
An attribute ai can be seen as a random variable, Xai , with values in V (ai)= {x
ai
1 ,x
ai
2 , ..,x
ai
n }
which follow a discrete probability function P(ai = x
ai
j ). Similarly, a user’s profile u
A
defined on a set of k attributes A can be seen as the outcome of the k-dimensional random
vector (Xa1 ,Xa2 , ..,Xak).
5.3.1.1 Information surprisal and entropy
IS or self-information measures the amount of information contained in a specific
outcome of a random variable. IS of a user profile u which includes a set of attributes A is
given by
IS(uA ) =−log2(P(uA )) (5.1)
with P(uA ) = |u
A |
|Tot| i.e. the proportion of users having the values of u
A for the set of
attributes A . IS is measured in bits and every bit of surprisal adds one bit of identifying
information to a user’s profile and thus halves the size of the population to which uA may
belong.
Entropy, denoted H(A ), on the other hand, quantifies the amount of information
contained in a random variable (here a multi-dimensional random vector). Entropy and
IS are closely related, as entropy is the expected value of the information surprisal, i.e.
H(A ) = E(IS(uA )). The entropy of a set of attributes A is given by
H(A ) =− ∑
uA ∈V (A )
P(uA )IS(uA )
and can be seen as the amount of information carried by the attributes in A . E.g. a user in
our public dataset of 4.45 ·105 profiles is unique if IS reaches 19 bits. For the Facebook
population estimate, we use the value provided by the Facebook Ads platform of 722
Million users, therefore a user profile is unique with an IS of 29 bits.
In the following, we focus on the use of the IS and entropy as a convenient way to
measure the uniqueness of uA amongst the OSN user profiles, which can be further utilized
to derive the related level of anonymity of user profiles e.g. by using k-anonymity [51].
5.3.1.2 The freq method – Is PubProfiles enough
A naive approach to compute the uniqueness of profiles is to rely on an unbiased sample
of the dataset of entire OSN’s profiles, such as PubProfiles, and adopt a frequency-based
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approach (denoted freq) to provide a rough approximation of the probability P(uA ), used
to compute IS and entropy. Assuming we have a dataset of |Tot|crawl profiles, we can then
estimate the probability of each profile simply as |u
A |
|Tot|crawl
if uA belongs to PubProfiles, and
0 otherwise, where |uA | represents the number of occurrences of uA in PubProfiles. In the
following, we will refer to the frequency-based computation of IS as ISfreq, computed by:
ISfreq =−log2( |u
A |
|Tot|crawl
) (5.2)
This approach has at least two drawbacks. Unless all possible combinations of attribute
values (as observed in the entire set of profiles Tot) are collected in the PubProfiles dataset,
the frequency-based approach would provide a very coarse estimation and the IS value
is lower bounded by the sample size of the dataset. Therefore if freq method is used, a
maximum value of 19 bits can be reached, as opposed to the maximum IS value of 29
bits, based on a full dataset. For the same reason, we would not be able to estimate the
uniqueness of profiles corresponding to a set of attribute values that are not in PubProfiles.
Whereas collecting such a large dataset is technically challenging, we propose a new
methodology based on the audience estimation provided by the advertising systems of
OSNs, which, as per Section 5.2, have access to the full set of private user’s profiles.
5.3.2 Computing profile uniqueness from advertising audience esti-
mation
Ideally, to compute IS and entropy of a set of attributes A that are free from sampling
bias and granularity constraints, we need to know the frequency of each profile, i.e. |uA |, in
the full dataset Tot. Leveraging the audience size estimation from the OSN Ads platform,
we are now able to obtain such statistics that are based on entire set of OSNs profiles. As
discussed in Section 5.2.3, the audience size is estimated from both public and private
profiles, resulting in overestimation of frequency for public profiles. This is because user’s
privacy policy limits the amount of information released on public profiles, which is often
significantly lower than that available in private profiles and as such |∅A |pub ≫ |∅A |priv.
However, the bias induced by the users’ privacy policy can be corrected by noting that:
|uA |pub = |u
A |priv ·P
rev(A )
where Prev(A ) is the probability to publicly reveal attributes in A knowing that they are
disclosed in the private profile.
In the following, we propose two methods to compute Prev, trading off accuracy of
the IS estimation and measurement costs (reflected by the number of requests to the
Ads audience estimation platform) as discussed in Section 5.3.2.2. These methods are
respectively denoted indep and dep, as they differ in the assumption regarding the mutual
independence of the probabilities to reveal specific attributes.
5.3.2.1 The indep method – assuming independence between the likelihood of re-
vealing specific attributes
Here, we assume the probabilities to reveal selected attributes in user’s public profile
are mutually independent. The probability to reveal an attribute ai, Prev(ai), can then be
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obtained as follows.
First, we highlight the fact that the total number of public and private profiles is equal,
|Tot|pub = |Tot|priv, i.e. there will always exist a corresponding public and private user’s
profile.
We also observe that the number of public profiles in which an attribute is not present,
i.e. |∅ai |pub, strictly depends on the probability that this attribute isn’t publicly present, i.e.
P∅pub(ai) is the probability that attribute ai is not available in public profiles, and as such:
|∅ai |pub = P
∅
pub(ai) · |Tot|pub
Similarly, we can calculate the probability that an attribute is not disclosed in private
profiles as:
|∅ai |priv = P
∅
priv(ai) · |Tot|priv
The number of profiles which define ai as a private attribute but in turn hide this
attribute from public access can then be obtained from equation (5.3):
|∅ai |pub − |∅ai |priv
= P∅pub(ai) · |Tot|pub −P
∅
priv(ai) · |Tot|priv
(5.3)
On the other hand, we note that (|Tot|priv− |∅ai |priv) accounts for the number of private
profiles where ai is revealed, and that Prev(ai) · (|Tot|priv − |∅ai |priv) is the total number
of public profiles where ai is revealed. Hence, the difference (|Tot|priv − |∅ai |priv)−
Prev(ai) · (|Tot|priv − |∅ai |priv) accounts for the number of users who have profiles where
ai is revealed on private but not on public profiles. We can then compute:
|∅ai |pub − |∅ai |priv
= (1−Prev(ai)) · (|Tot|priv − |∅ai |priv)
(5.4)
Hence from equations (5.3) and (5.4) we have:
P∅pub(ai) · |Tot|pub −P
∅
priv(ai) · |Tot|priv
= (1−Prev(ai)) · (|Tot|priv − |∅ai |priv)
i.e.
P∅pub(ai)−P
∅
priv(ai) = (1−Prev(ai)) · (1−P∅priv(ai))
Prev(ai) = 1−
P∅pub(ai)−P
∅
priv(ai)
1−P∅priv(ai)
(5.5)
Note that P∅pub(ai) is computed from PubProfiles: P
∅
pub(ai) =
|∅ai |pub
|Tot|crawl
. On the other
hand, P∅priv(ai), the probability that attribute ai is not available in private profiles, is
computed from the Ad platform audience estimation dataset: P∅priv(ai) =
|∅ai |priv
|Tot|priv
, where
|∅ai | is not directly available but can be computed by using the aggregate number of
profiles queried from the Ad platform for all possible values of the attribute ai:
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|∅ai |priv = |Tot|priv − ∑
uai∈V (ai)
|uai |priv
For example, for the attribute age, the number of private profiles in which this attribute
is not included can be obtained by: |∅age|priv = |Tot|priv −∑ j=65
+
j=13 |u
age= j|priv (age can be
queried from the Ads platform for a range of values between 13−65+, where 65+ refers
to the “Nomax” age attribute in the Facebook Ads audience estimation platform).
According to the assumed independence between attributes ai, the probability to reveal
every attribute in A is obtained by:
Previndep(A ) = ∏
ai∈A
Prev(ai)
Finally, the IS estimation of public profile uA using indep
method can be computed using equation (5.1) as:
ISindep =−log2(
|uA |priv ·P
rev
indep(A )
|Tot|priv
) (5.6)
5.3.2.2 The dep method – considering dependence between the likelihood of reveal-
ing specific attributes
Although the indep method offers a simple way to compute Prev(A ), the estimation of
probabilities can be inaccurate if the independence assumption does not hold. To verify
this, we evaluate the dependence between the likelihood of revealing specific attributes,
based on our PubProfiles dataset. Table 5.2 shows the calculated probabilities to reveal
each of the six example attributes: gender, interested in, relationship, age, current city,
and country along the rows knowing that another attribute along the columns has been
already revealed. Table 5.2 also includes the overall probability to reveal specific attributes
(1−P∅pub(ai)).
1−P∅pub(ai) 0.76 0.15 0.22 0.024 0.21 0.23
Gend. Int. In Rel. Age City Country
Gender 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.8 0.8
Interested In 0.17 1.00 0.46 0.35 0.24 0.24
Relationship 0.25 0.68 1.00 0.48 0.33 0.33
Age 0.01 0.04 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.03
City 0.23 0.34 0.32 0.41 1.00 0.97
Country 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.99 1.00
TABLE 5.2: Probabilities to reveal attribute a1 (rows) knowing that attribute a2 is shown
on public profile, e.g. P(gender = revealed|age = revealed) = 0.86
We can observe that there is indeed a correlation between probabilities to reveal specific
attributes on public profiles.
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To properly assess the correlation between two attributes, the probability P(ai =
revealed|a j = revealed) must be considered jointly with 1−P∅pub(ai), the overall proba-
bility to publicly reveal ai. The highest dependence can be observed for users’ interest
(Interested In), where users who reveal this attribute have a much higher probability to
reveal any other attributes, e.g. the probability to reveal the relationship status when
Interested In is revealed is over three times higher than the overall probability to reveal the
relationship status.
Our aim is to provide a general framework for the estimation of public profile unique-
ness. We note that the values of the probabilities from Table 5.2 may be driven either by
information sensitivity and user’s privacy awareness, or simply by natural dependency
between attributes from a semantic perspective, however the dependency analysis is out of
the scope of this work.
In the following, we present a methodology to compute Prev(A ) taking into account
the dependency between probabilities to reveal attributes.
Addressing the dependency between Prev(ai) with ai ∈ A , requires us to compute the
frequency of a disclosed combination of these attributes.
Prevdep(A ) can be computed similarly to equation (5.5), as:
Prevdep(A ) = 1−
P∅pub(A )−P
∅
priv(A )
1−P∅priv(A )
(5.7)
with P∅pub(A ) and P
∅
priv(A ), the probability that a set of attributes A is not available in a
public (resp. private) profile being defined as : P∅pub(A ) = P(
∨
ai∈A ai =∅) and
P∅priv(A ) =
|Tot|priv −∑uA ∈V (A ) |uA |priv
|Tot|priv
(5.8)
We note that the computation of P∅priv(A ), and P
rev
dep(A ), requires the audience estimation
of every value uA in V (A ). This is implemented by requesting every possible set of
attributes from the Ads audience estimation platform. For example, to obtain P∅priv(A )
where A = {Interested In, gender}, we query the Ads audience platform for the number of
profiles corresponding to all combinations of gender = {man, woman} and Interested In =
{man, woman, both}.
This represents an overhead in terms of measurement costs for the dep method, as
compared to the indep method which requires a fewer number of queries. However, we
note that this overhead may not be prohibitive, as the audience size estimation requests are
sent to the Ad audience estimation platform only once for any set of attribute values.
The IS of the public profile uA , assuming the dependency of publicly revealing at-
tributes, denoted by ISdep, can be estimated as:
ISdep =−log2(
|uA |priv ·P
rev
dep(A )
|Tot|priv
) (5.9)
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5.4 Findings on public profile attributes
In this section we study the uniqueness of users within the PubProfiles dataset, using
the methodology presented in Section 5.3. We first present our results for the uniqueness
based on specific single attributes disclosed in a user’s public profile, followed by a study
on the impact of revealed attribute combinations. Finally, we consider the impact of
a user’s privacy policy on the resulting uniqueness of the corresponding user. Due to
space constraints, we only present a subset of calculated values, noting that these are
representative of our overall findings.
We stress that our main focus is on the uniqueness resulting from the presence of
specific attributes and attribute combinations in user’s public profile, in line with our goal
to have a generic mechanism for evaluating uniqueness.
5.4.1 Information surprisal for a single attribute
We first consider the IS and entropy (average IS) for individual attributes, calculated
using the freq and indep/dep methods and based on the PubProfiles and Facebook Ads
platform datasets. Note that in this section, as we are calculating IS (and entropy) for a
single attribute, the ISdep and ISindep (and corresponding entropy) values are identical, and
denoted as ISdep/indep.
Figure 5.2 (a)–(l) shows the PDF and CDF of the calculated IS values (y-axis, left and
right hand side, respectively). For the sake of clarity, entropy H is included as a numerical
value on top of each sub-figure (a)–(l). We also show: the number of users who hide a
specific attribute, N (note the number of users who reveal this attribute is 445k−N); the
aggregate of N and the number of users with attribute values that are not available on the
Facebook Ads platform, denoted N/A.
Overall, we can observe that there is a considerable difference in the range of IS and
entropy values for selected attributes, with gender shown in Figure 5.2 (c)–(d) having the
lowest and current city shown in Figure 5.2 (k)–(l) the highest entropy (and IS) values,
respectively 1.3 bits and 13.6 bits. This follows the definitions of IS and entropy, which
are related to the number of values an attribute may take and the number of users with
specific attribute values, so higher information granularity and lower number of users for
a specific value both result in a higher uniqueness. However, an absence of an attribute
value may also be related to the profile uniqueness. Therefore, we also show the number
of users hiding the corresponding attribute ai and the associated IS as numerical values
included above each of the sub-figures 5.2 (a)–(l).
We note the different scale of y-axis in Figure 5.2 (a)–(l), resulting from the varying
value for the total number of users in the PubProfiles dataset who have disclosed a specific
attribute.
Age Considering the ISdep/indep values in Figure 5.2 (b), we can observe that over 70%
(approximately 5.5k) of users have an IS value higher than 10.5 bits, corresponding to an
identifying user group size of about 500k users. This supports the conclusion that age is
an identifying attribute which users should be careful about disclosing. In line with this,
the users who hide this attribute (representing 98.4% of the total population) are highly
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FIGURE 5.2: PDF (left) and CDF (right) of IS values and Entropy H (shown on top
of the sub-figures) for single attribute computed by ISfreq and ISdep/indep methods (note
ISdep = ISindep for single attribute). Values are shown for: age, gender, relationship,
interested in, current city and country. * hidden IS=information surprisal for users hiding
this attribute; N: number of users who hide this attribute; ** N/A: Total of N and the
number of users for whom the disclosed attribute value is not available on Facebook Ads
platform, e.g. age > 65
anonymous with an IS value of 0.024 bits.
We remind the reader that each bit of information increase in IS halves the size of the
population to which the user represented by their public profile with corresponding IS may
belong.
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Gender We can observe that users who reveal the gender attribute disclose less infor-
mation (with average ISfreq = 1.34 bits shown in Figure 5.2 (c) and average ISdep/indep =
1.4 bits) shown in Figure 5.2 (d) than the users who consider this information private (with
IS of 2.08 bits). In Section 5.4.4 we will show the impact of hiding a common combination
of attributes, including gender. Note that this is a highly popular attribute, with around
75% of Facebook users disclosing it in their profiles. Consequently, the population that
hides it displays a high IS value for this attribute.
Relationship status The calculated ISfreq shows, in Figure 5.2 (e)–(f), that for more than
60% of the users, the relationship status reveals a low value of IS, with ISfreq = 4 bits and
ISdep/indep = 4.4 bits. Hiding this information has a very low associated IS of 0.35 bits.
We note that only a subset of IS results are presented here, due to the supported values in
the Facebook Ads platform 6.
Interested In We can observe in Figure 5.2 (g)–(h) that OSN users generally consider
this attribute as highly sensitive and the vast majority does not disclose it, resulting in a
very low IS value for such users 0.24bits. The average ISfreq values for users who display
this attribute are moderate (7.53 bits). Similarly, the ISdep/indep values also do not indicate
high user uniqueness, with users being identifiable to within a group of 3.9 Million, only
by revealing this single attribute.
Current country There is a wide range of IS values for users who have disclosed this
attribute, as can be seen in Figure 5.2 (i)–(j). The average IS values are moderately high,
with ISfreq = 5.54 bits and ISdep/indep = 6.08 bits, while hiding this information reveals
very little (0.4 bits). We note that 210 different countries appear as values for this attribute
in our PubProfiles dataset. By examining the data values, we have observed that close
to half of the total population (of those who have revealed their current country) have
US as this attribute value. Therefore, the corresponding IS, for both ISfreq and ISdep/indep
methods, is low with a value of around 4 bits. For all other users with the current country
attribute set, the calculated IS values for both methods range between a moderate value of
7 bits to 15 bits, a significant amount of information which increases the uniqueness of the
user resulting in an identifiable group of around 22k users.
When comparing the ISfreq and ISdep/indep values, we can observe a lower ISfreq for
the US, indicating that the ISfreq method overestimates the representation of US in the IS
calculation.
Current city The large range of potential values for this attribute and correspondingly
high potential to distinguish users intuitively flags it as sensitive personal information.
We can observe from Figure 5.2 (k)–(l) that the average IS values are quite high, with
ISfreq = 12.7 bits and ISdep/indep = 13.16 bits, while hiding this information reveals very
little (0.4 bits). Also, more than 75% of the users who display this attribute value lose
6The Facebook Ads Platform allows display of relationship statistic based only on a subset of values
supported in Facebook profiles: single, married, engaged and in a relationship; queries based on divorced
and widowed status are not supported.
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more than 11 bits (based on both ISfreq and ISdep/indep values). Note than more than 20%
of the users in PubProfiles reveal this information, which makes it a valuable attribute for
unique identification.
5.4.2 Expected IS as a function of the number of attributes
We now consider multiple attributes in IS calculations.
Figure 5.3 shows the expected IS and the average entropy values calculated for a
varying number of attributes.
We show the minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and maximum of the
IS values for all users. Both IS and entropy are averaged over all combinations of the
selected number of attributes. As can be expected, increasing the number of disclosed
attributes results in higher IS and entropy values and the corresponding amount of revealed
information about the users. In the following subsection, we will explore in more detail the
specific attribute combinations which will result in higher IS values and therefore present
a higher privacy risk for users.
Comparing the results obtained using the three calculation methods, in Figure 5.3 we
can observe that the values of ISfreq are consistently lowest for all attribute combinations,
followed by ISdep and ISindep. As previously discussed, ISfreq presents a rough calculation
of values, which can be used as an indication of the relevance (to privacy) of both attributes
and attribute combinations. Increasing the complexity of obtaining data (i.e., the number
of required queries from the Facebook Ads platform) increases the accuracy of the result.
Consequently, the ISindep values can be calculated for the combinations not present in the
collected dataset. However, this method results in higher IS and entropy values than what
is obtained by the more precise ISdep method, which in turn requires the highest amount of
information from the Facebook Ads platform.
We can observe the most significant difference in the IS and entropy values obtained by
different methods when considering the users who have revealed six attributes in Figure 5.3
(b). The ISindep and ISdep values reach an average entropy higher than 25 bits, representing
a corresponding uniqueness within a set of 22 users, while the ISfreq value underestimates
IS and only reaches 19 bits of entropy with a significantly lower corresponding unique user
set of around 1300 users. Although there may be a number of factors contributing to the
low ISfreq values, the most relevant one is the dependency of the frequency-based entropy
estimation on the used dataset. Regardless of the large size and the unbiased sample of
the full dataset that we have used for ISfreq calculations, a number of combinations of
attributes among the profiles may still be missing and will influence the result.
5.4.3 On the relevance of disclosed attribute combinations
We now consider the IS values for different attribute combinations, enabling us to draw
conclusions about the dominant (and less relevant) parameters contributing to privacy loss.
Figure 5.4 shows the cumulative distributions function of the IS, for: (a) ISfreq, ISindep
and ISdep with all six attributes considered; (b)–(d) ISfreq, ISindep and ISdep for selected
attribute combinations that were shown to have extreme (both low and high) IS values.
Similarly to the results shown in Figure 5.3, we can observe that revealing 6 attributes
(regardless of their values) results in a high IS value for the majority of users, e.g. observing
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FIGURE 5.3: (a) Information surprisal and;(b) Expected entropy for a varying number of
attributes.
the ISindep and ISdep CDF values in Figure 5.4 (a), more than 80% of the OSN population
with six disclosed attributes has IS of more than 22 bits. This represents users uniquely
identifiable within a set size of 170.
Considering specific attribute combinations shows the importance of having a carefully
considered personal privacy policy with selectively disclosed attributes. Figures 5.4 (b)–(d)
indicate that users should be wary of concurrently disclosing the combination of age,
gender and current city, as this reveals almost as much information as as the total of six
disclosed attributes. Although the granularity of our data is significantly lower (only age is
available in the PubProfiles dataset, as compared to full birth date in the dataset used in
[120, 121]) and we study a different community (global and online, as compared to US
only and based on Census data in [120, 121]), our results are in line with the previously
published studies on the uniqueness of demographics [120, 121], which show that the
combination of gender, ZIP code and date of birth has a very high uniqueness. We can
observe in Figure 5.4 (c) that around 55% of users have IS of around 25 bits and can
therefore be identified in a set of 20 users. Further to this, around 18% of users can be
uniquely identified, having the IS value of their public profile at 29 bits. This represents a
significant potential threat, as the corresponding number of Facebook users is around 7.7
Million for being identifiable to within a set of 20 and 2.7 Million for unique identification.
On the other hand, revealing the gender and interested in may not be harmful from a
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FIGURE 5.4: Multiple attribute information surprisal distribution
privacy perspective for most of the OSN users (IS is less than 5 bits for 90% of the users).
Disclosing the relationship status along with the gender and country of residence reveals a
higher amount of information, with more than 70% of users loosing at least 11 bits of IS.
We note that, although our results have been derived for a sample of the Facebook
population, the unbiased nature of the sample (as argued in Section 5.2) makes them
applicable to the whole Facebook population.
5.4.4 Impact of privacy policy
This section complements the understanding of the key parameters that influence the
resulting IS and entropy values of users’ profiles, by studying the potential impact of users’
privacy policy.
The likelihood to reveal specific attributes varies significantly amongst user profiles
and there are some combinations that users may potentially prefer to hide (the dependency
between probabilities to reveal pairs of attributes, shown in Table 5.2 partially illustrates
this). One consequence of users’ restrictive privacy policies is that other users revealing a
rare set of attributes may be more easily identifiable, independently from the values of the
attributes (i.e., regardless whether the attribute’s values are rare). To verify this claim, we
show in Figure 5.5 the information surprisal ISdep as a function of the P
rev
dep (note the log
scale on the x-axis).
As expected, the lower the probability with which users reveal attributes, the higher
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the value of ISdep. However, to understand whether the increase in profile uniqueness
is contributed by the attributes’ values themselves or by the hiding of these attributes
(setting restrictive privacy policies), we also include in the figure the values of ISpriv
denoting the information surprisal of the user’s private profiles (i.e., reflecting the profile
uniqueness contributed to by all the attribute values). ISpriv is obtained from the Facebook
Ads platform statistics, for each set of attributes corresponding to a specific value of ISdep.
For improved clarity of the figure, we also plot the Bezier approximation of the data.
We again observe the general trend for both ISdep and ISpriv: A decrease in P
rev
dep
values corresponds to an increase in average ISdep and ISpriv values, which illustrates that
independently from the attributes values, the more a set of attributes is hidden the more
unique the corresponding profiles will be. In other words, a restrictive privacy policy is
also a good identifier of profiles. On the other hand, we highlight an interesting observation
that can be made from Figure 5.5, which shows that the gap between the ISdep and ISpriv
also increases as Prevdep decreases. This result suggests that the more users tend to hide a
combination of attributes, the more identifying this set of attributes will be for other users
that do reveal it. The paradox here is that when a combination of attributes becomes too
rare, because of a majority of users choice to hide it, it also becomes very identifying when
revealed on other profiles. Similarly, when a combination of attributes is very common,
hiding it becomes identifying amongst the rest of the crowd.
5.5 Discussion
We show that it is possible to estimate the quantity of information carried by a combi-
nation of attributes shared on OSNs profiles. This is accomplished by leveraging the Ads
audience size information from the OSN itself, to compute the probability that a selected
set of attributes would be revealed publicly by users. In fact, Prev can be seen as a way to
measure users’ willingness to publicly share attributes they have revealed in their private
profiles.
Consider a scenario where a user wanting to protect their privacy creates a pseudonym-
based profile, and hides some of the attributes from public access. While this may be
thought of as a suitable approach to being anonymous, our findings show that it may not
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always be effective, as the level of anonymity will depend on the chosen set of attributes
and attribute combinations, which will carry a varying level of identifying information.
We also show that revealing selected attributes may be more effective towards achieving
anonymity than hiding them, as this approach would allow users to hide in the crowd of
similar users.
Applications based on the proposed methodology We envisage a number of applica-
tions for our profile uniqueness computation framework. First, we plan to develop an
online service where users would submit a profile to be evaluated in regards to the potential
for unique identification of the information they would display publicly. The service would
provide an indicator to inform users whether the set of attributes they are revealing (or
hiding) is identifying. The users would therefore be able to measure the efficiency of the
applied privacy settings and choose the desired trade-off with the usability of their public
profile.
Second, our framework can be used by OSNs to design better strategies to release
datasets of OSNs records to e.g. the research community. To this effect, by understanding
which combinations of attributes disclose a high amount of information about users, OSNs
operators could carefully select public profiles with low IS, which will in turn have a low
likelihood to be linked to external records and thus deanonymized.
Potential extensions As previously mentioned, a frequency-based approach to compute
profile uniqueness is dependent of the collected public profiles i.e. the captured set of
combinations of attributes. It is therefore impractical, as e.g. it cannot estimate the
uniqueness of a profile with a combination of attributes absent from the dataset. An
alternative approach could be to adopt a smoothing-based (e.g., Good-Turing [175] or
Laplace [176]) frequency estimation technique that can be used to predict the occurrences
of the non-observed combinations of attributes, by relying on observed distributions of
individual attributes. However, a smoothing-based method still cannot take into account
the dependence between the likelihood of revealing specific attributes.
In this work, we have deliberately chosen to concentrate on a fixed set of attributes.
We illustrates the extent to which the chosen attributes may identify the users revealing
them, and it is important to note that our methodology is general enough to be extended
to other attributes that might be shown on users profiles. E.g., users’ interests have been
shown to be good predictors of other attributes [6] and as such may carry a high level of
information about users. We also did not include users’ full names in this study, as the
application scenarios we consider focus on anonymized profiles where the identity of users
is unknown.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a novel method to compute the uniqueness of public profiles
independently from the dataset used for the evaluation. We exploit the Ads platform of a
major OSN, Facebook, to extract statistical knowledge about the demographics of OSN
users and compute the corresponding IS and entropy of user profiles. This is used as a
metric to evaluate profile uniqueness and hence the magnitude of the potential risk to
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cross-link the specific (OSN based) public information about a user with other public
data sources. Our findings highlight the relevance of choosing the right combination of
attributes to be released in user’s public profile and the impact of user’s privacy policy on
the resulting anonymity.
This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis which treated privacy concerns related
to information sharing. In the next part, we study a second aspect of privacy in OSNs
namely privacy threats related to the OSN ecosystem. Specifically, we show how OSN
interactions with third and fourth parties can cause information leakages and breach user
privacy.
5.6. CONCLUSION
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6.1 Introduction
The popularity and widespread of OSNs has increased in recent years to a level
unparalleled by any other Internet service. While these services are freely accessible,
the viability of their business model relies on collecting users’ personal data for targeted
advertising and in some cases data monetisation [116].
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OSN user’s profiles represent a rich source of personal information about the users,
including the demographic information, their interests and social relations. Throughout the
last three chapters, we studied the threats to privacy resulting from this direct exposure
of personal information. In fact, by choosing to publicly reveal some attributes, the user
might be the target of inference attack that discloses some hidden or missing data. This
information can further be used to carry other attacks such as guessing his password.
However, a second source of privacy diffusion and exposure of information about
individuals is the third party tracking of user’s Internet activity (i.e., the visited web sites).
A number of research studies (e.g., [3]) investigate the mechanisms used for web tracking
by third party services including the Ads networks, analytics companies and content
distribution networks, and the increasing widespread of such mechanisms on the Internet.
In this chapter, we focus on the emerging players in the web tracking arena, the OSN
services. The OSN “share" feature provides both an incentive for web site owners to
include it on their sites, as it may result in their increased popularity, and a way for
OSNs to track user activity on these sites. We investigate in detail the mechanisms for
tracking user’s visited web sites and the magnitude (widespread) of the tracking activities
for the three most popular OSNs: Facebook (FB), Twitter (TW) and Google+ (G+). We
demonstrate how the tracking is done even when the users are logged out of a specific
OSN or, surprisingly, when they do not have an OSN account. We further demonstrate the
risks from such tracking by an experimental study showing how the majority of user’s web
profile can be constructed based on the information tracked by OSNs.
Our contributions include: (i) Highlighting of the mechanisms by which the three
most popular OSNs track visited sites and showing that even without an OSN account
a user is still vulnerable to tracking. (ii) Evaluation of the widespread of user tracking
by the three major OSNs, based on the Alexa top 10000 sites. (iii) Based on real traffic
traces, demonstration of the real potential that an OSN provider may construct a large
part of user’s web profile; we present examples where up to 77% of user’s web profile is
constructed by OSNs only by tracking user’s activity.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the techniques
deployed by the three majors OSNs to track users. Section 3 describe the widespread
of such mechanism in top10K most visited web site as classified by Alexa. Section 4
presents an analysis on real web traffic and demonstrates the efficiency of tracking system
on building accurate user profile.We conclude in section 5 and present ideas for future
work.
6.2 Privacy elements
This section describes the implementation of the OSN Tracking Mechanism (we will
call hereafter OTM or bugs interchangeably) by presenting its main components. We
then describe each technique of the studied OSNs and evaluate each of their tracking
capabilities.
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FIGURE 6.1: Retrieving web content
6.2.1 Preliminary Operations
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, when a user visits a web site, the fetched page typically
generates several other HTTP connections. These connections, which aim to get additional
components into the loaded web page, can be classified in two groups: i) connections
belonging to the user’s visited web site (usually referred to as first party connections), and
used to fetch “legitimate" resources such as images or css (e.g., step 2 in Figure 6.1). ii)
other connections established to third party entities for the purpose of content serving,
Ads, tracking, analytics measures and statistics computation or a combination of thereof
(step3). As such, these third parties can be Ads Networks (e.g., Google’s Adsense, Yahoo!
yieldmanager, AOL) or analytics companies (e.g., Google analytics, Microsoft/aquantive)
or content distribution networks (e.g., akamai, yimg), but also, as this chapter concentrates
on, Online Social Networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Google+).
In the case of an OTM, these connection triggers are embedded into the fetching of
the “Share" button resource. In fact, an increasing number of websites provide a button
to share their content within the visitor’s favorite OSN. These buttons, and without any
user specific interaction, establish connections and send information about the user to the
OSN provider. We stress that the user does not necessarily interact with the OTM resource,
and without his consent can be tracked by the OSN. As we will show it next, this OTM
operates even if the user is not logged-in the OSN and, even if he never registered to that
OSN. Similarly to [3] we examine the disclosure of web traffic activities to third parties.
However, these “new” kind of third parties have a huge amount of personal information
about the user. Therefore, armed with this new knowledge, they can build a better profile.
In general, the OTM is built on well-known building blocks, namely iframes, div
or XFBML and cookies. Besides how OTM resources are embedded into the visited
webpages, in the following we briefly describe how the webpage’s url is transmitted to
the OSNs. Then, we examine, for each of the OSNs, its specific implementation of the
cookies-based tracking mechanism.
6.2.2 Transmitting the url of the webpage
When loading the OTM resource the user browser typically transfers the current web-
page address to the OSN third party either via the referrer attribute of the HTTP request or
as a simple url parameter. For example, when fetching www.cnn.com, an HTTP request
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is sent to Facebook. As shown in the request (below), the url parameter origin specifies
the origin of the request transmitted to the OSN (the article that the user is accessing).
www.facebook.com/extern/login_status.php
?api_key=[...]app_id=[...]&origin=http%3
A%2F%2Fedition.cnn.com
Similarly, the referrer record as shown below reports the url of the website the user
accesses.
GET www.facebook.com/plugins/likebox[...]
Referer: http%3A%2F%2Fedition.cnn.com
6.2.3 Cookies-based tracking
In addition to the webpage url, OSNs need to uniquely identify the user to bind this
information to potential previously gathered data (e.g., from user’s profile). Cookies are
the de facto technique that is typically used to report user’s activities while ensuring unique
tracking identity. In this section, we examine specific cookies-based tracking mechanism
that we observed for three of the major OSN actors: Facebook, Twitter and Google+.
OSN Facebook Twitter Google+
Cookie name d_atr c_user twid guest_id SID PREF(ID)
Logged In Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Logged out (But having an account) Yes No No Yes No Yes
No account (But have visited the OSN website) Yes No No Yes No Yes
No account (Never visited the OSN website) No No No Yes No No
TABLE 6.1: Cookies Transmission Strategy
6.2.3.1 Facebook
Facebook stores 16 different cookies for an active session. The role of each one is hard
to determine but two of them are made to identify users: d_atr and c_user. The d_atr
cookie contains a random string (24 characters) and is set when a user visits Facebook.com.
If a user does not have a Facebook account but has once visited Facebook website, this
user will also have this cookie set. The cookie is valid for two years, which suggests
that Facebook has the ability to track all users that have once visited Facebook (and even
without registering to the service) for a relatively long period of time. This information of
the “past” could then theoretically be linked to the user upon registration of an account
using a unique web browser.
As shown in Table 6.1, when a user is logged in, the user’s browser sends both c_user
and d_atr to Facebook and hence the user is uniquely identified. When the user logs out,
the d_atr cookie is not deleted and the browser keeps on sending it to Facebook when
loading OTM resources. By matching the d_atr with c_user, Facebook is able to track
user’s activities who have logged out.
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To summarize Table6.1’s entries for Facebook, we note that we observed that Facebook
has the ability to track all users that have visited facebook.com at least once, and
logging out from the service does not help users to avoid being tracked.
6.2.3.2 Twitter
Twitter stores 15 different cookies for a logged-in user. Again, although it is difficult to
determine the role of each cookie, we note two cookies that are used as a user identifier:
twid and guest_id.
guest_id is set independently from whether the user is logged-in or not, as opposed to
the twid cookie, which is only present during a user’s active session. These two cookies can
be used to link the activity of logged-out users with his real Twitter ID. Moreover, Twitter
shows an interesting behavior when a user who has never visited the Twitter website visits
a website which contains a Twitter “Share” Button: Twitter automatically set the guest_id
cookie and hence may track users that never visited twitter.com. This behavior is
unique, since none of the studied OSNs behaves similarly.
6.2.3.3 Google+
Google stores 28 different cookies for a logged-in user. These cookies belong to
multiple domains and sub-domains of Google. Multiple cookies are used to uniquely
identify user, among which a few are sent through an encrypted connections (e.g., SSID).
We identified and studied two of those that are sent in clear, SID and PREF . The latter
contains a random string variable ID that uniquely identifies the user.
When the user disconnects, the PREF cookie is not deleted and is still transmitted to
Google when the browser loads a Google+ OTM resource. As such, theoretically, Google
is still able to track the web activities of logged-out users. To achieve this, Google has to
match the ID value from the PREF cookie to the user’s profile, which is possible since
both the session-id carrying SID cookie and the ID carrying PREF cookie are together
visible to Google while the user is logged-in.
Summary
An interesting finding when digging into the cookies-based OTM is that all the studied
OSNs provide a mechanism (theoretically capable of) tracking users who have explicitly
logged-out from the service. Moreover, users that did not register into these OSN services
are still trackable, since OTM allows also to keep web browsing traces of users prior to
their registration to the system, assuming they visited the OSNs domains once. Twitter
exhibits a unique, yet surprising tracking behavior and is theoretically designed to track
users that do not have accounts, and never visited the twitter domain either.
6.3 OTM Coverage of Alexa top 10000 Sites
In this section, we analyze to which extent OTM is diffused across the web. We
consider the top 10K most popular websites in which we evaluate the OTM distribution.
We also compare OSNs tracking possibilities to Google tracking mechanism.
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We extracted the top 10200 most visited websites according to Alexa 1 from which
we removed 128 entries belonging to search engines. The remaining list was crawled and
all subsequent HTTP requests recorded. We further removed 138 web pages containing
Javascript and/or flash programming bugs. The final list of analyzed websites contains a
total of 9933 different urls (which we will refer hereafter as top10k websites), out of which
7173 representing 72% of the considered websites include at least one tracking element in
their main page.
We used a modified version of Ghostery [119] to tag tracking and ad companies.
Google 2 tracking system is embedded in nearly half of the websites (43.29%). This
presence is mainly due to Google Analytics and Google AdSense. Facebook with both
its “Like” button and “Facebook Connect” plugins is second with a surprising coverage
of 22.2%. Google+ and Twitter are represented by 10.4% and 7.25% of the webpages,
respectively.
6.3.1 Ranking Coverage
FIGURE 6.2: Ranking Coverage
As a first step to measure the diffusion of OTM, we draw the distribution of the number
of detected OTMs as function of the website rank in Figure 6.2. This distribution suggests a
uniform diffusion of OTMs through the top10k websites. As observed previously, Facebook
has the highest coverage. In particular, it covers nearly 500 websites out of the top 2000
websites whereas Twitter and Google+ cover only 145 and 168 respectively.
1www.alexa.com
2We used en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_acquisitions_by_Google to tag all services that belong to Google
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FIGURE 6.3: Proportions of tracking mechanisms per webpages continent-based origin.
Surprisingly, these OTMs are not concentrated in most visited websites. In particular,
among the top 1000 sites, only a few dozen of sites embed OTMs. Two reasons may
explain this observation. First, the sites geographical origin3 may have an impact on such
a distribution, since the studied OSNs are not as spread in Asia as in Europe and U.S (see
Figure 6.3). Second, the website content and categories may be not suitable to embed
such OTMs, since OTM main targets are more likely to be interactive online services such
as Blogs or News. From a geographic perspective, OTMs target all origins as shown in
Figure 6.3. In this Figure, the y-axis represents the percentage of websites belonging to
the continent (illustrated in the x-axis) that contain at least an OTM. For example, 50% of
North American websites in our dataset contain a Google tracking mechanism whereas this
coverage reaches only 22% of Asian websites. Not surprisingly, Asia is poorly targeted by
the studied OSNs, which can be explained by the poor popularity of these in Asia due to
the existence of local concurrent services (Cyworld in south Korea, or Sina Microblog in
China, etc.).
The general trend observed above is still valid, with Google tracking system being
the most represented through all the continents, and Facebook leading the OTM diffusion
independently of the continent.
6.3.2 Category Distribution
In this section, we study the distribution of OTMs according to the category of the
website. We used [177] to extract the websites categories (e.g., cnn.com is categorized
3We define the site origin as the origin of its main audience (i.e., The geographic location of the majority
of its users)
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as News). We retrieved 81 categories from the top 10K websites, and then computed the
distribution of OTMs as a function of these categories.
We observe that among the total set of categories, Facebook covers the majority with
68 categories (83%), the most prominent being General News (14%), Entertainment (11.6),
Internet services (5.8%) and Online shopping (5.5%). Similarly, Twitter covers 60 different
categories, where the most illustrated categories are Entertainment (12.5%), General News
(12.2%), Internet Services (7%) and Blogs (5.6%). Finally, Google+ is also covering
almost 80% of the categories (64), but interestingly it is well represented in different
categories such as Pornography (5.6%).
This shows that OTMs are widely spread and not restricted to a small number of
categories. This confirms that if collected, OTM-based information would depict an
accurate user profile. Hence, the collected data rise concerns about users privacy, since it
is collected without neither the user consent nor his knowledge.
6.3.3 SSL-based connections
Transmitting cookies to OSN servers may rise security concerns if the connection is
insecure (e.g., unencrypted WiFi connection). Hence, transmitting these cookies over
SSL is preferable. We observed that Google+ uses SSL in the vast majority of the cases,
and only a few requests (16%) are still sent in clear. Twitter and Facebook OTMs differ
significantly from Google+’s behavior with 96% and 96.5% of the traffic containing the
transmitted cookies sent in clear, respectively. This behavior may endanger the privacy
and security of users since an attacker my easily perform a session hijacking.
6.4 Analyzing Real Traffic Traces
So far, we have studied the diffusion of OTMs, and observed that they are embedded in
a wide range of websites and hence can be effectively used to track users outside the OSN
sphere. Now, we concentrate on quantifying how much information is actually collected in
practice.
6.4.1 Used Dataset
We captured all the HTTP headers (requests and responses) transiting through our
lab local network, for a period of a week starting from the 20th of October 2011. We
anonymized the observed traffic by hashing the source IP, and constructed two datasets.
• Dataset1 containing all the traffic with 687 different IP addresses. It contains more
than 27 million connections to nearly 55K different destinations.
• Dataset2 For the purpose of our experiments in Section 6.4.3, we reduced Dataset1
so that the number of overall destinations is reasonably low. In fact, since we are
classifying websites into categories, we were unable to categorize all the 55K destina-
tions and hence chose to randomly sample a subset of users from Dataset1. Reducing
the number of users allows us to keep the history characteristics (length, diversity)
whereas reducing the number of destinations to classify. This reduced dataset, called
Dataset2 contains 69 IP addresses that made over 16 million connections to 17539
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different destination servers. We further filtered out Ads servers and static content
providers, which reduced the set of destinations to 5712 different addresses.
6.4.2 Who’s connected?
In the following, we use Dataset1 to estimate the proportion of users logged-in to the
considered OSN services. We capture the transmitted cookies to estimate such statistics.
Although, as mentioned in section 6.2, cookies are not reliable to determine whether a user
has an account or not, establishing whether a user is connected to the service by observing
the session cookies still fit for purpose, since the later is transmitted by the browser only
when the user is logged-in.
We observed that 48% of the users in our dataset have a Facebook account and 33%
were logged-in at least once during our measurements. The number of users with a Twitter
account is significantly lower than the number of Facebook users, with only 195 users
(28% of the total number of unique IP addresses) observed to have an account an only a
small fraction (4%) being logged-in at least once.
We do not present results for Google+ since we did not observe a significant number of
cookies transmitted in clear, due to the usage of SSL by default in most of Google services.
The relatively small proportion of logged-in users we observed, may be explained by
the IT awareness of users we monitored in our dataset. Most users here are computer
scientists and thus aware of potential tracking threats, and may use different techniques
to mitigate such threat by using cookies blocking/cleaning plugins, enforcing HTTPS
connections or using private mode browsing.
6.4.3 OSN profiling
So far, we showed that theoretically, OTMs are an efficient way of tracking users. In
this section, we aim to study to which extent this mechanism can be used to “construct”
users’ profiles. From dataset2, we construct simple profiles based on either the web history
of the user or on the visited websites’ categories and then observe how much of these
profiles can be reconstructed by the OSN.
6.4.3.1 Methodology
Most profiling techniques rely on classifying websites into categories to overcome the
huge amount of information generated by user’s web browsing. Based on these categories,
a user Profile can be constructed [178].
For the sake of profile construction simplicity, we define a user profile Pu as the union of
all websites categories visited by a user u. From dataset2, we extract all destination hosts
and used [177] to categorize the visited websites, 98.44% of which have been successfully
classified. Note that in our experimentation a website may be classified into up to three
different categories.
Each website visited by a user u belongs to at least one category c j(1 ≤ j ≤C) (the
total number of observed categories is 81 in our dataset) . The set of all visited categories
represent the user Profile (Pu) whereas the set of visited websites (i.e., the user web
history) is denoted by Hu. Furthermore, HCu denotes the proportion of Hu retrieved by
either Facebook or Twitter using their respective OTMs. PCu represents the fraction of
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FIGURE 6.4: From left to right (a) History size VS History coverage(%); (b) History size
VS History coverage(#); (c) History size Vs Profile coverage; and, (d) Profile size Vs
Profile coverage.
Pu that Facebook (resp. Twitter) is collecting through the OTM. For instance, if a user
visits cnn.com, kernel.org and foxnews.com, cnn.com and foxnews.com
are classified as News and Kernel.org as Software. Since only cnn.com has a
Facebook OTM, PCu is 50% whereas HCu is 33.3%. Figure 6.5(a) shows the distribution
of users according to the number of categories in their profiles. We observe that 75% of
the profiles have between 10 and 40 different categories.
6.4.3.2 User Web History Analysis
Figure 6.5(b) shows the CDF of HCu. For example, more than 50% of users have at
least 15% of their web history contain an OTM from both Facebook and Twitter. It also
shows that at most 10% have more than 25% of their web history tracked by the two OSNs.
A surprising result is that the coverage of Twitter and Facebook are slightly different as
opposed to our results observed in Section 6.3.1 (Alexa case).
Second, we analyzed the relation that might exist between the size of web history |Hu|
and HCu. Figures 6.4(c) and 6.4(d) depict our finding. Most users have HCu between 10%
and 25% whereas we observe a large variation of HCu for small history size. Thus, a small
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FIGURE 6.5: Profile length distribution (left),CDF of history coverage (right)
history size does not necessarily entail a small coverage but rather depends on the category
of visited websites. Moreover, as |Hu| increases, so does HCu. Thereby, users with large
history sizes tend to be more “efficiently” tracked than others.
Finally, we analyzed the correlation between the history size |Hu| and the profile
coverage PCu. As shown by Figure 6.4(c), the larger |Hu| is, the higher PCu is. These two
last results were expected since large history size implies that some of websites contain
an OTM with high probability. A second observation is the large variation of PCu for
users having small history sizes. For instance, different users with |Hu| = 40, can have
as different PCu value as 0, 22%, 30% or 68%. As for the HCu case, a small history size
does not necessarily implies a small profile coverage. On the other hand, this variation
decreases with a larger history size. In fact, most users with |Hu| larger than 200 have a
PCu value higher than 40%.
6.4.3.3 User Profile analysis
Previously, we showed that users with larger web history tend to be more tracked
than others. Nonetheless, we also note that even users having small history size are still
tracked but with a larger variation. In this section, we examine the correlation that might
exist between the profile size |Pu| and the profile coverage PCu, which is depicted in
Figure 6.4(d). It indicates a similar trend to the relation observed for the history size. In
essence, users with a large |Pu| tend to be more easily trackable whereas other users with a
small |Pu| exhibit a larger variation of PCu. However, for the the vast majority of users,
Facebook and Twitter are able to reconstruct a very accurate category-based profile. In
fact, PCu varies from 0.4 to 0.77.
To dig more into the reasons that would explain our findings, we ask whether users
with a high PCu value browse similar web content (i.e., similar categories). To answer
this question, we compute a similarity matrix as follows: for all users, we extract the set
of all Pu such that PCu ≥ β , where β defines the level of reconstructed profile coverage.
Then, we compute the Jaccard index between all profiles in that set. Recall that the Jaccard
index is computed as J(i, j) = |Pi∩P j||Pi∪Pj| . For example, a Jaccard value J(i, j) of 0.5 means
that user i and user j share the half of their respective profiles Pi and Pi. Figure 6.6 shows
the CDF of the Jaccard index for different values of β (i.e., 0.5, 0.6 and 0). First, the red
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FIGURE 6.6: Pu similarity using Jaccard index (FB left, TW right)
curve depicts Jaccard values for all users: we observe that nearly 80% of the users have a
similarity value lower than 0.5 which suggests a weak correlation between user profiles.
However, blue (β = 0.5) and green (β = 0.6) curves show that there is a high correlation
between users who are highly tracked. For instance, all users who have PCu higher than
0.6 for Twitter have a Jaccard index above 0.5. This means that all these users share at
least 50% of their profiles. This clearly indicates that highly tracked users tend to have
similar profiles.
6.5 Discussion
Since OSNs do already maintain a tremendous amount of information about their users,
it may be argued that tracking mechanisms could barely affect users privacy. Nonetheless,
many websites when visited may leak sensitive and personal information about users. For
instance, when a user visits www.sparkpeople.com, he might not be aware that such
an information about his web browsing activity, which can be considered highly sensitive
as it may refer to users health, is being reported to Facebook. Among the websites in our
Alexa dataset, 34.4% of the websites classified as potentially providing Health information
do embed at least one OTM.
On the other hand, users’ navigation patterns can be used to divide customers with sim-
ilar preferences into several segments through web usage mining and then recommended
targeted ads as shown in [179].
Since OTM are cookie-based tracking mechanism, solutions such as cookies deletion
after each session or private mode browsing can be a first approach to mitigate the threat.
However these countermeasure suffer from at least two drawbacks. First, navigation
patterns belonging to one session are still tracked. Second, more aggressive tracking
techniques (e.g., through IP address and browser fingerprint [118]) can still be applied. A
more suitable solution consists in blocking the OSN “iframes” connections, and as such all
connections to the OSN servers. Tools like Ghostry [119] implement such a mechanism as
a browser Plugin.
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents insights about a new tracking mechanism that can be used by OSN
providers to collect web browsing information about their current users, and, as we have
demonstrated, about potential future users. We observed that these increasingly popular
mechanisms cover a broad range of content ranging from Blogs, Health to Government
websites. Specifically, we draw attention to the potential privacy threat that may rise from
this accumulation of private data that may be utilized for user profiling, without the user
consent. We showed that this data, if collected, can draw an accurate profile of the user
interests.
6.6. CONCLUSION
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7.1 Introduction
Previous chapter showed that tracking techniques used by OSN operators allow them
to silently and persistently trace the user navigation. However, the leakage of personal
information from the OSN itself to third parties remains an open question. This chapter
answers this questions by examining the interaction between third-party OSN applications,
OSN platform and external entities (fourth parties) and exposing the information leakage.
Third-party OSN applications are tremendously popular with some apps being actively
used by more than 100 million users in Facebook. Besides, with apps potentially having
access to users’ personal information, through access permissions, they introduce an
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alternative avenue for privacy leakage. With the users’ personal information being exposed
outside of the OSN sphere, the privacy risk becomes even higher.
We examine third-party OSN applications for two major OSNs: Facebook and RenRen.
These third-party applications typically gather, from the OSN, user personal information,
such as user ID, user name, gender, list of friends, email address, and so on. Third-party
applications also typically interact with “fourth parties,” such as ad networks, data brokers,
and analytics services. According to Facebook’s Terms of Service, third-party applications
are prohibited from sharing users’ personal information, collected from Facebook, with
such fourth parties. We develop a measurement platform to study the interaction between
OSN applications and fourth parties.
We use this platform to analyze the behavior of 997 Facebook applications and 377
applications in RenRen. We observe that 98% of the Facebook applications gather users’
basic information including full name, hometown and friend list, and that 75% of apps
collect the users’ email addresses. We also find that the Facebook and RenRen applications
interact with hundreds of different fourth-party tracking entities. More worrisome, 22% of
the Facebook applications and 69% of the RenRen applications provide users’ personal
information to one or more fourth-party tracking entities.
7.2 Background
This section introduces the general concepts behind third-party applications for both
Facebook and RenRen networks. For concreteness, we discuss these concepts in the
context of Facebook, and point out how RenRen differs at the end of this section.
As shown in Figure 7.1, while logged into the OSN, the user selects an app, which
brings the user to a web page that includes a “canvas” served by Facebook, the application
(in an iframe) served by the publisher’s server, and possibly some advertisements served by
ad networks. If it is the user’s first visit, Facebook displays a dialog frame which asks the
user for permissions to access information in the user’s profile (step 1). This dialog frame
indicates the particular set of permissions the application is requesting. The application
can, for example, request permission for “basic info” 1, which includes user name, profile
picture, gender, user ID (account number), and user networks. Applications also have
access to friend lists and any other information users choose to make public (e.g., interests
and notes). In order to access additional attributes, or to publish content to Facebook on
behalf of the user, the application needs additional permissions.
The user’s browser then contacts Facebook seeking an access token, which is used
to query Facebook servers to fetch the user’s information (steps 2 and 3). The token is
transmitted to the publisher’s server (step 4), which queries Facebook for user information
(steps 5 and 6). Once the server obtains the user information, it may load all or some of that
information in the HTML (for example, using JavaScript) provided to the user’s browser.
OSN applications typically further interact with “fourth parties” such as ad networks,
data brokers, and analytics services. Different techniques can be used to contact these
external entities, among which include using an iframe (e.g., loading an ad) and Javascript
(e.g., sending data to an analytics service). Observe that when these entities are contacted,
1https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user/
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FIGURE 7.1: An overview of the Facebook application architecture
the referrer field is automatically filled with the current page (i.e., application main page)
URI. Our focus in this chapter is on these external entities and whether the personal
information obtained by the user’s browser is transferred to the external entities.
From an architectural point of view, RenRen has the same conceptual features and
operation as Facebook with a few minor exceptions. In particular, RenRen has only three
permissions: (i) access personal information and friend relations, (ii) access timeline
information (e.g., posts, shared content) and (iii) allowing the app to post on behalf of the
user. The first permission is granted by default to all applications.
Privacy issues: Third party applications naturally give rise to several privacy issues.
First, the application code is hosted on the publisher’s own servers and are out of Face-
book’s control. This inherently prevents Facebook from monitoring and/or controlling the
application’s behavior, and impedes any proactive measures to block malicious activities.
Second, as user information is transferred out of Facebook servers, user information usage
and dissemination is out of the user’s control. Finally, privacy control for third-party
apps are very limited due to the coarse-grain granularity of permissions, and as such it is
debatable whether this is in accordance with the “principle of minimal privilege” which
states that only minimum privileges should be granted to fulfill the task.
7.3 Methodology
In December 2012, we investigated each of the 997 working applications listed on
the official Facebook App center.2 To be referenced by the Facebook App center, the
2https://www.facebook.com/appcenter/
7.3. METHODOLOGY
Chapter 7. Information Leakage From OSNs 124
application needs to be reviewed and sanctioned by the Facebook staff.3 As a result, most
of the applications considered in our study are very popular, as we discuss below. For each
of these applications, we first obtain the application name, ID, installation URL, popularity
(in terms of number of users), category (e.g., game, Health & Fitness, Finance, etc.),
publisher (which was not available for a few applications) and a summary description. We
then automate the process of application installation based on the Selenium WebDriver.4 In
particular, using several different Facebook accounts with distinctly different user profiles,
we install and accept the requested permissions for each of the 997 applications. To monitor
the application behavior, we use a modified version of a Firefox plug-in [4], allowing us to
record all the HTTP and HTTPS traffic. Similarly, we investigated each of the 377 working
applications listed on the RenRen App center.
7.3.1 Limitations of the methodology
In our experimental methodology, we aim to measure and characterize third-party ap-
plications in a semi-controlled environment. We note, however, that our tested applications
are all gathered from the official App center and as such do not represent the totality of
the OSN third-party application ecosystem, since there are many other applications that
do not belong to the App Center. For the privacy leakage analysis, our methodology only
examines traffic originating from the user browser; any information leakage that might
happen outside this channel (e.g., communication between the application servers and
external entities) are not identified. Therefore, the extent of privacy leakage quantified in
this work serves as a lower bound.
7.3.2 Basic characteristics of applications
Our main interest centers on the applications’ interactions with external fourth-party
servers and resulting privacy leakages. To this end, it is useful to first understand the basic
characteristics of the Facebook and RenRen applications under investigation. Specifically,
in this subsection, we examine the popularity of the applications, the applications’ publish-
ing companies, and the permissions the applications request.
Application popularity: Figure 7.2(a) shows the cumulative distribution for the popularity
of our tested Facebook and RenRen applications. We observe that both distributions exhibit
a similar shape with 60% of the Facebook and RenRen applications having more than
100 thousands users and 10 thousands users, respectively. Importantly, the most popular
applications have more than 100 million users in Facebook and more than 10 million in
RenRen. This shows the potential of third-party applications to collect large volumes of
user data.
Application companies: We were able to collect the publisher’s company name
for 845 applications. Table 7.1 shows the top seven publishers among the applications
considered. These top seven companies only cover 10% of the applications; furthermore,
there are 536 different publishers for the 997 tested applications. From a data retention
perspective, this suggests that user data is more likely to be scattered among multiple
entities, further reducing the user’s control over its data.
3https://developers.facebook.com/docs/appcenter/guidelines/
4http://seleniumhq.org/
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6waves 2.35%
Zynga 1.66%
Playdom 1.37%
Peak Games 1.17%
Kingnet 1.07%
Electronic Arts 1.07%
MindJolt 0.98%
TABLE 7.1: Most frequent app
companies for Facebook (997 apps)
User basic information 98%
Personal email address 74.5%
Publish Action 59.6%
Access user’s birthday 33.6%
Publish stream 20.5%
Access user’s likes 12.25%
Access user’s location 9.8%
TABLE 7.2: Most frequently re-
quested permissions for Facebook
(997 apps)
(a) (b)
FIGURE 7.2: (a) Application popularity, (b) Number of contacted servers for each
application
Permissions: Table 7.2 shows the most frequently requested permissions. As expected a
large fraction of applications request permission to obtain the basic information, which as
mentioned previously, encompasses not only the user name but also all information the
user makes public in the public profile. Requests for access to email information is also
very frequent (75%). Sensitive information such as user’ birthday and hometown seems to
be less requested with 33% and 10% respectively.
7.4 Interaction with external entities
Now we turn our attention to the interaction between the third-party application running
in the browser and external entities. Since most, if not all, of the functionalities are very
similar in Facebook and RenRen networks, we mainly discuss features of the Facebook
network. However, the figures show our results for both OSNs.
HTTP Connections For an application to function properly in Facebook, the user
browser has to contact three main domains: the Facebook login page at facebook.com
to exchange credentials, the Facebook content server at fbcdn.net to extract user data
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 7.3: (a) Tracker distribution for third-party apps (b) Distribution of tracker
categories
(e.g., the user’s photo) and the application’s main server. For each of our tested applications,
we capture the traffic exchanged between the browser and the external entities, and extract
the external domains with which the application communicates. Figure 7.2(b) shows
the CDF of the number of unique contacted domains per application for both Facebook
and RenRen OSNs. Surprisingly, more than 75% of the Facebook applications exchange
traffic with at least six different domains, and for almost 10% of the tested applications the
number of unique domains exceeds 20.
The RenRen network exhibits a slightly different behavior with 70% of the tested
applications contacting less than 6 servers. The maximum number of domains contacted
by RenRen applications is four times smaller than in Facebook. This suggests that the
tracking eco-system in RenRen is less complex and includes a smaller number of entities.
Tracker distribution Many of these external entities are “trackers,” including ad net-
works and analytics services, which are contacted when the user visits the application
webpage. To identify the tracker domains, we use lists provided by Ghostery, AdBlock and
the Microsoft Tracking Protection List (TPL) to compile a set of 10,292 tracking domains.
The total number of trackers identified within our set of Facebook and RenRen applications
is 410 and 126, respectively. Their distributions are shown in Figure 7.3(a). These results
show that for Facebook (respectively, RenRen), 39% (respectively, 37%) of the tracking
domains are employed by a single application. The tail of the CDF also shows that a few
trackers are employed by a large number of applications, with less than 5% of the trackers
in both Facebook and RenRen tracking more than 100 different applications. The top 3 of
the observed trackers is composed of Google Analytics (with 613 tracked applications),
smartadserver (416 applications) and Turn.com (344 apps).
Tracker Categories We now further classify the set of identified trackers into five
categories: ad networks (e.g., Google Adsense) referred to as Ad; analytical services (e.g.,
Google analytics) referred to as analytics; online service plug-ins (e.g., Twitter connect)
referred to as widgets; ad-network tracking services as special tracking features (e.g.,
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DoubleClick Floodlight), which are referred to as trackers. Finally, we also consider the
trackers not belonging to these classes but included in the Microsoft Tracking Protection
List (Scorecard Research) and refer to these as tpl.
Figure 7.3(b) shows the cumulative distribution of the trackers according to their
different categories (only for Facebook). As expected, we observe that more than 70% of
the applications use analytics services. Notably, Google analytics is employed by 60% of
the applications, far ahead of all other analytics services. Note that 84% of the applications
use a single analytics service, and only 2% of use more than 3 different analytics services.
More than 60% of the tested applications did not use a known “ad network”, which
puts in question the revenue model of these applications. There are numerous ways for
a Facebook application to generate revenue: inserting ads from a particular ad-network
(which is the case for 40% of our tested applications); by monetizing the “pay more, play
more” scheme which allows the users to buy virtual credits; by selling private advertising
space (e.g., through the Facebook exchange protocol FBX); or selling user data, although
this is officially not compliant with the application development agreement. We highlight
that the high proportion of applications not relying on ad-network revenue is surprising,
which merits further investigation.
The sharp slope of the ad CDF curve shows that a large fraction of the applications
that use ad-networks tend to include a variety of different networks; in particular, 10% of
the applications embed at least 5 different ad-networks. Other types of trackers are less
popular and most of them are employed by a single application.
GET /api/.../?s=USERID&g=male&lc=US&f=1...
Host: api.geo.kontagent.net
GET /__utm.gif?..&utmhn=iframe.
onlinesoccermnager.nl&utmul=en-us
&...& utmhid=110829611
&utmp=userName, ProfilePicture,email
,Network First/LastName, USERID
Host: www.google-analytics.com
Domain Leaking Total
kontagent.net 60 66
ajax.googleapis.com 38 480
google-analytics.com 36 624
6waves.com 18 30
socialpointgames.com 13 16
mindjolt.com 9 10
disney.com 8 9
adobe.com 6 183
FIGURE 7.4 & TABLE 7.2: Left: (top) Information leakage to Kontagent, (down) Infor-
mation leakage to Google Analytics – Right: Number of leaking Facebook apps vs. total
number apps contacting this domain
7.5 Personal Information Leakage
In this section we present a methodology to detect potential privacy leakage from
Facebook and RenRen apps to fourth parties. We then employ this methodology to
quantify the amount of privacy leakage.
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7.5.1 Methodology
Our methodology is as follows. First, we create multiple user accounts with distinctly
different profiles (i.e., attribute values). For each of these accounts, we then automatically
install and run the apps and record the network traffic. We then examine, for each app and
user pair, whether the HTTP requests are transferring user information to fourth parties.
For instance, to assess whether a user’s gender is leaked, we check all requests that transfer
the string “male” for a male user and “female” for a female user. While this approach
allows us to automatically search for personal data leakages, encrypted or encoded data are
not detected as we only use string matching. We further checked the API documentation of
known services (e.g., kontagent and Google analytics) to assess the meaning of parameters
observed in the traffic.5
7.5.2 Data leakage classification
The process of leaking information to external entities can be categorized into two
types: intentional and unintentional.
Intentional information leakage In this scenario, the app developer intentionally trans-
mits user information to external entities (usually analytic services) by embedding user
data into the HTTP request. The total number of Facebook apps that are leaking user info
intentionally is 183. In the following, we study two representative examples:
Kontagent This company presents its business as helping customers “derive insights from
app data in ways beyond traditional analytics.” Kontagent provides detailed statistics about
app usage. To achieve this, the app sends a set of user attributes to Kontagent; the API
specification6 provides a set of functions for transferring user data, among which are year
of birth, country of origin, or friend count. Note also that the API allows the transfer of
any other type of data as an associative array. Figure 4 shows how user ID, gender and
location are transferred to Kontagent.
Google Analytics As with Kontagent, some developers are using Google Analytics to
generate statistics about app usage. To do so, they embed user data inside the request to
Google Analytics. This data can then be used (in Google dashboard) to derive statistics.
Figure 4 shows how data is transferred.
Unintentional data leakage A website may unintentionally leak personal information
to a third party in a Request URI or referrer. Krishnamurthy et al. [16] examined this
problem for 120 popular websites and found that 48% leaked a user identifier. We consider
user information to be leaked unintentionally if it is transferred through the referrer. In fact,
the referrer is automatically filled by the browser; thus data leakage through it is generally
the result of poor data sanitisation. The total number of applications leaking info through
the referrer field is 79.
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scorecardresearch.com 170 377
sinaapp.com 61 64
google-analytics.com 38 51
doubleclick.net 36 51
baidu.com 23 69
linezing.com 12 13
friendoc.net 10 10
TABLE 7.3: Num-
ber of leaking Ren-
Ren apps vs. total
Number apps con-
tacting this domain
Info # App
user ID 181
Name 17
Gender 72
Country 2
City 2
Age 10
TABLE 7.4: Infor-
mation leaked by
Facebook apps
# leaked attribute # Apps
One or more 220
2 or more 48
3 or more 14
More than 3 0
TABLE 7.5: Num-
ber of attributes
leaked per applica-
tion
7.5.3 Statistics
Table 7.4 shows the number of applications that leak various user attributes. More than
18% of apps transmit user ID to an external entity. While this information seems harmless,
in fact querying Facebook Graph API7 with the User ID allows the external entity to gather
all public information about the user (i.e., username, full name, link to Facebook profile,
hometown, gender, and so on). Moreover, as the user ID is unique, it can be used to track a
user across different apps. Finally, there is substantial evidence that user ID (and username)
can be used to (re)identify a user [123]. We observe that 1% of apps are transmitting age to
an external entity; this attribute is considered highly sensitive and only few users disclose
it publicly [180]. Finally, the low value for country and city (only two apps are leaking
this info) can be explained by two facts: First, some apps are using IP-geo location to
identify the user location.8 Second, Facebook provides a more coarse grained attribute
that determines the user language (e.g., fr_FR). In a second step, we analyzed how many
attributes are leaked per application. Table 7.5 shows that 220 applications (22%) leak at
least one attribute, 48 leak at least 2 attributes and 14 more than 2.
The question remains: To whom is this data being transferred? Table 2 answers this
question. From a domain perspective, three main categories are sharing data gathering
in the top 10 domains: analytics services (e.g., Kontagent), social app companies (e.g.,
6waves) and entertainment companies (e.g., disney).
Table 2 shows that analytics services are way ahead of the others for data gathering.
However, there is a significant distinction between them. Kontagent’s main goal is to draw
statistics from social apps and as such is inherently dependent on the user data that the
app is leaking. This can clearly be seen by the large proportion of apps that are using
Kontagent and are leaking user information (60 apps out of 66). On the other hand, the
Google service is not expressly designed to derive statistics about social apps but is instead
adapted to this task. Not surprisingly, a relatively smaller percentage of applications using
5For instance, Kontagent is using a parameter g=m for transmitting the gender (male)
6https://github.com/whydna/Kontagent-API---ActionScript3-Wrapper
7http://goo.gl/KlOL8
8Facebook is using IP-Geo location in its ad platform to determine user location
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a Google service are leaking user information.
Social app companies are ranked second (6waves, socialpointgames and mindjolt).
This can be explained by the app publishing process. For instance, 6waves is the company
behind the Astro Garden app. However, this app is not hosted under the 6waves domain
but rather under redspell.ru. As such, 6waves is considered an external entity as it is
not the app main page. To centralize data gathering, this company sends back user data to
the main corporate server (e.g., 6waves.com) which explains the data leakage. Note that
using this process, companies like 6waves can track users across multiple applications.
Finally, entertainment companies such as Disney and Adobe are ranked third.
Disney is gathering data in a systematic way which is shown by the high number of
apps that are leaking data (8 out 9). As such, Disney is collecting data from different
(affiliated) apps and collecting the data in a centralized way. Adobe, on the other hand,
is receiving the user information unintentionally. This claim is confirmed by the small
number of apps that are leaking data (6 out of 183). In most cases, the information is
transmitted to Adobe in the referrer when loading the Flash player.
7.5.4 RenRen leakage
At a first glance, RenRen apps appear to be privacy preserving as no user data is
transferred to fourth parties. However, a deeper look shows that the situation is much
worse than for Facebook. Recall from Section 7.2 that the app receives an access token
from the OSN operator, and this token is then used to query the OSN for the user data. Our
measurements reveal that 69% of RenRen tested apps are transmitting this token to external
entities. This behavior represents a major privacy breach as external entities “inherit” the
app privileges and can therefore query RenRen on behalf of the user. Table 7.3 shows the
top external domains receiving the access token. In contrast with Facebook, the leaked
information is sent to both Chinese and US tracking companies.
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Several third party applications are leaking user information to “fourth” party entities
such as trackers and advertisers. This behavior affects both Facebook and RenRen with
varying severity. 22% of tested Facebook applications are transmitting at least one attribute
to an external entity with user ID being the most prominent (18%). While in 183 appli-
cations the user information is intentionally transmitted to fourth parties (e.g., through
an API call), some leakages are the result of a poor data sanitization and hence can be
considered unintentional. On the other hand, RenRensuffers from a major privacy breach
caused by the leakage of the access token in 69% of the tested apps. These tokens can be
used by trackers and advertisers to impersonate the app and query RenRen on behalf of the
user.
While user information is transmitted to several entities, some major players might
represent a bigger risk. For instance, Google is able to track 60% of Facebook applica-
tions and receives some user information from 8% of them. In RenRen, the situation
is even worse, as 45% of tested apps transmit the full user profile to a single tracker
(scorecardresearch.com). Hence, a single social networking app might lead to
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users being tracked across multiple websites with their real identity. Web tracking in
combination with personal information from social networks represents a serious privacy
violation that shifts the tracking from a virtual tracking (i.e., the user is virtual) to a real
“physical” tracking (i.e., based on user personal information).
7.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Chapter 8
Conclusion & Perspectives
In spite of the numerous benefits of Online Social Networks, they inflict terrible privacy
costs. This thesis aimed at quantifying these risks by analyzing several privacy breaches.
Our work is composed of two main parts that shed light on privacy issues from both sides:
user and OSN operators.
In the first part, we studied how the data supplied to the OSN can be exploited by a
malicious attacker to invade user privacy and even break its online security.
In our first work, we demonstrated that an attacker who has only access to public interests
can exploit this knowledge to infer – with high accuracy– other sensitive information about
the user [6]. Specifically, we presented a semantic-driven inference technique that exploits
music interests —which are often disclosed by users — to infer user attributes. To do so,
we proceeded in three steps: First, we augmented the user music interests with information
obtained from Wikipedia. Second, we extracted Interests Feature Vectors (IFV) using the
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) generative model and the augmented interests. Finally,
we computed the similarity between users according to the IFV. The inference step makes
the assumption that similar users are likely to share the same attributes. Hence, we predict
a user attribute by computing the most probable attribute of the n closest users to him in the
IFV space. Through extensive experiments and using both a public and a private dataset,
we showed that our approach predicts hidden attributes with a high accuracy.
These inferred attributes can be exploited in several other attacks such as spear phish-
ing [10, 146] and Sybil nodes creation [181]. Our second contribution [37] shows that this
personal data can also be used to speed up the process of password guessing.
Our work has two main contributions. From a security perspective, we proposed a novel
password cracker based on Markov models that outputs passwords in decreasing order of
probability. Through extensive experiments, we showed that it is able to crack more than
80% of passwords, more than all probabilistic password crackers we compared against.
From a privacy perspective, we formally investigated the impact of additional personal
information on the cracking success ratio. We provided an extension to our algorithm that
exploits such information and assess its performance. Our results show that the speed gain
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can go up to 30% for passwords that are actually based on personal attributes. Our findings
suggest that privacy breaches can have a disastrous security consequence as they might
allow an attacker to break into the user account.
These studies called for a better measure of privacy exposure. To answer this question,
we developed a practical, yet formally proved, method to estimate the uniqueness of each
profile by measuring the amount of information carried by public profile attributes [39]. To
this end, we elaborated a methodology to compute the Information Surprisal (IS) of each
public profile —independently from the used profile dataset— using the Ads audience
estimation platform of a major OSN (Facebook). Our measurements, based on an unbiased
sample of more than 400K Facebook public profiles, show that the combination of gender,
current city and age can identify close to 55% of users to within a group of 20 and uniquely
identify around 18% of them. We believe that our approach enhances privacy in at least two
scenarios: (i) it provides a quantitative privacy measure: by hiding or revealing attributes a
user can measure the amount of information he is disclosing (ii) data providers can quantify
the risk of re-identification (i.e., identifying a user in a dataset) when disclosing a set of
attributes.
In the second part of this thesis, we analyzed the privacy issues related to the OSN’s
ecosystem. We analyzed the privacy issues that arise from the interactions between the
OSN’s platform and several other third and fourth parties.
We started by presenting tracking techniques that are deployed by three major OSN
providers to trace user navigation pattern. First, we studied the mechanisms by which the
three most popular OSNs track visited sites and showed that even without an OSN account
a user is still vulnerable to tracking. Second, we evaluated the extent of user tracking
by the three major OSNs based on the Alexa’s top 10K sites and demonstrated that it is
widespread. Finally, based on real traffic traces, we demonstrated the real potential of
large scale user’s profiling and history reconstruction by showing that OSNs are able to
construct up to 77% of user’s web profile.
The second part dealt with information leakage from OSN to third and fourth parties.
By examining the application ecosystem of both Facebook and RenRen, we demonstrated
that these complex interactions lead to information leakages. Specifically, we showed that
several third party applications are leaking user information to “fourth” party entities such
as trackers and advertisers. This behavior affects both Facebook and RenRen with varying
severity. 22% of tested Facebook applications were transmitting at least one attribute to
an external entity with the user ID being the most prominent (18%). On the other hand,
we showed that RenRen suffers from a major privacy breach caused by the leakage of
the access token in 69% of the tested apps. These tokens can be used by trackers and
advertisers to impersonate the app and query RenRen on behalf of the user. This represents
a serious privacy risk as the tracking is shifted from the virtual world (i.e., tracking an
Internet user) to the physical one (i.e., the identity of the tracked user is known).
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We conclude this dissertation by highlighting some open problems and items for future
work:
Attributes Inference. First, we only tested our approach on profiles that provide music
interests. Even with this limitation, our results show the effectiveness of our technique in
inferring undisclosed attributes. In addition, we only based our method on user interests
and did not combine it with any other available attributes (e.g., gender or relationship) to
improve inference accuracy. One open question remains whether or not and to what extent
considering other interests (e.g., movies, books, etc.) and/or combining with different
available attributes can improve the inference accuracy.
Second, we demonstrated our approach using an English-version of Wikipedia. How-
ever, our approach is not restricted to English, since Wikipedia is also available in other
languages. Finally, we encountered a few examples that denote a non-interest (or“dislike”).
In particular, we observed interests that semantically express a dislike for a group, or
an ideology. For instance, an interest can be created with the title “I hate Hollande”.
Our semantics-driven classification will falsely identify the users having this interest as
“Holland” supporter. One might integrate Applied Linguistics Techniques to handle such
peculiar cases and filter out dislikes.
Exploiting Public Information to enhance password cracking One of the main limi-
tations of our approach is the data availability. In fact, we had only access to a very limited
amount of information which might have an impact on the results (e.g., we had only three
users publicly revealing their birthday). One vital extension is to collect more information
and assess further the results we obtained. In near future, we are planning to deploy a
social application that allows the user to measure his password strength by exploiting data
collected from his public profile.
Privacy Measure. Although the proposed methodology provides a general framework
to compute information surprisal when access to private attribute statistics is available (e.g.,
the Ads audience platform), our probability estimation depends on the OSN default privacy
settings. However, we note that one of the desirable properties of our approach is that it only
requires an unbiased sample of public profiles. Therefore, a massive privacy update (e.g.,
Facebook changing the default policy) would only require an up-to-date dataset to reflect
these changes. In this work we did not investigate in depth the impact of attribute values
on the uniqueness of attributes. We have observed the impact of some attribute values (e.g.,
US in current country) on the IS values computed for a single attribute. Such analysis can
and should be extended to other attributes and attribute combinations. The goal of such
extension would be to study the distinction between the impact of rare combinations of
attributes and the rarity of the attribute values. Hence, this work represents only a first
step towards the computation of an OSN “fingerprint” resulting from the combinations of
attributes regardless of their values.
Information Leakage to OSN. We have shown that OSN operators are collecting a
tremendous amount of data about their users. However, two questions remain unanswered:
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(i) Is this data being used? (ii) If yes how?. We plan to further study these questions by
collecting advertisements in OSNs and checking any discrepancies that might be the results
of user tracking.

Part III
Appendices
Password creation policies
One surprising fact highlighted by the data in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5) is that usernames
and passwords are very similar in a small, yet significant, fraction of the cases. Common
sense mandates that a password should not be too similar to the corresponding username,
because the username is almost always available to the attacker in a guessing attack.
This fact prompted us to study this specific aspect of password policies in more detail.
We conducted a brief test1 across 48 popular international sites (from the Alexa Top 500
list), to see how they handle similarities between the username and the password (See the
table below).
These sites have different demands for security, ranging from relatively low security
demands (Facebook, Twitter), to high security demands (Ebay, PayPal). We did not rely on
the stated password policies, but manually created an account on each site. We created a
random but plausible username that was not yet used with the service, and tried to register
an account. We initially tried to use the username as the password, and if that failed we
tried subsequent modifications until we succeeded. The results are worrisome, but not too
surprising. Out of 48 sites tested, 27 allowed identical usernames and passwords, including
major sites such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, and only 4 sites required more than
one character difference between the two. This could lead to highly effective guessing.
1This survey is neither representative nor complete, but the results are clear enough to show that the
problem exists on a large scale.
Account Username Password
Same
accepted?
Min. Diff.
(# Chars) Comments
Google berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Facebook berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Twitter berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Baidu berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Ebay berkusrnfe03 BerkUsrnfe14 no 2 Username cannot be same as
email; requires capitals.
Amazon berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Paypal berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Yahoo berkusrnfe02@yahoo.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Wikipedia berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Windows Live berkusrnfe02@hotmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
QQ.com berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
LinkedIn berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Taobao berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Sina.cn.com berkusrnfe02@yahoo.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
MSN berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
WordPress berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Yandex berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
163.com berkusrnfe02@163.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Mail.ru berkusrnfe02@Mail.ru berkusrnfe03 no 1
Weibo berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrenfe02 no 0
Tumblr berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Apple berkusrnfe02 BerkUsrnfe02 no 0 Password at least 1 capi-
tal, 1 number, no 3 consecu-
tive identical characters, not
same as account, at least 8
char.
IMDB berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Craigslist berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Sohu berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
FC2 berkusrnfe02 berksurnfe03 no 3 The password cannot contain
any five (5) consecutive char-
acters of your e-mail address.
Tudou berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Ask berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
iFeng berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Youku berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Tmall berkusrnfe02 berksurnfe03 no 3
Imgur berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Mediafire berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
CNN berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Adobe berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Conduit berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
odnoklassniki.ru/ berksrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
AOL berkusrnfe02 beruksrnef03 no 5
The Pirate Bay berkusrn berkusrn yes 0 Username length limit.
ESPN berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Alibaba berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Dailymotion berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Chinaz berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
AVG berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Ameblo berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
GoDaddy berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
StackOverflow berkusrnfe02 BerkUsrnfe03 no 1 Needs capitals or special
characters.
4shared berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
TABLE 8.1: Detailed results from a small survey on 48 large sites concerning their
password policies.
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